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A b s t r a c t 
Roman-Parthian Relations I n the time of Augustus 
w i t h reference t o Augustus* Foreign P o l i c y 
A th e s i s f o r the degree o f Master of A r t s 
by James Lander 
The Parthlansy h e i r s to the Seleucld empire, yet 
h a r d l y touched by Hellenism, had a tough, nomadic back-
ground which enabled them t o r e s i s t any Imposition o f 
the t r a d i t i o n a l c l i e n t - p a t r o n r e l a t i o n s h i p o f Roman 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Though s o c i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y de-
c e n t r a l i z e d , the Parthlans were y e t able to defeat 
Crassus, twice Invade S y r i a , and l a t e r t u r n back an 
Invasion by Antonlus. 
Augustus, n e i t h e r a p a c i f i c c o n s o l l d a t o r nor a 
world-conqueror, maintained a f l e x i b l e p o l i c y toward 
P a r t h l a . Conquest was not a prudent aim, yet the s t a -
b i l i t y of the eastern possessions .of the Roman empire 
r e q u i r e d t h a t Rome be I n a p o s i t i o n superior t o P a r t h l a . 
For a time Augustus c a r r i e d on a p o l i c y (begun, I n f a c t , 
by Antonlus) o f supporting a r i v a l t o the Parthian 
t h r o n e , but t h i s brought no long-term success. The 
r e t u r n o f Crassus' captured standards, which would sym-
b o l i z e P a r t h l a ' s submission, was e f f e c t e d I n 20 B.C., 
but o n l y a f t e r Augustus s e r i o u s l y threatened war and 
seized Armenia* M a i n t a i n i n g an e f f e c t i v e suzerainty I n 
Armenia, whose s t r a t e g i c and p r e s t i g e value was g r e a t . 
I I 
became the crux of Augustus* p o l i c y . 
This p o l i c y was adhered to by T i b e r i u s , alLov/ed 
to lapse by C a l i g u l a , and then was revived by Claudius. 
But I n Nero's r e i g n , amid a l t e r e d circumstances I n both 
East and West, a Par t h i a n nominee was allowed to s i t on 
the Armenian throne. Peace f o l l o w e d , but Vespasian 
f e l t the need"to f o r t i f y the f r o n t i e r , and. I n e f f e c t , 
made the preparations f o r Trajan's s o l u t i o n to the r e -
awakened feud: conquest and annexation. Despite h i s 
m i l i t a r y successes, Trajan could not s t a b i l i z e the s i t u -
a t i o n : Hadrian f e l t compelled t o withdraw. The violence 
continued on t h i s f r o n t i e r even long a f t e r the Parthlans 
had been replaced by the Persians In the t h i r d century. 
The v i r t u e of Augustus' p o l i c y was tha t I t attempted 
no absolute remedies, but Instead, through constant e f -
f o r t , I n t e r v e n t i o n and re-adjustment, Roman predominance 
was maintained west o f the Euphrates, the Parthlans were 
kept o f f balance, and Augustus avoided a strenuous east-
er n war which the young empire could I l l - a f f o r d . 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The Topic, the Approach and Questions, 
and the Problem of Augustus 
We study Roman h i s t o r y by s t a r t i n g w i t h the C i t y 
and expanding as the empire expanded. The centre of 
a l l m o t i v a t i o n and a c t i o n I s Rome) the r e s u l t s r a d i a t e 
t o regions whose own events are l i k e r i p p l e s spread out 
across the splashed p o o l . P a r t h l a was on the periphery 
of the Roman w o r l d and I s on the periphery of Roman h i s -
t o r y . 
P a r t h l a I t s e l f was an empire f o r over four centu-
r i e s , and f o r over three centuries was I n contact w i t h 
the Romans. One period o f t h i s contact I s r e l a t i v e l y 
weII-documented because I t coincides w i t h one of the 
gr e a t e s t epochs I n ancient h i s t o r y — t h e r e i g n of Augus-
t u s . 
I t was a t r a n s i t i o n a l p e riod f o r the ancient'world. 
Augustus' r u l e I s engrossing and Important f o r the t r a -
d i t i o n s f o l l owed or discarded and the precedents estab-
l i s h e d . His p o l i c y toward P a r t h l a borrows much of I t s 
f a s c i n a t i o n from the c o n t i n u i n g themes of the East con-
f r o n t i n g the West, the barbarian f a c i n g the c i v i l i z e d 
w o r l d , the need t o consolidate and f o r t i f y an e m p i r e — 
and the d e s i r e to expand. 
Therefore I would l i k e to examine Augustus' p o l i c y 
toward P a r t h l a w i t h the I n t e n t of understanding not only 
the d e t a i l s , but also the broader l i n e s . This w i l l not' 
be a simple study o f events, f o r two reasons. F i r s t , no 
p o l i c y — r e f l e c t i n g desires and Intended g o a l s — c a n be 
st u d i e d outside I t s h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . So my thesis 
w i l l begin w i t h a look at relevant events of Parthian 
and Roman h i s t o r y , and a discussion of Roman Imperialism 
up t o the time of Augustus. Secondly, I discovered e a r l y 
I n my research t h a t the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of a great power 
cannot be understood by studying only one of I t s f a c e t s , 
and the I n d i v i d u a l p a r t s have l i t t l e meaning away from 
the whole.^ But, I n t r y i n g to ch a r a c t e r i z e the o v e r a l l 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y of Augustus, one Immediately f i n d s a t r a -
d i t i o n a l view which I s undergoing needed overhaul, and 
a new^ ' h e r e t i c a l ' ^ theory which has not yet been f u l l y 
developed on an a b s o l u t e l y sound b a s i s . So, more pre-
l i m i n a r y work I s c a l l e d f o r . 
At the very beginning of h i s Decline and F a l l of 
the Roman Emplre. Edward Gibbon declared: 
' I t was reserved f o r Augustus to r e l i n q u i s h the Eun-
b l t l o u s design of subduing the whole e a r t h , and to 
Introduce a s p i r i t of moderation I n t o the pub 1,1c 
c o u n c i l s . I n c l i n e d t o peace by h i s temper and s i t -
u a t i o n . I t was easy f o r him t o discover t h a t Rome, 
I n her present exalted s i t u a t i o n , had much leiss to 
hope.than t o fea r from the chance of arms; and t h a t . 
I n the prosecution o f remote wars, the undertaking 
On t h i s , see the I n t e r e s t i n g c r i t i c i s m by Mark 
Hassa l l I n h i s review of CM. V/ells, The German P o l i c y 
of Augustus (Oxford, 1972): JES 64, 1974, p. 257. 
^As the author, P.A. Brunt, himself describes i t : 
P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore, Res Gestae D l v l August I 
(Oxfo r d , 1967), p. 69* 
became every day more d i f f i c u l t , the event more 
d o u b t f u l , and the possession more precarious and 
les s b e n e f i c i a l . ' ^ 
This passage I s followed I n the same paragraph by an 
example which Gibbon apparently f e l t would s u f f i c e t o 
I l l u s t r a t e the t r u t h of h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of Augus-
tus ' f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
'The experience o f Augustus added weight t o these 
s a l u t a r y r e f l e c t i o n s , and e f f e c t u a l l y convinced him 
t h a t , by the prudent v i g o u r o f h i s counsels, i t 
would be easy to secure every concession which the 
s a f e t y o r the d i g n i t y o f Rome might require from 
the most formidable b a r b a r i a n . Instead of exposing 
h i s person and h i s legions to the arrows of the 
Parthl a n s , he obtained by an honourable t r e a t y , the 
r e s t i t u t i o n o f the standards and prisoners which 
had been taken I n the defeat of Crassus.' 
Here Gibbon adds. I n one of h i s d e a d l i e r footnotes, t h a t 
among the pieces of Inf o r m a t i o n which 'Roman v a n i t y has 
l e f t upon the subject,' there I s Augustus' own a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t 'he compelled' (and Gibbon I t a l i c i z e s these two 
words) the Parthlans to rest o r e the standards of.Cras-
sus 
I have quoted Gibbon at such length because of the 
In f l u e n c e he has had on subsequent w r i t e r s . As I f these 
words were c h i s e l l e d I n stone, l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s have 
seemed almost u n i v e r s a l l y I n c l i n e d not only to agree, 
but t o obey. One very good reason f o r t h i s I s t h a t 
^Edward Gibbon, The Decline and F a l l of .the Roman 
Empire, ed. J.B. Bury~TLondon, 18697, . 1 , .PP« ,1-2. 
^ I b l d . , p. 2. 
^He I s quoting from Res Gestae 29. 
Gibbon's statements do not lack support from some of 
our f a v o u r i t e ancient a u t h o r i t i e s . Tacitus r e l a t e s 
hov^ Augustus, I n a document of I n s t r u c t i o n s to h i s suc-
cessors, urged th a t the empire not be extended beyond 
I t s present f r o n t i e r s . ^ Suetonius asserts t h a t Augusi-
tus p r e f e r r e d calm r e l a t i o n s abroad p e a c e f u l l y n e g o t i -
a t e d , d i s d a i n i n g a l l wars merely to Increase the empire 
7 
or f o r m i l i t a r y g l o r y . Dlo repor t s t h a t as e a r l y as 
27 B.C. Augustus advised the senate not to seek what 
was not t h e i r s , and t h a t he l a t e r praised T i b e r i u s f o r 
r e f u s i n g to subdue a d d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y when t o do so 
Q 
would have r i s k e d what Rome already possessed. 
Of course, these remarks are out of context," and, 
of the authors, none was a contemporary o f Augustus; 
even the e a r l i e s t , T a c i t u s , was w r i t i n g over h a l f a 
century a f t e r Augustus.!.-death, and I n an empire much 
changed. Among w r i t e r s contemporary t o Augustus, a d i f -
f e r e n t tone I s o f t e n found. V e l l e l u s Paterculus was 
awestruck a t the thought o f recording a l l the wars waged 
under Augustus' command, and the p a c i f i c a t i o n o f the 
wo r l d through h i s v i c t o r i e s ('pacatusque v l c t o r l l s t e r -
Q 
rarum o r b l s ' ) . V l t r u v l u s marks Actlum as the p o i n t 
when Caesar gained the empire of the whole w o r l d . 
^Tac. Ann. 1 , 1 1 . 
7 
Suet. Aug. 21-22. • 
®Dlo 53, 10; and 56, 4 1 . 
^ V e l l . Pater. 2, 89, 6. 
^ ^ I t r u v l u s , De a r c h l t e c t u r a 1 , 1; w r i t t e n presum-
a b l y before 27 B.C.: Octavlan I s not yet c a l l e d Augustus, 
but Caesar. 
Nlcolaus of Damascus declares t h a t Augustus r u l e d over 
the g reatest number of people w i t h i n the memory of men 
and e s t a b l i s h e d the f u r t h e s t boundaries f o r the Roman 
empire; and then Nlcolaus adds, r e v e a l l n g l y , t h a t Augus-
tus d i d a l l t h i s a t f i r s t w i t h arms but afterward even 
w i t h o u t arms.^^ That Augustus was ' i n c l i n e d t o peace 
by h i s temper,' as Gibbon would have I t , I s not support-
ed by the tone of the Res Gestae, nor by the coinage I s -
sued I n Augustus' name. The Augustan.poets speak of 
Peace, but by then I t may have become an o f f i c i a l c u l t . ^ ^ 
I n any case, the Roman n o t i o n of peace I s not opposed to 
the n o t i o n o f conquest, as we have j u s t seen from the 
statement of V e l l e l u s Paterculus.^^ 
Despite these d i s t u r b i n g f a c t o r s . Gibbon's view of 
Augustus has become the t r a d i t i o n , and has never lacked 
14 
defenders. But P.A.., Brunt has taken these f a c t o r s , 
added a c o n t r o v e r s i a l view of the propaganda aspects of 
Augustan poetry and also a s t i m u l a t i n g hypothesis about 
Augustus' knowledge of the world's geography, and has 
ended up w i t h the s t a r t l i n g theory t h a t Augustus was 
thoroughly I n t e n t on conquering the e n t i r e w o r l d . 
^^Nlc. Dam. 1. 
^^Sefan Welnstock, 'Pax and the "Ara Pads",' JRS 
50, 1960, p. 47. 
^^Note 9; Welnstock. p. 45; Ronald Syme, The Roman 
Revol u t i o n (Oxford, 1939), p. 304; C.H.V. Sutherland, 
Coinage I n Roman Im p e r i a l P o l i c y 31 B.C.-A.D. 68 (Lon-
don, 195T7, p. 29: pax and v i c t o r i a had 'become s t r l c t -
l y complementary terms.' 
^^The most recent and competent re-statement of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l view I s by Hans D. Meyer, Die Aussen-
p o l l t l k des Augustus und d i e augustelsche Dlchtung CCo-
logne, 1961). 
l i t e r a l l y , B r u n t thus destroys Gibbon's p i c t u r e and 
then replaces I t w i t h I t s exact opposite; n a t u r a l l y , 
the perspective on Augustus' p o l i c y w i t h P a r t h l a I s 
d r a s t i c a l l y a l t e r e d . Augustus sought settlement, not 
out o f a d e s i r e f o r peace, or even out of f e a r , but 
f o r expediency—a temporary measure u n t i l ' , more urgent 
conquests were completed f i r s t . 
Where the t r u t h l i e s between these two views I 
w i l l seek to determine through a c r i t i c a l examination 
o f Brunt's t h e o r i e s , which, being w e l l organized and 
argued^ provide a sound format f o r discussing Augustus' 
o v e r a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Only then can we approach the 
basic questions: how d i d Augustus perceive Rome's p o s i -
t i o n v l s - a - v l s the P a r t h i a n empire? What goals d i d he 
have? To what extent were long-term goals s a c r i f i c e d 
f o r short-term gains? ,How d i d Augustus' p o l i c y a l t e r 
throughout h i s reign? How f a r (and by what c r i t e r i a ) 
d i d he succeed? And how enduring was t h a t success? 
. r 
I t should be no s u r p r i s e I f Augustus' p o l i c y r e -
f l e c t s h i s p e r s o n a l i t y , which has remained as enigma. 
Few f a l l t o r e a l i z e some aptness In'Augustus' choice of 
17 
a personal s i g n e t , the sphinx. 
He has been awarded so many extreme and even con-
t r a d i c t o r y a t t r i b u t e s t h a t he seems hard l y human, or 
perhaps superhuman. Augustus was a most ambitious man; 
^^P.A. Brunt, a review of Meyer (note 14), JRS 53, 
1963, pp. 170-6. — ' 
^ ^ I b l d . . p. 175. 
.^''suet. Au£;. 50. 
y e t he could be so moderate t h a t he l e f t h i s opponents 
no place to stand. He commanded the l a r g e s t armies seen 
by' the ancient w o r l d and brought the greatest Increases 
to the empire; and yet he was r i g h t f u l l y c a l l e d the 
b r l n g e r of peace by nations ( i n c l u d i n g I t a l y I t s e l f ) 
which had p r e v i o u s l y known only Rome's v i o l e n t hand. 
He was the r e v o l u t i o n a r y , and the r e s t o r e r ; the c r e a t o r , 
but a l s o the product o f h i s times; a modern, and yet the 
t r a d i t i o n a l Roman. These c o n t r a s t s are explained by the 
f a c t t h a t Augustus was a pragmatic p o l i t i c i a n and ad-
m i n i s t r a t o r whose v i s i o n was r a r e l y b l u r r e d by s e l f i s h 
v a n i t y , who perceived the d i f f e r e n c e between Imago and 
r e s , who foresaw more mistakes than he made, and who 
could change course w i t h o u t changing d i r e c t i o n . 
Augustus as an I d e a l — t h e lover of peace or the 
w o r l d - c o n q u e r o r — I s d i f f i c u l t t o re c o n c i l e w i t h the e v l -
dnece. The answer t o the r i d d l e o f Augustus may resem-
b l e the answer t o the r i d d l e of the sphinx—he was a 
man. I f we make him a myth, any conclusions we reach 
about h i s p o l i c y w i l l f i t , whether or not they resemble 
the t r u t h . 
When general h i s t o r i e s of Rome r e f e r to Augustus' 
p o l i c y w i t h P a r t h l a , the event most o f t e n mentioned I s 
the r e t u r n o f the captured standards of Crassus I n 20 
B.C. Attached are Inferences t h a t Augustus scrupulously 
avoided war and employed Instead diplomacy, which was 
completely successful. The t r a d i t i o n a l view of Augus-
tus' p o l i c y I s supposedly j u s t i f i e d by the ' r e s t i t u t i o n ' 
o f 20 B.C. But on a c l o s e r look questions a r i s e . How 
Important was I t to,have the standards returned? Why 
8 
20 B.C. and not a decade e a r l i e r . Immediately a f t e r 
Actlum? What was Augustus' p o l i c y I n those years? How 
much o f a 'success' were the diplomatic e f f o r t s from 
which the ' r e s t i t u t i o n ' resulted? And what happened 
a f t e r 20 B.C.? 
When the evidence has been examined and these ques-
t i o n s answered, I bel i e v e the Impression given by the 
general h i s t o r i e s w i l l be shattered: the r e t u r n of the 
standards was on l y a small p a r t of Augustus' p o l i c y 
toward P a r t h l a , There was a long-term p o l i c y , though 
the methods o f I t s a p p l i c a t i o n v a r i e d , i t was a con-
tinuous e f f o r t , begun even before Actlum and l a s t i n g 
beyond Augustus' death.. There were no easy successes, 
and some determined attempts simply f a i l e d . The Par-
o 
t h l a n s surrendered nothing v o l u n t a r i l y : but Augustus 
was not t i m i d about the.use of pressure, even when I t 
r i s k e d war on various occasions. 
I t was a p o l i c y of opportunism, pursued by a gambler 
who entr u s t e d as l i t t l e as possible to f a t e , p r e f e r r i n g 
I n s t e a d to c a l c u l a t e the r i s k s f i n e l y , and succeeding. 
E r r o r s and setbacks would occur, but they could be m i n i -
mized through f o r e s i g h t and d i s s i m u l a t i o n . And the 
smallest success could be magnified Into greatness. 
This I s not the p o l i c y of a v i s i o n a r y . Gibbon's 
t r a d i t i o n a l and Brunt's h e r e t i c a l views of Augustus' 
p o l i c y , a r e I d e a l i z a t i o n s , which, I hope to prove, mis-
represent the tru e p o l i c y of Augustus as I t can be pieced 
together I n a c a r e f u l study of the evidence. 
Chapter One 
P a r t h l a 
'Greater I r a n * I s probably the most comprehensive 
name f o r the land mass between Mesopotamia and I n d i a 
and betv/een the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf: Par-
t h l a and Pe r s i a , or P e r s l s , can r e f e r as e a s i l y to a 
p a r t i c u l a r satrapy as to the general empire. The cen-
t r e o f t h i s area I s the I r a n i a n p l a t e a u , made up l a r g e -
l y o f two vast s a l t d e s e r t s . There are mountains on 
the perimeter: the Zagros to the west, the Elburz to 
the n o r t h , the mountains o f the Caucasus I n the f a r 
northwest, and the Hindu Kush I n the east. The r a i n -
f a l l on the plateau I s not g r e a t ; the f e r t i l e s o i l I s 
a l l to the west o f I t , along the great r i v e r s , the T i -
g r i s and Euphrates. The s e t t l e d a g r i c u l t u r a l c i v i l i s a -
t i o n s began here I n Mesopotamia, and, from the e a r l i e s t 
times, they were threatened by various nomadic peoples 
who were a t t r a c t e d by the surplus o f food. Such peo-
ples had var i o u s p o i n t s o f o r i g i n and d i f f e r e n t d e s t i -
n a t i o n s : I n search o f , o r f l e e i n g t o , a b e t t e r land. 
Those m i g r a t i n g from east o f the Caspian Sea were forced 
on reaching the s a l t deserts to t u r n e i t h e r west I n t o 
I r a n o r south and east I n t o I n d i a . The route through 
I r a n , defined by the d e s e r t , the Elburz and the Zagros, 
l e d n a t u r a l l y northwest to f e r t i l e Atropatene and to 
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Armenia. This track Is part of what was l a t e r known 
as the S i l k trade route*^ 
As early as the s i x t h century B.C., much of 
Greater Iran was under a u n i f i e d c o n t r o l , that of Cy-
rus the Great. I n the northeast was a region called 
Parthava. I t s Iranian Inhabitants are referred to In 
early Greek sources as Parthlans, but they are not the 
same people as those we are studying.^ Our Parthlans 
do not make t h e i r appearance u n t i l a f t e r the death of 
Alexander. 
The Seleucld empire was generally more occupied 
w i t h the west and neglected the east. I n the middle 
of the t h i r d century B.C. the eastern satraps of the 
king were able, through the weakness of Seleucld power, 
to assert t h e i r own Independent r u l e . I n 245 B.C. the 
satrap of Parthla, Andragoras, revolted while c i v i l 
wars were raging I n the west. About 239 B.C. the sa-
trap of Bactrla, Dlodotus, followed Andragoras' exam-
ple . When the reigning monarch, Seleucus I I , was de-
feated by C e l t i c Invaders I n Asia Minor about 238 B.C., 
the way was open fo r the ejection of Andragoras and the 
occupation of Parthla by a semi-nomadic t r i b e 9 the 
Parnl.^ 
M^. Colledge. The Parthlans ^London, 1968), pp. lS-6. 
^N. Debevolse, The P o l i t i c a l History of Parthla 
(Chicago, 1938), p. TT 3 
Justin 41, 4-S; R. Ghlrshman, Iran from the Ancient 
Times to the Islamic Conquest (Harmondsworth, 19S4i, p. 
243J R. Frye, The Heritage of Persia (London, 1962), pp. 
172-3; and Debevolse, pp. 7 - t l . 
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The Parnl, said to be one of three tribes In the 
Dahae confederation, had apparently migrated Into the 
satrapies of Parthla and Bactrla a f t e r the death of 
Alexander, following disturbances I n th e i r homeland 
region east of the Caspian.^ 
They were led by Arsaces, who, a f t e r successfully 
establishing his t r i b e In Parthla, then attacked and 
annexed Hyrcanla, Parthla*s neighbour to the northwest* 
Arsaces died In subsequent f i g h t i n g , however, and his 
brother Tlrldates took controls and the name *Arsaces' 
(which thus became a t i t l e comparable to 'Caesar*). 
The nascent Parthian state was spared the Immediate a t -
tention of Seleucus I I , s t i l l occupied with the west, 
and an alliance was arranged with the Greco-Bactrlans* 
So Tlrldates had time to prepare his kingdom and his 
army before Seleucus attacked I n 228 B.C.^  Henceforth 
the Parnl are referred to as Parthlans. 
Whether by necessity or strategy, Tlrldates r e -
treated to hi s native steppe I n the face of iSeleucus' 
attack. But Seleucus soon had to return west to deal 
w i t h r e b e l l i o n there. Tlrldates could claim a v i c t o r y 
of s o r t s , and he set about Increasing his army, building 
f o r t s , strengthening and establishing cities® ( f o r the 
St r a b o 11, 9, 2; and Justin 41, 1, 
5 
Colledge, p. 25. 
^ I b l d . . pp. 25-7; and Justin 41, 4, 8. 
7 
Colledge, p. 27 and Debevolse, pp. 12-3 re f e r to 
I t as a forced r e t r e a t ; Ghlrshman, p. 244, c a l l s I t 
• t a c t i c a l . * / . 
®Justin 41, 5, 1-4, 
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Parthlans were nomads no longer), u n t i l his death In 
Q 
211 B.C. ended a reign of thirty-seven years. 
Antlochus I I I perhaps saw Tlrldates* death as the 
perfect opportunity f o r h i s own eastward sweep. The 
new Parthian king, Artabanus I , retreated while his 
horsemen were sent out to destroy the water holes and 
canals on which Antlochus' army would depend. But 
Seleucld cavalry pushed ahead and drove o f f the Parthian 
horsemen. Antlochus defeated the Parthlans In a pitched 
b a t t l e and forced Artabanus Into some condition of vas-
salage.^^ 
Artabanus died I n 191 B.C. and was succeeded by 
Prlapatlus, whose fifteen-year reign was made easier by 
the defeat Antlochus suffered at the hands of the Romans 
In 189 B.C. The Seleucld empire was dis i n t e g r a t i n g ; 
Media Atropatene, Elymals, Persls, Characene,^^ and the 
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two kingdoms of Armenia* a l l broke away. Prlapatlus* 
successor and eldest son, Phraates I , made war on the 
Mardlans, people of the Elburz mountains, and he thus 
brought the Caspian Gates under Parthian control.^"' 
About 171 B.C. Phraates died, leaving the throne hot 
to one of his e l i g i b l e sons, but to his much-valued 
14 • 
brother, Mlthradates. 
Q 
Debevolse, p. 16. 
^^Justm 41, 5, 7. 
^^Ghlrshman, p. 245. 
^^Colledge, p« 28. 
^^ md. 
^'^Justln 41, 5, 9-10, 
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Between 160 and 140 B.C. the conquests of Mlthra-
dates I extended Parthian control from India to the T i -
g r i s . Then, b r i e f l y , while Mlthradates was I n the east 
f i g h t i n g o f f a Bactrlan Invasion, the Seleucld king, 
Demetrius Nlcator, struck back and won several v i c t o -
r i e s * Contingents from Bactrla, Elymals, and Persls 
Joined the Seleucld force. But eventually Demetrius 
was defeated and captured, and those p r i n c i p a l i t i e s 
which had aided him were punished.*^ 
When Mlthradates I died, about 138 B.C., he l e f t 
to h is son and successor, Phraates I I , a Parthla no 
longer obscure, but now an empire. However, by 130 B.C., 
Parthla was again struggling against Seleucld forces, 
now led by Antlochus V I I Sldetes* Once more supported 
by Local monarchs who had Only recently become Parthian 
t r i b u t a r i e s , Antlochus won three v i c t o r i e s which gained 
him even more support. However, b i l l e t i n g his troops 
f o r the winter I n native towns around Ecbatana cost him 
I n good-will, and Phraates was able to I n c i t e the popu-
l a t i o n against the scattered garrisons of the Seleucld 
army* Antlochus himself was k i l l e d I n an engagement 
w i t h the Parthlans: thus ending the' las t c o n f l i c t be-
tween Parthlans and Seleuclds.^^ As a r u l i n g power, 
Hellenism no longer reached o f f i c i a l l y beyond the T i g r i s * 
To look f o r a moment at what the Parthlans had done. 
I t must be understood that they were t r u l y a l i e n to the 
*^Justin 36, 1, 2-6* 
* ^ I b l d * , 38, 10, 6f* 
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old Persian, sett l e d Iran which, since Alexander, had 
been controlled and s u p e r f i c i a l l y touched by Hellenis-
t i c power. The various kingdoms of Iran had only Just 
become Independent of the decaying Seleucld empire• 
when the Parthlans charged I n ; they were not viewed as 
l i b e r a t o r s . Whenever the opportunity arose, these 
kingdoms would turn against the Parthlans, whether I n 
aid of t h e i r old Seleucld masters, or In alliance w i t h . 
Rome. The c u l t u r a l g u l f was too wide. For loyal help, 
the Parthlans always had to return to the steppes east 
of the Casplan.^^ 
The nomadic background of the Parnl constantly re-
vealed I t s e l f I n Parthian I n s t i t u t i o n s . Monarchical 
succession was Influenced by the t r a d i t i o n s of the no-
madic clan and t r i b a l organisation. The head family 
were the Arsacldae> the-descendants of the f i r s t Arsaces. 
Any male of t h i s family, from any branch of I t , provided 
he was physically unblemished, was a possible candidate 
f o r the monarchy; brother-succession was very common. 
This system l e f t a great deal of room for dispute as to 
which of the q u a l i f i e d Individuals would actually be 
made klng.^® This weakness of the central monarchy was 
matched by another: the lack of a royal m i l i t a r y force* 
The kings were dependent on the heads of the great clans 
for the provision of an army; t h i s w i l l be discussed 
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Ghlrshman, pp. 246 and 262-3* The most notable 
examples of Parthlans fi n d i n g succour among the steppes-
people are Phraates IV about 31 B.C. (see p. 74) and Arta-
banus I I I about A.D. 36 (see p*i73)» The Hyrcanlans were 
much Involved I n the c i v i l war of A.D. 35-42 (see>pp.176-7)* 
^®Colledge, p* 60* 
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19 l a t e r I n more d e t a i l * These two factors, the ambi-
guous succession and the decentralized army, created 
weakness at the best of times, and, at the worst, 
c i v i l war. 
* Feudal' systems'!—decentralized s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l 
and m i l i t a r y administrative systems—were not new to 
I r a n . The Achaemenlds before and the Sassanlans l a t e r 
had such systems* But they were sedentary, based on 
a g r i c u l t u r e , and the Seleuclds had Introduced a large 
element of urbanization. The c o n f l i c t , or fusion, of 
nomadic Parthian ^traditions w i t h sedentary Iranian and 
urbanized Seleucld I n s t i t u t i o n s Is v i t a l I n Parthian 
hl8tory.^° 
The Parthlans Inherited the Seleucld conglomeration 
of Iranian vassal-kingdoms and p r i n c i p a l i t i e s , the ad-
m i n i s t r a t i v e dlvlslons-of satrapies, eparchies and hyp-
archies, and the Greek c i t i e s . The Seleuclds had f i n a l l y -
f a i l e d I n t h e i r attempt to enforce obedience from t h e i r 
Iranian vassals^ and the Parthlans made l i t t l e improve-
ment on Seleucld methods. The connexion was loose: the 
Parthlans were content to receive acknowledgement of 
t h e i r suzerainty and to exact t r i b u t e ; the vassals took 
every opportunity to r e v o l t . The old Achaemenld satrapies, 
taken over and sub-dlvlded by the Seleuclds, had evolved 
I n t o Inherited estates l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t from vassal klng-
domsi The Parthlans treated them as such*^^ Many 
^^See p.lSf. 
^^Colledge, p. 64; and Frye, p. 182* 
-^Ghlrshman, p* 263. 
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satrapies were administered by heads of the great 
Parthian f a m i l i e s , and a few of the larger vassal 
kingdoms were at various times ru.led by members of 
22 
the Arsacld family* 
The Parthlans favoured the Greek c i t i e s with 
autonomy* When Mlthradates I reached Seleucla on the 
T i g r i s (about 141 B.C.), he did not garrison the town, 
and to show his good-will he struck coins bearing, w i t h 
h i s own hellenlzed Image, the t i t l e 'Phllhellene.'^'^ 
Mlthradates' great conquests na t u r a l l y bolstered 
the prestige and Influence of the monarch* Vestiges 
of Seleucld governmental structure may have helped the 
monarch to obtain a more dominating position I n the 
Parthian hierarchy* But t h i s was Inconsistent with 
nomadic t r a d i t i o n s , and since the ever-present strength 
of the n o b i l i t y and t h e ' v o l a t i l e nature of the royal 
succession were against t h i s , the trend continued to be 
24 
toward decentralisation* 
A f t e r Phraates I I had ended the Parthian struggle 
w i t h the Seleuclds (about 130 B.C.), Syria was l e f t un-
protected. Phraates did not attack I t , perhaps because 
Parthla was herself under attack I n the east. The Sacae 
Invaders were near r e l a t i o n s , yet the Parthlans fought 
them as they would f i g h t them f o r centuries to come, thus 
^^Ghlrshman, p* 263; and Colledge, p* 60* 
^^Frye, p* 183; Colledge, p* 56; Ghlrshman, p* 246; 
and W* Wroth, Catalogue of the Coins of Parthla (London, 
1903), pp* xxvl and 12. 
182; and Colledge, pp* 59-60 and 75-6* 
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25 protecting V/estern Asia. I t was a huge struggle. 
The Greco-Bactrlan kingdom disappeared about 120-100 
B.C. The Parthlans suffered heavily, losing Phraates I I 
In a massacre I n 128 B.C. and four years l a t e r his suc-
cessor and uncle, Artabanus 11.^^ Meanwhile much of 
Babylonia was l o s t to the Persian Gulf kingdom of Char-
27 
acene, or Mesene* So Parthla was I n a greatly weak-
ened state when Mlthradates I I , son of Artabanus I I , 
ascended the throne I n 123 B.C. 
Known as the second founder of Parthla, Mlthradates 
defeated f i r s t the Characenean king, Hyspaoslnes, and 
28 
regained possession of Babylonia* Next he won back a 
29 
number of provinces I n the east, and by 113 B.C. had 
s h i f t e d to the west to overrun Mesopotamia and enter 
Dura-Europus.^^ 
To achieve these.victories, Mlthradates I I appar-
e n t l y re-organlzed the Parthian m i l i t a r y . The o r i g i n a l 
Parnl nomads depended on numerous horse-archers supporting 
mall-clad knights who fought at close quarters. However, 
the, f i r s t Mlthradates owed much of his success against 
the Seleuclds to 'the fact that he adopted many Seleucld 
t a c t i c s , and employed mercenaries so that he would have 
an adequate number of l i g h t - and heavy-armed cavalry* 
^^Ghirshman, p. 149* 
Justin 42, 1-2, 
^^Debevolse, p. 38-9; and Colledge, p. 32* 
^^Debevolse , p. 40 c i t e s coin evidence. 
Justin 42, 2, 4-5. ' 
"^^Cblledge, p* 32. 
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But I n the f i g h t i n g w i t h the Sacae, these tactics fared 
poorly, and the mercenaries caused trouble for Phraates I I * 
A revolution I n Parthian arms along t r a d i t i o n a l Iranian 
li n e s now took place, probably I n the time of Mlthradates 
I I . I n f a n t r y was maintained for f i g h t i n g In d i f f i c u l t 
t e r r i t o r y and to.act as garrisons, but the main arm of 
the Parthian m i l i t a r y was now cavalry. The heavy caval-
rymen, the cataphractl, were armoured In mall from head 
to foot except at the Inside of the legs, f o r , having 
no s t i r r u p s , they could stay mounted only by gripping 
w i t h t h e i r knees. The l i g h t e r cavalry, the horse-
archers, could hit-and-run, with the 'Parthian shot* 
f i r e d over the back of the horse—and thus avoid enemy 
charges* They used the composite bow, made up of layers 
of horn and wood, the standard weapon of the East, which 
underwent no changes between 700 B^ G^. and A.D. 700. No 
bow had a greater range, and at short distances the pene-
t r a t i n g power was great* The horse-archers were deadly 
u n t i l they ran out of arrows.^* 
However formidable such an army sounds, the fact 
was t h a t , especially a f t e r the wars of expansion ended 
about 100 B.C., there was no standing Parthian army, 
except for the king's personal b o d y g u a r d . T h e real 
^Colledge, pp. 65-6J Amra. Marc* 22, 8, 37; W. 
MacLeod, 'The Range of the Ancient Bow,' Phoenix 19, 
1965, pp* 1-14; P. Medlnger, 'L'Arc turqubls et les 
Arches parthes a l a B a t a l l l e de Carrhes,' Rev. Arch., 
1933, pp. 227-34; M* Rostovtzeff, 'The Parthian Shot,* 
AJA 47, 1943, pp* 174-87* 
^^For the size of the Parthian king's bodyguard, 
we have no d i r e c t Information or good comparison: the 
Achaemenlds' 10,000 man e l i t e — t h e 'Immortals'— were 
a genuine standing army.(Herodotus 7, ^ ) * 
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forces were In e x t r i c a b l y bound to the feudal system of 
the Parthian empire. When war was declared, the king 
had to c a l l on his vassals and the heads of the major 
clans, who I n turn c a l l e d on t h e i r vassals, the great 
land-owners, and t h e i r dependents. The upper echelons 
of society (who could a f f o r d horse and armour) were re-
presented by the heavy-armed cavalry, the lower eche-
lons iBUPplled horse-archers and Inf a n t r y . Essentially 
there was not one army, but several: by I t s e l f , the 
army of the Suren family defeated Crassus. I t was d i f -
f i c u l t f o r the king or his commander to keep such a 
force together. With the coming of winter, or a long 
siege, the Parthian army would generally disintegrate. 
Social r i v a l r i e s caused unwarranted changes In tactics*''^ 
The u n i f i c a t i o n of Greater Iran under Mlthradates I I 
was a catalyst to the .overland trade. The Parthlans were 
not producers, but middlemen I n the lucrative luxury 
trade between the Mediterranean world and Asia. The 
trade and trade routes were ancient, but commerce bene-
f i t t e d from the fact that the Parthlans now uniformly 
con t r o l l e d such a large section of i t . Firm t i e s were 
34 
established w i t h the Chinese. The duties, taxes and 
t a r i f f s f i l l e d the Parthian coffers and helped pay for 
Mlthradates' v i c t o r i e s . 
For his achievements, Mlthradates earned the t i t l e 
^^Colledge, pp* 65-6; and Tarn, C^, IX, pp* 606-11* 
"^^ See F. H l r t h . China and the Roman Orient (Leipzig. 
1885), pp. 27ff* 
"^^Colledge, pp. 77-9; and Debevolse, pp. 42-3. 
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'the Great.' But he also I n i t i a t e d the use of the Achae-
menld t i t l e 'King of Kings*' This was part of a concerted 
e f f o r t to connect the Arsacld dynasty w i t h the Achaemen-
lds *^^ P a r t l y t h i s was meant to legitimize the rule of 
the Parthlans over the whole of Iran and much of Mesopo-
tamia. But also the t i t l e 'King of Kings' described the 
compromised status to which even the greatest conqueror 
had to be resigned: he could not hope to be the sole 
governing king, but must be content to be the f i r s t 
among many. With power so decentralized, the r i s k of 
r e b e l l i o n was great. During the reign of Mlthradates I I 
there was I n Babylonia an Important satrap named Gotarzes, 
known. I n f a c t , as 'Satrap of Satraps,' who rebelllously 
established himself as an Independent r u l e r . He re-
mained unc rushed even u n t i l Mlthradates died I n 87 B.C., 
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When Gotarzes assumed .the t i t l e 'Arsaces,' Such was 
Parthla's I n s t a b i l i t y at the height of her power* 
So, I t Is evident that much of Parthla's character 
and her position In Western Asia were determined by her 
nomadic o r i g i n s * A governmental organisation which 
functioned I n the steppes proved I n t e r n a l l y unstable 
and weak when applied to a large land mass and I t s s e t - j 
t i e d , heterogeneous population. Moreover, the Parthlans 
were aliens I n t h e i r own empire, and could never f u l l y 
depend on t h e i r vassals' l o y a l t y * 
Perhaps, I f circumstances had permitted, the 
Parthlans would have se t t l e d down and been assimilated* 
^^Colledge, p. 33. 
^'^Debevolse, pp. 48-52. 
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They were not t o t a l l y u n c i v i l i z e d . They b u i l t towns and 
38 
a succession of c a p i t a l s . Their architecture, l i k e 
t h e i r p i c t o r i a l a r t , was Innovative, further developing 
Iranian motifs and not simply begging from the Greeks* 
The Parthlans l a i d the groundwork f o r styles which 
39 
would f l o u r i s h under the Sassanlans. The Parthlans 
were benevolent toward the Greeks and t h e i r culture, 
and most Parthian kings could speak Greek. But mainly 
the Parthlans remained on the outside looking I n : there 
was no urgency I n t h e i r a t t i t u d e f o r or against Hellen-
ism. Iran benefited^, o r i e n t a l t r a d i t i o n s were kept 
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a l i v e and the Sassanian 'revival* was made possible. 
However, I f the Parthlans quickly changed t h e i r 
ways, assimilated and settl e d down completely, they 
risked being swept away by some hardier breed from 
the wastes of Asia. The pressure from the east was a 
constant factor In Parthian l i f e ; I t s t i f l e d the c i v i -
l i s i n g and softening effects of the west. Parthian 
manners remained rough, and no Parthian raised I n the 
West and then returning to his countrymen was l i k e l y 
41 ' 
to survive the t r a n s i t i o n , or be allowed t o . 
The subject of Parthian expansionism must be viewed 
amid h i s t o r i c and changing circumstances. The power 
vacuum created by the Seleucld decay l e f t the various ''^Colledge, p* 67* 
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I b i d . , pp. 115-62; and M. Rostovtzeff, 'Dura and 
the Problem of Parthian A r t , ' Yale Classical Studies 5» 
1935, pp* 294-6* 
40 
Ghlrshman, pp* 267-8*' 
^4ee pp* 161, 171-3, and 176* 
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Independent kingdoms and p r i n c i p a l i t i e s of Iran a l t o -
gether vulnerable to whatever dominant power should 
come along. I f I t had not been Parthla, I t might 
have been Persls, I n a r e v i v a l , or Bactrla, or some 
horde from the east, which, though modified. Is what 
the Parnl were. Once Parthla had opted not to be domi-
nated, there was no hope of co-existence w i t h the Sel-
euclds. Ultimate v i c t o r y or defeat would determine 
s u r v i v a l . A f t e r so much struggling, and a f t e r a l l of 
Iran had been brought under Parthian r u l e , would the 
Parthlans stop, or would expansion continue? 
Mlthradates I I desired to connect the Arsaclds with 
the Achaemenlds. Perhaps he also desired to make his 
empire as vast as that of Darius* On the other hand, 
having dealt w i t h eastern Invaders and dis l o y a l vassals, 
Mlthradates may have decided that Parthla had enough to 
handle already* One might read Into the re-organlsatlon 
of Parthian arms and t a c t i c s an emphasis not on offence, 
but on the defence of Parthla, especially against the 
east, where no expansion would have been contemplated. 
t 
Expansion Into Syria would have brought l i t t l e a g r i c u l -
t u r a l b e n e f i t , and by the time Syria's commercial value 
I n the t r a n s i t trade was f u l l y appreciated, Syria was no 
longer to be easil y taken. 
Parthla was not lacking I n external contacts. Early 
I n the f i r s t century B.C., commercial and diplomatic t i e s 
were being formed with China. S i l k , I r o n , apricots and 
peaches were being Imported from China, while Syrian 
t e x t i l e s , Arabian camels, Babylonian ostriches and Nesaean 
chargers—'heavenly horses,' as the Chinese called them— 
23 
were sent eastwards across Parthla. Coins of Mlthra-
42 
dates I I found t h e i r way to Turkestan. And I t was 
during t h i s king's reign that Parthla made her f i r s t 
formal contact w i t h Rome (92 B.C.). 
^^See the notes by Tarn on page 598 of CAH. IX; and 
H l r t h , passim* 
Chapter Two 
Roman Imperialism 
and 
Contacts w i t h Parthla: 92-44 B.C. 
I n 92 B.C. the Roman general, Sulla, received a 
Parthian embassy on the banks of the Euphrates. At one 
point Sulla ceremonially sat between the Parthian envoy 
and the newly I n s t a l l e d king of Cappadocla, Arlobarzanes— 
one of Sulla's c l l e n t e s * The meaning behind the seating 
arrangement was not l o s t on the Parthian king, Mlthra-
dates I I . The Parthian envoy, on his return to the royal 
court, was reportedly executed*^ 
This was the f i r s t formal contact between Parthlans 
and Romans* Their meeting place, the Euphrates val l e y , 
was also to become t h e i r border, t h e i r prize and t h e i r 
battleground* F i r s t I t must be asked what the Romans 
were doing so f a r from Rome. 
The expansion of the Roman empire Is never an un-
t 
controversial subject, but c e r t a i n tendencies and t r a -
d i t i o n s must here be explained, however s i m p l i f i e d , and 
a review must be made of the events of Roman Involvement 
I n the East up to the time of Caesar. 
Economic determinism, which pervades modern concep-
tions of Imperialism, Is based largely on the functions 
of economic structures which simply did not exist on any 
^Plutarch, Sulla 5. 
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comparable scale In the ancient world. I t Is more Im-
portant to understand the social and p o l i t i c a l power 
structures of the d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s — I n thetcase of Rome, 
I t s oligarchy. 
Prowess I n war was not only a v i r t u e among Roman 
senators. I t was also a necessity f o r the survival of 
the state. According to Badlan (on whose view of Roman 
Imperialism I am most dependent), the early struggles 
of Rome, hard but triumphant. Inculcated two principles 
which remained prominent throughout most of the h i s t o r y 
of Roman expansion*^ The f i r s t vras a kind of paranoia, 
r e f l e c t e d I n an I n a b i l i t y to accept even a balance of 
powers—the t r a d i t i o n a l International formula for the 
H e l l e n i s t i c East. The H e l l e n i s t i c states had been too 
evenly matched f o r one to destroy the others, but Rome 
was able to break the pattern.^ A second pri n c i p l e 
grew out of the r e a l i z a t i o n that the Roman oligarchic 
c i t y - s t a t e could not adequately govern an empire; t h i s 
4 
was the p r i n c i p l e of non-annexation, the desire f o r the 
p r o f i t s and power of empire, but not the expence and rl d k 
of d i r e c t rule* I f any other means could be found to 
avoid annexation of a defeated country, short of allowing 
the danger to be renewed, the senate embraced I t * But^ 
In the chaos of the H e l l e n i s t i c world especially, t h i s 
was often Impossible* Old fears and over-confident kings 
^E. Badlan, Roman Imperialism I n the Late Republic 
(Oxford, 1968), pp* 4 f f * 
^ I b l d * . p. 5. 
I b i d * . pp* 2-5* 
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brought Rome step by step Into a po3^ition of dominance 
I n the East. Macedonia, Like Carthage, was only annexed 
a f t e r other settlements proved unworkable. A country 
which had to be defeated more than once was annexed a l -
most automatically: t h i s became something of a mos 
malorum. Pergamum was especially noted f o r making the 
most of Rome's paranoia.^ 
Aside from a policy of non-annexation, however, 
Rome c e r t a i n l y cannot be considered a n t l - l m p e r l a l l s t . 
The basic patron-client relationship of Roman society 
made I t s e l f f e l t I n Rome's foreign p o l i c y . *The obedi-
ence of the weak to the strong was, to the Roman a r i s t o -
c r a t , nothing less than an eternal moral law.*^ This, 
combined w i t h the dread of being ruled and the dread of 
d i r e c t l y r u l i n g , created a policy of continual I n t e r -
vention without the acceptance of administrative re-
s p o n s l b l l l t y . This Is *hegemonlal* Imperialism. 
Changes occurred, however, during that development 
ca l l e d the Gracchan revolution. By fln^inclng land d i s -
t r i b u t i o n from the bequest of Pergamum, Tiberius Gracchus 
t 
brought the material benefits of empire to wider classes 
Of Romans. The empire now financed the Gracchan reforms; 
I t a l i a n eaultes began flooding Into the East; and, l a t e r , 
conquered land would provide colonies f o r the veterans 
.^W. Tarn, H e l l e n i s t i c C i v i l i s a t i o n (London, 19S2), 
pp. 2 9 f f . 
^Badlan, p. IS. 
7 
I b i d . , p. 4, acknowledging M. Rostovtzeff, Social 
and Economic History of the H e l l e n i s t i c World (Oxford, 
194i;^ I , p. 70. 
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of the new legions* I t was the nev/ province of Asia . 
which began a l l t h l S i changing the attitudes of Romans 
toward t h e i r own empire. I t was p r o f i t a b l e — a n d even 
v i t a l , to Judge by Cicero's statement that the slightest 
Q 
threat to Asia caused a collapse of c r e d i t In Rome. 
Yet even t h i s d i d not greatly damage the t r a d i t i o n of 
non-annexation, f o r the Roman r u l i n g classes found I t 
simple enough to * Intervene' p o l i t i c a l l y and economically 
I n other areas without the need of annexation.*^ The 
Romans c e r t a i n l y made t h e i r presence f e l t , and were not 
loved: when the Pontic king Mlthradates called f o r the 
slaughter of Romans I n the East, 80,000 I t a l i a n s died 
In one day.** Mlthradates was eventually crushed, and 
more I t a l i a n s flooded eastward.*^ 
By now, however, a new development had occurred. 
Sulla's m i l i t a r y coupmade a p o l i t i c a l Impact on Rome 
which even Sulla could not control. * ^ The road to power 
was l a i d bare, and I t ran through and beyond the foreign 
t e r r i t o r y controlled by Rome. A t r a i n i n g ground f o r 
troops, a source of cllentes and a mine of wealth I n the 
form of booty, t r i b u t e , bribes and' taxes—the extremities 
^Badlan, p. 48o 
g 
Cicero, Imp. Cn« Pomp. 18f. 
*°Badlan, p. 54. 
**Memnon, f r . 22 (Fragmenta hlstorlcorum Graecorum, 
ed. C. Mailer I P a r i s , 1848-74;, I I I , 434;. 
*^Badlan, p. 67. 
*^Syme,«RR, p. 17: 'Sulla could not abolish his own 
example and preclude a successor to his domination.' 
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\ of the empire, the East especially, offered a l l these. 
The opportunities f o r eastern conquests seemed vast. 
Long ago, at Magnesia and Apamea, Rome had dispensed 
w i t h the dread of an equal and threatening power; and 
Mlthradates of Pontus was a threat to Roman Interests, 
but not to Rome herself. As f a r as the Romans knew, 
there were no equals l e f t , only victims. But Rome had, 
as y e t , made only the s l i g h t e s t contact with the Parthian 
emplre. 
* « * * * 
I n protecting the province of Asia, the Roman senate 
had to keep careful watch on the growing power of Mlthra^-
dates of Pontus. I n 96 B.C. Marlus met Mlthradates In 
Cappadocla and delivered a stinging warning: be stronger 
14 
than Rome, or submit to her commands. Mlthradates de-
cided that words were cheap, and, w i t h the help of Nlco-
medes of Blthynla, he occupied Paphlagonla, Galatla and 
Cappadocia. But Just as suddenly, the alliance broke 
down, and Mlthradates was forced to obey a stern order 
from the senate to withdraw. Forming a new all i a n c e , 
t 
t h i s time w i t h Tlgranes of Armenia, Mlthradates again 
Invaded Cappadocla, expelling Arlobarzanes and I n s t a l l i n g 
the puppet, Gordlus. The senate f i n a l l y had to act. The 
task of restoring Arlobarzanes was assigned to the proprae-
to r of C l l l c l a ^ f o r 92 B.C., L. Cornelius Sulla. Sulla 
apparently was more or less on his own, and employed the 
forces of Roman a l l i e s to accomplish his assignment. 
^"^Plut. Marlus 31. 
*^Plut. Sulla S. 
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I t was at t h i s time that the noted f i r s t encounter with 
the Parthlans took place. 
Parthla's posttton was strong. The present king 
of Armenia, Tlgranes, had at one time been a hostage of 
the Parthlans, and was only released at the cost of 
•seventy valleys' of Atropatene. Tlgranes remained 
a f r i e n d and a l l y of the Parthian king, Mlthradates I I , 
while also forming an alliance w i t h Mlthradates of Pon-
tus. The general Interplay of these three eastern powers 
di d not preclude f o r Parthla fears concerning the growing 
power of Fontus—fears shared by Rome. Parthla had no 
desire to a l l y I n any way against Rome, and the request 
made by the Parthian envoy who met Sulla was for ' f r l e n d -
17 
ship and al l i a n c e ' w i t h Rome, and perhaps f o r an a l l i -
ance both offensive and defensive.*® Sulla, on his own 
aut h o r i t y yet t o t a l l y consistent w i t h Roman foreign p o l -
i c y , chose to In t e r p r e t 'friendship' I n the Roman way. 
To ask Rome's friendship was to submit to c l l e n t s h l p . 
Though they had f i l l e d a portion of the vacuum 
l e f t by the decay of the Seleucld empire, the Parthlans 
were hot at t h i s time a dominating force In the East, as 
was Mlthradates of Pontus. However, there was no reason 
yet clear why the Parthlans should have to scrape before 
the Romans. Sulla's arrogance ^and Ignorance) caused 
Mlthradates of Parthla to form an alliance w i t h Mlthradates 
*^Strabo 11, 14, 15. 
*'''piut. Sulla 5. 
*®Debevolse, p. 46. 
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of Pontus,*^ and perhaps a marriage t i e w i t h Armenla.^^ 
Twenty years passed before,the Parthlans again 
had d i r e c t contacts with Rome. I n the meantime Rome 
continued I t s p o l i c y of opposition to any 'aggression' 
by Mlthradates of Pontus. He was driven out of Greece 
by Sulla, who enriched himself and his loyal troops I n 
the process. Blthynla was backed I n a war against 
Mlthradates. When Nlcomedes, the king of Blthynla, died, 
the country was annexed by Rome, but Invaded by Mlthra-
dates. Thie senate sent out L. Lucullus and Aurellus 
Cotta, the consuls of 74 B.C., to correct the s i t u a t i o n . 
Meanwhile, Parthla was having d i f f i c u l t i e s . The 
Armenian king, Tlgranes, had been a frie n d and a l l y of 
the Parthian king, Mlthradates I I ; but when the l a t t e r 
died, Tlgranes proceeded against the new klng,.Gotarzes, 
takHngback the 'seventy valleys' as wel l as a great deal 
of Parthla's north and west vassal regions. 
Lucullus won v i c t o r y a f t e r v i c t o r y against the 
kingdoms of Pontus and Armenia.^* I n the winter of 72/71, 
Mlthradates of Pontus appealed to the reigning king of 
*^Applan, Mlth. 15. 
20 
This depends on the dating of Avroman Parchment I : 
the present Information results from dating according to 
E.H. Minns, 'Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avro-
man I n Kurdistan," JHS 35, 1915, pp. 22-65. But a d i f -
ferent dating Is argued by M. Rostovtzeff and C.B. Welles, 
'A Parchment Contract of Loan from Dura-Europus on the Eu-
phrates,' Yale Classical Studies 2, 1931, pp. 1-78. The 
problem Involves correlations of Seleucld and Parthian 
methods of dating documents and coins, and I feel unquali-
f i e d to Judge. But Tarn, C^, IX, p. 586, n. 2, wishes 
to r e t a i n Minns' dating u n t i l f u r t her evidence comes to 
l i g h t , and Debevolse, p. 47, n. 70, accepts Minns. 
^*Davld Magle, Roman Rule I n Asia Minor (Princeton, 
1950), pp. 323-46.^ 
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Parthla, Slnatruces, f o r aid against the Romans. The 
aged Slnatruces r e f u s e d . W h e t h e r I t was merely the 
caution of an old man, or a genuine desire on the part 
of the Parthlans to remain unlnvolved, I t Is Impossible 
to determine. Three years l a t e r . I n 69 B.C., a new 
Parthian king, Phraates I I I was s t i l l t r y i n g to keep 
Parthla out of the f i g h t i n g , or at least hoping not to 
annoy any pote n t i a l v i c t o r . Phraates negotiated with 
23 
both sides, seeking amity and of f e r i n g nothing. 
Mlthradates and Tlgranes offered to return the 'seventy 
valleys' and other lands I n exchange f o r a Parthian as-
24 
sault againstVthe Romans. Lucullus, who had already 
received a Parthian embassy, now learned of these double 
negotiations. Through his a l l i e s ^ Lucullus made threats 
and promises to Phraates, who sent back envoys to estab-
l i s h friendship and alliance w i t h Lucullus.^"^ But 
Phraates soon f e l t betrayed, f o r Lucullus' legate and 
representative, S e x t l l l u s , seemed more l i k e a spy.^^ 
Negotiations apparently broke down, and Lucullus con-
sidered I t time to attack Parthla. 
The question here I s , to what extent does Lucullus* 
action r e f l e c t an o f f i c i a l Roman policy? Parthla had 
refused to act the vassal a f t e r the encounter with 
^^Memnon, f r . 43. 2 (EHG, I I I , 549). . 
^^P l u t . Luc. 30. 
2^Memnon, f r . 58. 2 (Hffi, I I I , SS6f.). 
^^Dlo 36, 3. 
2^ I b l d . ' 
^^P l u t . Luc. 30. 
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Su l l a , and had I n fact formed closer ties w i t h Pontus 
and perhaps Armenia, enemies of Rome. However, Parthla 
had so f a r remained quite neutral during Rome's long . 
struggle w i t h Mlthradates. Most l i k e l y , Lucullus acted 
on his own authority f o r his own aggrandizement: there 
was much h o s t i l i t y I n Rome against Lucullus' p i l i n g war 
28 
upon war to extend his proconsular command. Having 
already subdued two Eastern kings, Lucullus perhaps 
thought a t h i r d would not be d i f f i c u l t to defeat. But 
he did not have a chance to test the Parthlans I n b a t t l e , 
29 
f o r his own Roman troops refused to go f u r t h e r . This 
probably reflected no s o l d i e r l y fear of the Parthlans, 
but simple exhaustion. 
Lucullus was very shortly superseded by Cn. Pompelus 
Magnus, who had been highly successful against the C l l l -
clan p i r a t e s ; he also had the support of economic I n t e r -
ests at Rome, who were anxious for a s w i f t settlement 
against the tenacious Mlthradates. 
Pompelus, Mlthradates and Tlgranes a l l seemed to 
value highly the support of the Parthlans. The two kings 
renewed t h e i r o f f e r of the t e r r i t o r y which Tlgranes had 
seized a few years before.^* Pompelus made the same of-
f e r , though the land was not yet his to glve.^^ Phraates 
28 
P l u t . Luc. 30} and Badlan, p. 38. 
^^P l u t . I b i d . 
"^^^Clc. Imp. Cn. Pomp. 6 and 7i Cicero, speaking f o r 
Pompetus' appointment. Immediately appeals to his l i s -
teners' sense of revenue. 
*^ *M. Cary, CAH, IX, p. 377. 
. "ibU. 
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Chose a side at l a s t , and attacked Armenia,'^^ though 
a further and perhaps greater motivation was provided 
by' a refugee son of the king of Armenia. Tlgranes the 
Younger had f l e d to the Parthian court and requested 
34 
aid I n overthrowing his father. 
I t was a very sensitive s i t u a t i o n , and our under-
standing of I t must lar g e l y be hypothetical. Tlgranes 
the Younger apparently preferred the aid of Parthla to 
that of Rome: vassalage under the disorganized Parthlans 
offered a prospect of less severity or permanence. 
Phraates had a great deal to gain, or regain, from Ar-
menia, but there Is good reason to believe that a treaty 
had been made by Pompelus and Phraates to establish Par-
thian neutrallty.'^^ Perhaps Phraates f e l t that Pompelus 
would be soothed by the fact that the Parthlans would 
now be the enemies of .the enemies of Rome. 
The e f f e c t of the a l l i a n c e . I f we can c a l l I t th a t , 
was that while Phraates held down Tlgranes, Pompelus had 
a chance to hammer Mlthradates. The Parthlans drove the 
Elder Tlgranes back Into his c a p i t a l , Artaxata, and then 
displayed one of the characteristic weaknesses of* Par-
thian arms, the I n a b i l i t y to lay siege. Phraates w i t h -
draw most of his forces, leaving a detachment under the 
Younger Tlgranes to press the siege. But the Elder T l -
granes broke out and scattered his son's forces. The 
younger Tlgranes sought help. His f i r s t Intention was 
^^Dlo 36, 45. 
^ ^ I b l d . 
^ ^ I b l d . , 51. 
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to Join Mlthradates, but, re a l i z i n g that the Pontic 
king was even worse o f f than himself, Tlgranes f l e d 
to' Pompelus Instead. Using the refugee as a guide, 
Pompelus marched Into Armenia. The Elder Tlgranes made 
an abject surrender without a f i g h t . 
I n Pompelus' settlement, Tlgranes the Elder re-
tained Armenia proper, his son received Sophene and 
Gorduene, whii&h meant that the Parthlans gained nothing. 
Tlgranes the Younger was not not s a t i s f i e d w i t h his 
37 
share, and was placed under close arrest by Pompelus. 
Sophene and Gorduene were then given to Arlobarzanes I 
38 
of Cappadocla. Phraates occupied Gorduene, a border-
land on the upper T i g r i s , which was actually s t i l l In 
the possession of Tlgranes the Elder. Phraates sent an 
embassy to Pompelus asking that the Younger Tlgranes be 
handed over and also reQuestlng an agreement which would 
39 
make the Euphrates a border. Pompelus refused to re-
turn Tlgranes, and said that boundaries would be deter-
40 
mined by r i g h t and Justice. Pompelus then wrote a 
l e t t e r to Phraates, addressing him as 'king' rather than 
h i s accepted t i t l e 'King of Kings,' a d e f i n i t e I n s u l t . ^ * 
The l e t t e r concerned Gorduene, but without waiting for 
an answer Pompelus sent his lleutenanti L. Afranlus, to ^^Magle, RRIAM. pp. 351-7. 
^^Pliut. Pomp. 33. 
^®Applan, Mlth. 105. 
^^P l u t . Pomp.. 34. 
. ^ ' D I O 3 7 , 6 . 
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occupy the t e r r i t o r y . Whether t h i s was done without 
4 2 
f i g h t i n g Is unclear I n the sources. 
Phraates obviously f e l t that he had a claim to 
the t e r r i t o r y . He probably f e l t betrayed at being 
driven out, and began to wonder I f he had any rights 
at a l l as f a r as the Romans were concerned. The an-
swer was No. Pompelus, l i k e Sulla, wanted the Parthl-
ans as vassals. The Roman was perhaps shocked that 
they were so zealous about making demands when l i t t l e 
zeal had been displayed by the Parthian m i l i t a r y I n 
I t s siege of Artaxata. They had not fought l i k e vas-
sals; they would receive no spoils. By t h i s time the 
.1 
Parthian and Armenian kings began to reallze -ithat they 
must not damage each other I n the presence of this 
43 
common enemy. 
Except when he wanted them f o r m i l i t a r y a l l i e s , 
Pompelus was consistently arrogant and even rude to 
the Farthlans. Quite n a t u r a l l y for the Roman, I t ran-
kled that the Parthlans refused to act l i k e vassals. 
But was I t worth a campaign to make them submissive? 
The Parthlans had shown no desire to threaten areas 
west of the Euphrates, nor had they manifested any 
4 4 
threatening m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . Perhaps Pompelus 
had the m i l i t a r y acumen to foresee the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of such a campaign: and Pompelus, unlike Lucullus, 42 
Debevolse, p. 75, n. 18. 
^^Dlo 37, 7-
44 
J. DoblaS, 'Les Premiers Rapports des Remains 
avec les Parthes et I'Occupatlon de l a Syrle,' Archlv 
Or l e n t a l n l 3, 2, 1931, pp. 244 and 254-6. 
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knew when to stop pushing his men. Pompelus had gained 
so much; perhaps Parthian submission did not seem worth 
the e f f o r t at the time. 
* • « * * 
A few years l a t e r . I n 55 B.C., another Incident 
occurred which I l l u s t r a t e s the confusion of Roman-Parthl-
an r e l a t i o n s at t h i s time. About 57 B.C. Phraates I I I 
had been murdered by his sons Orodes and Mlthradates, 
who Immediately quarrelled over the t h r o n e . T h e Par-
thian n o b i l i t y eventually expelled Mlthradates and ac-
.• 
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cepted Orodes as king. Mlthradates Immediately went 
to the proconsul of Syria, A. Gablnlus, who had been a 
legate of Pompelus, and requested assistance In his re-
47 
s t o r a t l o n . Gablnlus agreed, and marched a detachment 
across the Euphrates; but he stopped short when he re-
ceived a lu c r a t i v e o f f e r from Ptolemy Auletes of Egypt, 
who was also I n need of restoration. Abandoning the 
less p r o f i t a b l e Parthian enterprise, Gablnlus turned 
back across the Euphrates. 
The two most Interesting points to be noted In 
t h i s adventure concern Mlthradates* eagerness to receive 
help from a Roman, and Gablnlus' confidence I n his own 
a b i l i t y to Impose a settlement. 
I n view of the previous f o r t y years of experience 
w i t h the Roman, no eastern prince could have been so 
•^^Dlo 3 9 , 5 6 . 
46 
Justin 4 2 , 4 , 1 ; that Surenas was a key figure 
I n Oroded' success: P l u t . Crass. 2 1 . 
^ ' ' D I O 3 9 , 5 6 . 
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naive about the Implications of asking Roman *help' 
that he could hope to escajpe genuine vassalage sub-
sequently. I f Mlthradates did aspire to such hope, 
perhaps he was relying on Gablnlus to act on his own, 
motivated only by greed and not pol i c y . Of equal I n -
terest I s Gablnlus' self-confidence. Mlthradates must 
have spoken convincingly of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a 
successful takeover, perhaps arguing that a genuine 
state of c i v i l war existed. Indeed, a f t e r Gablnlus 
reneged, Mlthradates on his own won over the important 
c i t i e s of Babylon and Seleucla, where he even struck 
48 
coins of v i c t o r y . Moreover, Gablnlus had no reason 
to doubt the a b i l i t y of Roman arms. A l l I n a l l , there 
seemed nothing to lose and money to gain: and. I f the 
Roman were Interested, t h i s was an opportunity to put 
paid to Parthian 'Insolence.* But, with Gablnlus side-
tracked f o r more money, the opportunity had to wait. 
Mlthradates* c i v i l war proved short-lived. By the 
end of 55 B.C. Orodes had retaken Babylon and Seleucla, 
and captured and executed his brother. The c i v i l war, 
while s t i l l I n progress, was known'to M. Llclnlus'Crassus 
49 
I n I t a l y , who w i t h Pompelus was consul Cn Rome f o r that 
year. 
A few months before, at the c r i t i c a l Luca confer-
ence, arrangements had apparently been made whereby Cae-
sar could remain In Gaul and Pompelus and Crassus become 
48 
Justin 42, 4, 2; Wroth, p. 65; and D.iSellwopd, 
An Introduction to the Coinage of Parthla (London, 1971), 
p. 115: Nike Is depicted holding wreath and palm branch. 
•^^Dto 40, 12. 
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consuls. I t was perhaps already agreed that Crassus, 
receiving Syria as his province, should attack Parthla. 
This Is not 'Roman foreign policy,' but the lack 
of I t . A f t e r Sulla had shown the way, the restra i n t s 
were gone. As Badlan writes: 'Naturally, there are 
now no l i m i t s except convenience to calculated aggres-
sion by Rome's representatives.'"^* 
Marcus Crassus was how to be Rome's 'representa-
t i v e ' to the Parthlans. Under the circumstances, there 
was nothing unusual about his wanting war wi t h Parthla: 
I t seemed prime ground f o r questing a f t e r m i l i t a r y glory 
and riches--the sine qua non of any Roman dynast. Cras-
sus had served w e l l under Sulla, carrying the day at the 
b a t t l e of the CoIline gate, and l a t e r he commanded the 
army which defeated Spartacus; but he was In no way an 
52 
eminent general. Crassus' wealth was proverbial and 
yet dwarfed by the riches of Pompelus, who l i t e r a l l y 
owned a great portion of the Near East.^^ Parthla was 
s t i l l awaiting e x p l o i t a t i o n : the t r a n s i t trade was an 
54 
a t t r a c t i v e feature. 
And I t seemed so easy. Lucullus and Pompelus had 
made sw i f t work of peoples whom Crassus perhaps equated 
^^Tarn, C^, IX, p. 605. 
'^*Badlan, p. 87. ' 
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F.E. Adcock, Marcus Crassus. M i l l i o n a i r e (Cam-
bridge, 1966), pp. 9, 27, and 50-4. 
"^^Badlan, p. 84. 
^^That t h i s was Crassus' main aim, see P. Giles, 
Proc. Camb. P h l l o l . Soc. 144, 1929, p. I f . Refuting 
Giles, see Adcock, p. 49. 
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w i t h the Parthlans.^."^ Besides, there was c i v i l war I n 
Parthla, which made everything seem perfect, and Cras-
sus was v i s i b l y eager."^^ 
Almost Immediately, however, there was opposition 
w i t h i n Rome. Caesar and Pompelus already possessed the 
best troops, so Crassus had to levy the dregs; such 
l e v i e s , f o r a useless war,, angered the plebs, and Cras-
57 
SUS had to be protected by the popular Pompelus. The 
tribune C. Atelus Caplto led the antt-war sentiment, 
and, w i t h elaborate r i t u a l , he l a i d a curse on Crassus 
58 
as he marched out of the City I n November, 55 B.C. 
The d e t a i l s of t h i s campaign have been discussed 
In many places, and need not be rewritten here: but a 
nxomber of Interesting points should be noticed. 
Adding the levies he brought with him to the Syrian 
garrison taken over from Gablnlus, Crassus now had a 
force of seven legions, w i t h extra cavalry supplied by 
his a l l i e s Abgarus of Osrhoene, Alchaudonius, an Arab 
c h i e f , and Artavasdes, who had recently succeeded to 
59 
the throne of Armenia. 
The f i r s t year (54) was spent I n minor operations 
I n Mesopotamia. Crassus crossed the Euphrates, chased 
out the Parthian satrap, and garrisoned towns I n Osrhoene 
along the r i v e r B e l l k , a t r i b u t a r y of the Euphrates. This " T a r n , CAH, IX, p. 605. 
^^P l u t . Crass. 16. 
^ ^ I b l d . 
^ ^ I b l d . ; and see Cicero, ad A t t . 4, 13. 
^ ' p i u t . Crass. 20. 
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established a bridgehead extending some f i f t y miles 
Into Parthian t e r r i t o r y , and gave his raw troops a 
taste of action, though perhaps giving them and him-
s e l f a false Impression of the Parthlans. While the 
garrisons held the bridgehead during the winter, Cras-
sus went back to Syria to t r a i n his troops further and 
to plunder temples.^^ 
When Crassus f i n a l l y set out again, the Armenian 
king Artavasdes urged him to go by way of the Armenian 
h i l l s , which would provide cover against Parthian caval-
r y . But Crassus Insisted on going by way of Mesopotamia, 
where he had l e f t his garrisons. At this point, Arta-
vasdes took h i s forces home.^* 
These delays had given Parthla time to prepare. 
The c i v i l war was over, and Orodes planned his strategy 
w i t h his general, the head of the Suren clan, Surenas.^^ 
The main attack would very l i k e l y come through Armenia, 
where Orodes now took the main Parthian amy. 
Crassus' strategy was very conventional. The Roman 
legion had long ago superseded the Macedonian phalanx as 
the highest expression of ancient warfare. By modern 
standards, such warfare was s t i l l very narrows a st y l i z e d 
and organized version of Neanderthal 'clubbing, hand to 
^°Plut. Crass. 17; Dlo 40, 13; Josephus BJ 1, 179 
and AJ 14, 105; and Tarn, CAH, IX, pp. 606-7. 
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*Plut. Crass. 17; d e t a i l s of the b a t t l e are drawn 
from Plutarch's account. 
^^The name Surenas Is not a personal, but a family 
or clan, name. I t I s somewhat o f f i c i a l , and many h i s t o r i -
ans w r i t e 'the Surenas.' Since the name, f o r us. Is not 
very de s c r i p t i v e , I prefer to use a personal form. 
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hand. The Idea, f o r a general l i k e Crassus, was to 
guide the legions up to the enemy, and l e t the legions 
handle the problem from t h e r e . C r a s s u s had no I n -
tention of avoiding the enemy. 
6 4 
There Is no mention of siege equipment. Crassus 
probably expected the Greeks of Seleucla to greet him 
wi t h a revolt against the Parthlans. Once In the c i t y 
and resupplled, the Romans could welcome the Inevitable 
b a t t l e w i t h Orodes' main force. Then on to the EaSt. 
An envoy sent by Orodes to Crassus announced that 
I f t h i s were an o f f i c i a l war of the Roman people, then 
I t would be without quarter; but I f Crassus Invaded 
Parthla for his own p r o f i t and against the consent of 
his country (as Orodes understood the case to be), then 
the Parthlans would take Into account Crassus' old age 
and have p i t y . Crassus-retorted that he would give his 
answer I n Seleucla. He would never get that f a r , said 
the Parthian, pointing at his open palm: 'Hair w i l l grow 
here, Crassus, before you look upon Seleucla.'^^ 
Between Crassus and Seleucla was Surenas. A romantic 
fi g u r e I n h i s t o r y , much contrasted'with Crassus: f i a l f his 
age, born f o r b a t t l e , a king-maker, Surenas was the head 
of the second greatest family of Parthla. He had been 
l e f t behind by Orodes, not contemptuously I n any sense, 
but entrusted w i t h the real strength of the Parthian 
m i l i t a r y forces—Surenas' personal army of cavalry. 
Tarn4 CAH. IX, p. 606. 
^ ^ o t e d by Adcock, p. 53., 
" p i u t . Crass. 17-18; and Dlo 40, 16. ^ S l u t . i b i d . 
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The heavy-armed cataphracts acted as shock-troops; the 
l i g h t e r cavalry possessed unique s k i l l s w i t h the short 
composite bow. The t a c t i c s I n which Surenas had trained 
his men were suited p e r f e c t l y to the open t e r r a i n of 
Mesopotamia. There was no way Crassus could reach Sel-
eucla without somewhere crossing open t e r r i t o r y , and 
Surenas would be ready. 
Crassus was the v i c t i m of a great deal of treachery^ 
67 
especially concerning I n t e l l i g e n c e . But he was easily 
deceived exactly because he probably would have acted 
the same even I f his Intelligence reports had been per-
f e c t . Admittedly, archers and sllngers and cavalry a l l 
had t h e i r separate and r e l a t i v e Importance—even I n the 
Roman army. But I t was absurd to expect them to stand 
up to a Roman legion. A decade before, while campaigning 
In I b e r i a , Pompelus had .fought o r i e n t a l archers: l i k e the 
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Athenians at Marathon, his legionaries simply rushed them. 
Besides, everyone knew that quivers are soon emptied. So, 
when Crassus f i n a l l y did make contact with the Parthlans— 
when the kettle-drums sounded, and the arrows clouded the 
sky and then rained down on the locked shields of'the 
Romans—It was some time before the Romans began ^o worry. 
The long s t r i n g of camels, laden w i t h the surplus of ar-
rows, was a great part of Surenas* contribution to m i l i -
t a r y science. The d i v i s i o n of archers, some shooting 
low, f r o n t a l t r a j e c t o r y and some high, exploited the 
least v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the legionaries, and the Parthian 
^^Dlo 40, 21. 
^®M. Gary, CAg,.IX, p. 379, 
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cataphracts and plkemen dismantled the shaken * tortoise' 
formations of the Romans. When a rushing counter-attack 
was launched, the Parthlans r e t i r e d : fresh supplies of 
horses made them sw i f t and untouchable, and the 'Parthi-
an shot* made them deadly. Carrhae, not Crecy or Agin-
court, f i r s t proved the f u l l p o t e n t i a l of archery and 
mobile t a c t i c s . 
* * « « « 
The Romans began a painful r e t r e a t ; though d i s c i -
p l i n e and morale were low, the hopeless t e r r a i n discour-
aged ia rout. Surenas pursued them to w i t h i n a few miles 
of the Armenian h i l l s , where he realized that they might 
yet escape surrender, or destruction. We cannot know 
which fate Surenas wished for the Romans. Plutarch and 
Dlo give an account of treachery: Surenas shouting (loudly^ 
69 
f o r the soldiers' benefit) that the Parthlans had made 
t h e i r point and were now ready to l e t the Romans leave, 
70 
I f Crassus would come and discuss a truce or make a 
tre a t y by which Rome abandoned a l l claim to t e r r i t o r y 
71 
east of the Euphrates. Dlo's Crassus Is t r u s t i n g , 
Plutarch's I s not. I n e i t h e r source the Roman soldiers 
were adamant f o r a truce. Crassus had no choice but to 
go w i t h the Parthlans, who insisted that a document be 
signed, 'for you Romans have not good memories for con-
d i t i o n s . ' ^ ^ But when the Parthlans seemed to force 69 
No doubt I n Greek, which many of Crassus' o f f i c e r s 
would know and could quickly translate f o r the anxious 
troops. 
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/ " P l u t . Crass. 30, , 
''^Dlo 40, 26. 7^Plut. Crass. 31. 
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Crassus onto a Parthian horse, a scuf f l e ensued, and 
Crassus and a few others were k i l l e d . 
Was there r e a l l y a treaty waiting to be signed, 
or was I t a ruse, as implied by Plutarch and Dlo? The 
t r u t h cannot easily be distinguished from the Ironic 
elements of the s t o r y — t h e mention of the Euphrates as 
a border and the reference to Roman Lack of f a i t h — 
which r e f l e c t previous Roman-Parthian relations. And 
even I f , f o r the present na r r a t i v e , these elements are 
apocryphal, s t i l l they were meaningful to our ancient 
sources. 
A f t e r Crassus was s l a i n , the Parthlans did not 
proceed to slaughter the Romans, but took 10,000 p r i s -
oners, while another 10,000 escaped to Syria. 24,000 
73 
had perished. The l a s t casualty, was Surenas; Orodes 
now feared him too much.to l e t him Live. 
The Parthlans, possessing the Roman eagles, were I n 
t h e i r glory. The t e r r i t o r y east of the Euphrates was 
74 
now d e f i n i t e l y Parthian, and king Orodes came to terms 
w i t h Artavasdes of Armenia, whose s i s t e r now married 
prodes' son, Pacorus. 
The Parthlans did not follow up t h e i r v ictory with 
any major attack, possibly because the personal army of 
75 
Surenas was without I t s leader. Pacorus led a few 
raids Into Syria I n 51 B.C., but was driven o f f by C. 
76 
Casslus Longlnus, a survivor of Carrhae. But, that a 
73 
PLut. Crass. 31; and Tarn, Cm, IX, p. 611. 
^^ebevolse, p. 93. , 
^^ I b l d . . ' p. 92. 7 S l o 40,: 28, 
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huge Invasion was feared In 51 B.C. can be seen from 
the l e t t e r s of Cicero, who had Just been appointed 
proconsular governor of C l l l c l a . There were uprisings 
I n Syria, and many d i s t r i c t s , sick of Roman r u l e , wel-
77 
corned the prospect of Parthian c o n t r o l . Roman forces 
78 
I n the East were I n s u f f i c i e n t even to keep order: 
Pompelus and Caesar, In mutual d i s t r u s t . Jealously 
kept t h e i r legions I n Spain and Gaul. 
The Parthian Invasion was never any such thing. 
The Romans did not comprehend that the Parthlans were 
attacking w i t h s w i f t cavalry, not f o r conquest, but 
for booty, destruction of property, and f o r the shock 
79 
value and prestige. Although the Parthlans were cut 
up badly on one occasion by the able Casslus (who adopt-
80 
ed Parthian t a c t i c s ) , Pacorus was not driven o f f ; but, 
when the looting was done, he withdrew to winter quarters 
81 
m Cyrrhestlca, the area between Zeugma and Antloch. 
The danger f o r the coming year s t i l l seemed great* 
There was t a l k that Caesar or Pompelus should be sent 
82 
out t o take command. When I t was decided that Pom-
pelus should go, Caesar turned over to him a legion f o r 
83 
the expedition. 
^^Dlo 40, 28. 
^®Clc. ad Fam. 15, 1, 3-5. 
^^Debevolse, p. 100. ^%io 40, 29. 
®^Clc. ad A t t . 5, 21, 2. 
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Caellus I n Ctc. ad Fam. 8, 10, 2; ad A t t . 6, 1, 3. 
83 
Plu t . Pomp. 56 c a l l s I t a 'pretence,' and In Ant. 
35, Antonlus t r i e s to Insure that the troops w i l l actu-
a l l y go to Syria. 
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CSf. Calpurnlus BlbuLus, the governor of Syria, 
t r i e d a diplomatic scheme to f o r e s t a l l any Parthian I n -
vasion. He persuaded a disaffected Parthian satrap to 
84 
Join I n on a plan to place Pacorus on the throne. 
That r e s u l t was not achieved, f o r Orodes heard of the 
85 
plan and recalled Pacorus: jwhich perhaps was a l l that 
was hoped f o r . The Invasion panic died down. 
For the next nine years the Parthlans made no ag-
gressive moves across the Euphrates. They may have 
been distracted by a c t i v i t y on t h e i r own eastern fron-
86 
t i e r . Yet Parthla became s l i g h t l y Involved I n the 
Roman c i v i l wars. 
Pompelus sent L. Hlrrus and perhaps other ambassa-
87 
dors to Orodes. As a condition f o r a l l i a n c e , the 
Parthian king demanded Syria. Pompelus refused, per-
88 
haps because Hlrrus had been Imprisoned, or because 
Pompelus had married the widow of Publlus Crassus, dead 
w i t h h i s father at Carrhae. More simply, the price was 
Impossible. Syria was a v i t a l part of the empire f o r 
which Pompelus was f i g h t i n g ; I t was through his eastern 
campaigns that Syria had been annexed Into the empire, 
and the province was f i l l e d w i t h Pompelus' c l l e n t e s o ^ S l o 40, 30. ' 
®^Justin 42, 4, 5. 
®^Debevolse, p. 104, arguing from the fact that no 
tetradrachms were struck between 52 and 40 B.C.: see R.H< 
McDowell, Coins from Seleucla on the T i g r i s (Ann Arbor, 
1935), pp. 184 and 221. 
®^Dlo 41, 55; and Caesar BO 3, 82. 
: ^Vo 42, 2. 
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Later, a f t e r Pharsalus, Pompelus considered Parthla 
iais a possible refuge and base f o r renewed resistance 
to'Caesar, but he was persuaded by an argument that 
the Parthlans were treacherous, and went Instead to 
89 
Egypt. That Parthla, having no reason to love Pom-
peluSf should be considered as a p o s s i b l e a l l y shows 
Pompelus' desperation and hints at how much Crassus' 
war had t r u l y been Crassus' and not Rome's. The Par-
thlans did I n f a c t aid the Pompelan general Q. Caecl-
l l u s Bassus, whose legions were besieged I n Apamea by 
the Caesarian C. A n t l s t l u s Vetus I n 45 B.C. Vetus was 
'90 
driven o f f w i t h losses, but the Parthian force ( l e d 
by Pacorus, who was again In: favour) did not li n g e r , 
91 
perhaps because of the lateness of the season. 
I t was not because of the aid given Pompelan forces 
or f o r any other Immediate reason of security that the 
Di c t a t o r Caesar began elaborate plans f o r an attack on 
92 
Parthla. The shame of Crassus' l o s t standards proba-
b l y affected Caesar as l i t t l e as I t had Pompelus. Ex-
ter n a l motivations were lacking; the Roman state could, 
and d i d , survive without a campaign against Parthl'a. 
Perhaps Caesar f e l t he could c o l l e c t wider support as 
the v i c t o r of a great foreign war than as the survivor 89 
P l u t . Pomp. 76. Of course. I n Egypt Pompelus was promptly s l a i n . 
90 
91 
^^Clc. ad A t t . 14, 9, 3. 
Dlo 47, 27; and Applan BC;;4, 58ff. 
92 
Possibly planning began as early as 47 B.C., but 
there I s no ce r t a i n t y : M. Gelzer, Caesar. P o l i t i c i a n and 
Statesman, trans. Peter Needham (Oxford, 1969), p. 305. 
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93 of a c i v i l war, or perhaps he found war Less f r l g h t -
94 
enlng that the c i v i l task ahead of him. Cicero did 
95 
not reckon Caesar would ever return a l i v e . ' Perhaps 
96 
Caesar agreed. I n any case, the obvious target was 
Parthla. No longer Just an Insolent vassal, P.arthla, 
since Carrhae, had Interfered I n Roman a f f a i r s and 
had acquired a great reputation: Caesarian propaganda 
reported a S i b y l l i n e prophesy that only when led by a 
king could the Romans be victor i o u s over the Parthl-
97 
ans. The Independent existence of another empire was 
unpalatable to Rome. But, a f t e r defeating Roman arms 
and demonstrating an a b i l i t y to s t r i k e deeply Into Ro-
man t e r r i t o r y , the Parthlans had become Intolerable. 
Caesar's preparations were massive—another I n d i -
cation of Rome's altered opinion of Parthia. Sixteen 
98 
legions and tien thousand cavalry were collected. 
99 
Gold was transferred to Asia Minor, and arms were 
100 
fabricated and stockpiled I n Thessaly.* One legion 
was sent Immediately to S y r i a , s i x others to winter ^^Adcock, CAH, IX, p. 713. ' 
94 
That Caesar was running from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , see 
Syme, RR, p. 53. 
95 
Clc. ad A t t . 15, 4, 3: ' l l l e numquam revertisset.* 
96 
Suet. Caes. 87; and P l u t . Caes. 63. The ominous 
statements he made before his assassination may have ac-
t u a l l y referred to the coming Parthian campaign: Gelzer, 
pp. 325-6. 
^'^Plut. Caes. 60.. '^Applan BC 2, IfO. 
99 
Nlcolaus of Damascus 18. 
^°°Plut. Brut. 25. 
^^^Applan BC..4, 58. 
I n Apollonla, together with light-armed troops and 
102 
cavalry. Also I n Apolldnta was Caesar's nephew 
Octavlan, supposedly there to study philosophy, but 
Instead learning m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s . 
When Caesar was s l a i n , the campaign was scrapped. 
Yet the magnitude of the plims l e f t I t s mark: the sense 
that a clash between Rome and Parthla was Inevitable. 
^^^Applan BC 3, 24; and Dlo 14, 9. 
^°^Suet. Aug. 8; Applan BC 3, 9; Pl u t . Brut. 22; 
Clc. 43; and Ant* 16. 
Chapter Three 
Antonlus and Roman A f f a i r s I n the East 
The association of Augustus and 'the Parthian 
Question' began very early Indeed. While s t i l l a 
youth, he was expected to accompany his adoptive father 
on the proposed expedition against the Parthlans. J u l -
ius Caesar sent the boy to Apollonla to t r a i n w i th the 
army being organized there.^ But with the death of 
Caesar, the expedition was cancelled. Octavlan was ad-
vised by friends to take over the expeditionary force 
I n Macedonia and march on Rome.^ Octavlan chose to 
leave the army where I t was, but sent Immediately to 
Asia f o r the money that-Caesar had transferred e a r l i e r 
f o r the Parthian war.^ 
I n Rome, a strong hand had taken charge a f t e r 
Caesar's assassination. Marcus Antonlus Immediately v-
4 
gained consular command of Macedonia. But the ar-
rangement was made palatable to the senate through the 
assumption that the Macedonian legions would Indeed s t i l l 
be used against Parthla: Antonlus enticed the ambitious 
P. Cornelius Dolabella w i t h the prospect of executing 
Caesar's war against Parthla. Dolabella accepted the 
Aug. 8. 
V e i l . Pater. 2, 59, 4; Applan Bg 3, 2 j 9; and Suet. 
^Nlc. Dam. 18. ^ I b l d . 18. 
^Clc. ad A t t . 14, 9, 3 (Apr. 18th). 
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governorship of Syria, assuming he would receive the 
Macedonian Legions.^ But then Antonlus began manoeuvring 
to keep the legions. He started a rumour of an Invasion 
of Macedonia by the Getae. The senate Investigated and 
found no t r u t h I n I t , though the danger was admitted. 
Antonius made the statement that everything was quiet 
on the Parthian f r o n t i e r . ? Next he moved to exchange 
his province:for that of Gaul. To avoid opposition In 
the senate, a p l e b i s c i t e was passed; Antonlus received 
Gaul and was expressly allowed to transfer the six Ma-
cedonlan Legions to his new command. With t h i s , Cae-
sar's expeditionary force was dismantled. 
By the time the leading assassins, M. Junius Brutus 
and C. Casslus Longinus, realized that t h e i r position 
was d e t e r i o r a t i n g , Macedonia had been stripped of I t s 
troops. S t i l l , Brutus.seized I t , while Casslus travelled 
to Syria, outstripping the governor-to-be, Dolabella. 
Casslus was s t i l l w e ll known In the East. He had been 
Crassus* quaestor I n 53 B.C., and had led back the sur-
vivors of Carrhae.® During the cavalry raids of Pacorus 
In 52 B.C., Casstus kept his forces I n Antloch, but even-
t u a l l y ventured out to harass the retreating Parthian 
q 
forces. Now I n 43 B.C. Casslus went efast and dlscovei 
a remnant of Pompelus* forcies, one Legion commanded by 
"^Applan BC 3, 1, 7-8 and 3, 5, 1. , 
^ I b l d . . 3, 3, 25. 
^Clc. ad A t t . 14,U4, 4* 
®Plut. Brut. 43. 
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Clc. ad A t t . 5, 21, 2; and Frontinus S t r a t . 2, 5,. 35. 
52. 
Q. Caeclllus Bassus, besieged In the town of Apamea by 
six Caesarian legions. A l l seven legions came over to 
Casslus. Among Bassus' force was found a contingent of 
Parthian horse-archers. They had been l e f t by Pacorus, 
who had answered an appeal from Bassus, but la t e r w i t h -
drew most.of h i s forces because of the lateness of the 
s e a s o n . T h e Parthian bowmen now became part of Cas-
slus' force. They helped him In defeating Dolabella 
l a t e I n 43 B.C.^V But then, I n preparation f o r the 
struggle against Antonlus and Octavlan, Casslus sent 
the Parthian contingent back to Orodes, along with 
presents and ambassadors seeking a larger f o r c e . O r o -
des h e s i t a t e d , b u t apparently did send a Parthian force, 
which did not a r r i v e In time to f i g h t In the b a t t l e of 
Phll l p p l . * ' * 
I f the Parthlans were to be punished f o r this new 
crime, that of siding w i t h the losers, the punishment 
would not come from Caesar's h e i r , f o r Octavlan was a l -
l o t t e d the West, and the arduous task of s e t t l i n g vet-
erans on confiscated I t a l i a n s o i l . The prestige of 
P h l l l p p l went to Antonlus, and he those to stay In the 
East to regulate a f f a i r s and squeeze out funds.^'^ 
Antonlus may already have been contemplating a 
^°Dlo 47, 27; and Applan BC 4, 58f. See p. 47. 
^^Dlo 47, 30. 
^^Applan BC 4, 63f. 
^''DIO 48, 24, 5. 
^'Vpplan BC 4, chs. 63, ,88 and 99; and Justin 42, 4, 7. 
^^Syme, RR, p. 206. 
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war against P a r t h i a . I f so, there seemed to be no 
rush about i t : there were minor scores to be settled 
17 
and money to be raised. These a c t i v i t i e s . Including 
a r a i d by one 6f Antonlus' lieutenants on the wealthy 
trading centre of Palmyra, caused bad f e e l i n g , which 
may have contributed to :the success of the Parthian 
assault of 40 B.C.^® 
When Casslus had been negotiating with Orodes for 
Parthian a u x i l i a r i e s , one of his envoys was Q. Lablenus, 
son of Caesar's legate, T. Lablenus, who had deserted 
to Pompelus.^^ Stranded a f t e r P h l l l p p l and r i g h t l y a-
f r a l d to return to I t a l y , Lablenus Joined i n a Parthian 
Invasion of Roman t e r r i t o r y In the spring of 40 B.C. 
I t Is Impossible to estimate to what extent the 
Parthlans required Incitement from Lablenus to spur 
them to the attack. I.t-would prove to be more than a 
mere r e p e t i t i o n of the rald-ln-force conducted by Pa-
corus a decade e a r l i e r . There were Indications that Oro-
des was Interested I n expansion westward, especially f o r 
economic reasons: to control more of the t r a n s i t trade.*^^ 
Increased Issues of coinage Indicated an expansion In 
commercial a c t l v l t y . ^ ^ And the Palmyrene traders who 
^^Plut. Ant. 25, 1. 
* % p l a n BC 5, 4, 15ff. ^®Ibld.» 5, 9f. 
^^Llvy E p l t . 2, 78; Dlo 48, 24, 4; Ruf. Fest. 18? 
and Florus 2, 19. 
^^Caesar BG 8, 52, 1. 
^^McDowell, pp. 219-20. 
" i b i d . , p. 170. 
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had f l e d to the Parthian court may have uttered pro-
vocative encouragements.^^ This may help explain why 
the Invasion was not begun Immediately a f t e r P h l l l p p l . 
The Parthlans had to watch for the p o s s i b i l i t y of an 
early attack from Antonlus; meanwhile the e v i l s of 
Roman rule were building support f o r the Parthlana 
24 
among the peoples west of the Euphrates. Also, I t 
was probably known to the Parthlans that Antonlus had 
25 
gone to Egypt. 
The Parthian force, led J o i n t l y by Lablehus and 
Pacorus, swept through Syria, defeating I t s governor,, 
26 
L. Deeidlus Saxa, In a pitched b a t t l e . Roman so l -
diers deserted to Lablenus; Apamea was taken without 
resistance. The Parthian force was then divided, Labl-
enus d r i v i n g successfully Into Aisla Minor, Pacorus go-
27 
Ing south along the coast. Labienus drew much sup-
port from Local kings and tyrants who proved that t h e i r 
l o y a l t y was not so much to Rome as to t n e l r former pa-
tr o n Pompelus, w i t h whom Lablenus could be closely Iden-
28 
t l f l e d . While Lablenus was I r o n i c a l l y s t y l i n g himself 
'Parthlcus Imperator,'^^ Pacorus was being welcomed at ^"^Applan BC 5, 9f. 
^\>io 48, 24, 8. 
^ ^ I b l d . , 7; Applan BC 5, 6, 52. 
, ^ ^ L l w E p l t . 127. 
^^Justm 42, 4, 7; Dlo 48, 25; and Plut. Ant. 28. 
28 
Syme, RR, p. 259. 
29 
H.A. Grueber, Coins ;of .the Roman Republic Jin the 
B r i t i s h Museum (London, 1910j, I I , p. 500. Issued I n 
both gold and s i l v e r , ajpparently from Antloch, the coin 
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Sldon and PtoLemals,^^ where he established the f i r s t 
Jewish king to rule In f i v e hundred y e a r s . E v e n the . 
32 
Nabataean Arabs were obedient to the Parthlans. 
Working to the Parthlans' advantage was the c o i n c i -
dence of t h e i r invasion w i t h the outbreak of the Peru-
sine war I n I t a l y . Antonius received f i r s t news of both 
at the same tlme,^^ and he started out against the Par-
thlans, but on the way received from his wife Fulvla 
f u r t h e r Information on the s i t u a t i o n In the west, and 
chose to s a i l w i t h h i s f l e e t to I t a l y . ^ " * 
Several months passed before Antonlus was certain 
that the s i t u a t i o n I n I t a l y would not require the a b i l i -
t i e s of his best general, P. Ventldlus. Ventidius was 
now sent ahead to confront the Parthians, while Antonius 
remained I n I t a l y u n t i l the winter of 39 B.C?^ He then 
was f o r use among Lablenus' Roman troops. Dlo (48, 26,. 5) 
notes the Irony of the t i t l e , usually taken by a general 
from the name of a conquered people, here being used by 
Lablenus, who Is helping the Parthians i n t h e i r conquests. 
Grueber believes that. In the legend Q^ LABIENUS PARTHICUS 
IMPy the PARTHICUS Is not necessarily q u a l i f y i n g the IMP, 
but could simply be a name Lablenus has taken f o r himself. 
But Strabo ( l 4 , 2, 24; describes how Hybreas of Mylasa, 
one of the few local rulers to oppose Lablenus, sent the 
Roman a taunting message that he Intended to c a l l himself 
the 'Carlan Imperator.' 
"^^Josephus AJ 14, 330ff.; 20, 245, and £J 1, 248ff.; 
and Dlo 48, 26, TT 
"^^Jos. AJ 14, 379 and 384ff. 
^^Jos. BJ 1, 276. 
^"^Plut. Ant. 30. 
^ \ b l d . ; and Applan BC 5, 6, 52. 
•^^Llw E p l t . 127; Front. 2, 5, 36; Plut. Ant. 33; 
Dlo 48, 39f. 
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moved to Athens, where he could survey the actions of 
Ventldlus as w e l l as those of his f r i e n d C. Aslnlus 
P o l l l o , who was f i g h t i n g In the Balkans.^^ 
Ventldlus, who had served Caesar and had displayed 
s i m i l a r speed and f l e x i b i l i t y , e f f e c t i v e l y dealt with 
37 
the Parthians by respecting t h e i r peculiar t a c t i c s . 
As I t turned out, Ventldlus did not encounter the 
mounted archers he had expected (and perhaps dreaded). 
The Parthian m i l i t a r y had changed I n the l a s t few years. 
The v i c t o r y of Surenas against Crassus had slighted the 
rest of Parthla's n o b i l i t y . The ageing Orodes could not 
f o r e s t a l l the nobles' desire to replace the mounted arch-
38 
ers w i t h formations of heavy cavalry. These Ventldlus 
found easy to defeat, and I n C l l l c l a he conquered and 
39 
k i l l e d Labienus. Next he vanquished the Parthian noble 
40 
Pharnapates at the Amanus Gates, the entrance to Syria. 
Pacorus, who had not been w i t h the army which now w i t h -
drew from Syria, reorganized I t and Invaded Syria again 
I n the spring of 38 B.C. Ventldlus f i n a l l y crushed the 
Parthlans at Glndarus, where Pacorus himself was s l a i n . 
This was given tremendous significance by the Romans, as 
41 
I f avenging Crassus' death. ^ S l u t . Ant. 33. 
37 
Front. 1,1,6 and 2, 5, 36; Applan BC 5, chs;. 65 
75, and I32f.; and Dio 48, 39-41 and 49, 19-22. 
^Sarn, CAH, X p. 49. 
^^Dlo 48, 26 and 39-40. 
• '^^Jbld. 48, 41, 1. 
"^^Plut. Ant. 34; and Florus 2, 19, 9. 
» 
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Next Ventidius assaulted those Syrian c i t i e s which 
had supported the Parthlans. Parthian administration 
had apparently been popular among the c i t i e s ; but a di s -
play of Pacorus' head was a successful Inducement to sur-
42 
render. 
Ventidius' only reported reason f o r not following 
up his v i c t o r i e s w i t h an Invasion of Parthla was his 
fear of Antonlus' Jealousy: well-founded fears, according 
to Plutarch, who reports that Antonlus soon rushed In 
during Ventidius* mopplng-up operations and took over 
43 
command, l e s t a l l glory glory f a l l to Ventidius alone. 
But there were other reports that Ventidius had accepted 
a bribe In return f o r sparing a c i t y , so Antonius was 
44 
forced to take command. Ventidius returned to Rome, 
and was the f i r s t Roman to celebrate a triumph over the 
45 
Parthtans. 
Venttdlus' success was followed quickly by the suc-
cesses of two other Antonlan lieutenants. C. Soslus, 
who replaced Ventidius as governor of Syria, proceeded 
to pacify Judaea; and P. Canldlus Crassus secured Ar-
menla by force and began campaigns toward the Caucasus. 
Ahtonlus, who had thus re-asserted Roman control In the 
Eastp began a re-organlzatlon of the East's p o l i t i c a l 
"^^Dlo 49, 20, 4. 
"^^Plut. Ant. 34; and Dlo 49, 21, 2. 
44 
Jos. AJ 14, 439-47; Dig 49, 20f.; accepted by Tarn, 
CAH. X, 53. 
*^ P l u t . Ant. 34; and Dlo 49, 21, 3. 
•^^Plut. Ant. 37; and Dlo 49, 22, 3 f . 
s t r u c t u r e , which had proven I t s e i f unreliable* 
There were only three Roman provinces I n the area., 
Asia, Blthynla and Syria. A chain of kingdoms was now 
formed, which ran from Pontus to Egypt, and most of the 
t e r r i t o r y was consigned to four kings: Polemo, Herod, 
Archelaus and Amyntas. Chosen by Antonlus, these men 
were nev/ leaders who did not belong to any dynastic 
l i n e s , but had proven t h e i r l o y a l t y to Rome, or, rather, 
47 
to Antonlus. Armenia was only loosely attached to 
t h i s group. Though the Armenian king, Artavasdes, had 
deserted Crassus In 53 B.C., Canldlus had brought Ar-
menia under c o n t r o l I n 37 B.C., so that Antonlus was 
confident of using I t as a base of operations I n the 
near f u t u r e . 
Antonlus reconstructed the East as he v/anted I t ; 
a l l h i s measures had been r a t i f i e d by the senate In ad-
48 
Vance. The arrangements gave Rome a more secure 
eastern f r o n t i e r ; but, more Importantly, Antonlus now 
had a powerful body of cllentes who v^ere loyal to him 
personally. There would be support at his back whether 
he marched eastward against the Parthlans, or west. 
I t seems clear that Antonlus had long Intended to 
attack Ps^rthla. A f t e r the re-organlzatlon of the East 
following Ventldlus' v i c t o r i e s , Antonlus was delayed by 
the need to aid his f e l l o w - t r l u m v l r , Octavlan, against 
47 
Tarn, CAH, X, p. 52; Syme, RR, pp. 260-2; and Magle, 
RRIAM. pp. 433-7. That the method of governing I n d i r e c t l y 
was not new, but that Antonlus* p a r t i c u l a r contribution was 
I n h i s outstanding choice of men: see, Hans Buchhelm, Die 
O r l e n t p o l l t l k des Trlumvlrn M. Antonlus (Heidelberg, 1960), 
p. 93. 
^®Applan BC 5; 75. 
59 
the ptrate-dynast Sextus PompeLus, son of Pompelus 
49 
Magnus. I n return f o r h i s a i d , Antonlus had expec-
ted Octavian to give him 20,000 troops f o r his war 
against the Parthlans.^^ Understandably, Octavian 
could never bring himself to pay up. I n the next year, 
36 B.C., when Sextus had been defeated and Lepldus had 
been eliminated, a sense of balance was f e l t , which 
seemed to mean the end of c i v i l d i s s e n s i o n . O c t a -
vian promised to restore the c o n s t i t u t i o n when Antonlus ' 
should return from the Parthian war: he was sure An-
tonlus would be w l l l l n g . " ^ ^ 
There were a number of reasons fo r Antonlus' a t -
tack on Parthla I n 36 B.C. Though Ventldlus may have 
somewhat avenged Crassus' defeat, the captured standards 
and prisoners were s t i l l I n Parthla, whose t e r r i t o r y 
remained I n v i o l a t e . The East, newjyre-organlzed, had to 
be made secure. The Parthlans had shown again In 40-
38 B.G. not only the a b i l i t y to attack Syria, but also, 
t h i s time, the desire to hold I t . ^ * ^ Rome's new vassal 
kings—^Antonlus* cllentes—^would be more r e l i a b l e I f 
the o r i e n t a l competitor were removed, and an extension of 
the sphere of vassal kingdoms could even be hoped f o r . 
49 
^''Applan BC 5, 93. 
"^^Ibld., 95; and Dlo 48, 54, 1-3. 
^^Applan BC 5, 132, 
•^^Ibld.: as an Indication of Octavian's vlev^s on 
the Parthian war, t h i s remark eludes Int e r p r e t a t i o n . 
•^^Tarn, C^, X, p. 48; and McDowell, pp. 219-20. 
54 
Syme, p. 263. 
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Then there was the r i v a l r y with Octavian. Far 
from being mired down by the awesome task of s e t t l i n g 
the veterans, Octavian had emerged as the soldiers' 
f r i e n d . And I n 36 B.C., as Antonlus must have r e a l -
ized, Octavian was at la s t achieving a m i l i t a r y v i c -
tory (over Sextus) which would J u s t i f y the m i l i t a r y 
aura of his recently adopted praenomen. Imperator,"^"^ 
Antonlus' monopoly of m i l i t a r y glory would be broken; 
yet the conquest of Parthla could re-assert his pre-
dominance. I t might also cast Antonlus as the truer 
h e i r of Caesar, something to outweigh the prestige of 
Octavian's Inherited name."^ ^ Moreover, I t seemed a 
good time to attack. Now, as In the time of Gablnlus 
and again of Crassus, there was unrest I n Parthla. 
King Orodes was unbalanced by the death of his 
eldest son, Pacorus, ln-38 B.C.; a new heir was deslg-
57 
nated, Phraates, the eldest of Orodes' t h i r t y sons. 
Before the year was ended, the Impatient Phraates did 
away w i t h h i s father and, f o r safety's sake, k i l l e d a l l 
CO ' 
h i s brothers as w e l l . Many Parthian nobles, whose 
power had Increased I n the l a s t years of Orodes reign, 
were now forced to f l e e , some seeking refuge w i t h Anto-
59 
nlus. At t h i s point a very curious figure makes his 
^^Thls praenomen I s f i r s t seen on coins struck I n 
38 B.C.; Grueber. Coins R. Rep.. I I . 4 l l f f . 
"^^Tarn, CAH, X, p. 66; Clc. P h i l . 13, 24 quotes 
Antonlus: 'et t e , o puer, qui omnia nomlnl debes.* 
Justin 42, 4, 11-16; and Dlo 49, 23, 3. 
"^®Plut. Ax^, 37; and Dlo I b i d . . 4. 
^^P l u t . I b i d . : and Dlo I b i d . . 5.' 
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appearance, a Parthian notable named Monaeses. 
Our sources report that Monaeses approached Anto-
nlus and offered his services f o r any attack against 
Phraates.^^ Antonlus welcomed him, and, likening his 
case to that of the e x i l e d Themls'tocles,^^ gave him 
62 
three Syrian c i t i e s to r u l e , and promised him the 
Parthian kingship as w e l l . ^ ^ But then Phraates de-
sired Monaeses to return: perhaps because of the furor, 
64 
among the Parthlans caused by Monaeses* f l i g h t . 
Phraates offered promises of safety, and Monaeses v/aa 
content to go; and Antonlus content to l e t him, though 
he d i d request the return of the l o s t standards of Cras* 
sus and the captives. This request, not surprisingly, 
went u n f u l f i l l e d . 
The whole episode Is odd. Monaeses was probably 
the Warden of the Western M a r c h e s , a very Important 
part of the Parthian m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l hierarchy, so 
I t I s extraordinary that he should f l e e a new king I n 
f i r s t place. That the f u g i t i v e should then suddenly 
t r u s t I n the promises of such a man as Phraates seems 
dubious enough, but when the same Monaeses ends up com-
manding the Parthian forces against Antonlus~a hoax of 
^°Dlo 49, 24, 2. 
^ ^ P l u t . Themis. 29. Antonlus Is following the ex-
ample of the Persian king who gave Themistocles three 
c i t i e s to r u l e . 
^ ^ P l u t . Ant. 37; and Dlo 49, 24, 2. 
^^Dlo I b i d . . 2. ^ ^ i b l d . 
^^Rostovtzeff and Welles, 'Parchment Contract,' 
pp. 45-8. See p. 71. 
62 
some sort may be s u s p e c t e d . I t may have been an I n -
telligence mission, and Antonlus may have suspected 
67 
so. Perhaps Phraates recalled Monaeses when the mis-
go 
slon was completed, or given up — o r when the r i s k of 
t r u l y losing Monaeses became too great. Antonlus may 
have been happy to return Monaeses w i t h whatever I n -
69 
formation Antonlus chose to divulge. Or perhaps An-
tonlus feared that by detaining Monaeses he v/ould lose. 
' 70 
the support of othisr Parthlans. In any case, Anto-
nlus was himself preparing a ruse: by returning Monaeses 
along w i t h envoys requesting Crassus' standards and cap-
t i v e s , he would give the Impression of continuing nego-
t i a t i o n s , thus l u l l i n g Phraates Int o a false sense of 
71 
security. 
The Information we have on.this matter of Monaeses 
demands further explanation, f o r which we lack evidence. 
The mystery of Monaeses does not end here; and from l a t e r 
events I t appears that the l o y a l t y which Monaeses f e l t 
most keenly, from the very s t a r t , was to himself. 
Another Important occurrence which can be connected 
w i t h Phraates' opposition to the Parthian n o b i l i t y Is 
the r e - l n s t l t u t l o n of the mounted archer as the basis of Tarn, CAH, X, pp. 71-2: assumes a hoax, but Debe-volse, pp. 121-3, sees none. That Monaeses was I n com-
mand lis gathered from P l u t . Ant. 44 and Horace Od. 3, 6, 9. 
^^Tarn, iblld./.-.. 
^ ^ I b l d , 
^ ^ I b l d . 
^°Dlo 49, 24, 4. 
^^Plut. Ant. 37; and Dlo 49, 24, '6. 
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72 Parthian m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s . The n o b i l i t y ' s heavy 
cavalry had f a i l e d completely against Ventldlus. The 
horse-archers, v/ho had slaughtered Crassus, had since 
been beaten only once, and then but s l i g h t l y — b y Cas-
slus, through such un-Roman tac t i c s as an ambush and 
73 
feigned r e t r e a t . 
Antonlus was not unaware of the r i s k of meeting 
Parthian horse-archers. Rejecting Crassus' strategy 
of d r i v i n g east across Mesopotamia In order to make 
contact w i t h the enemy, Antonlus' strategic plan was 
f o r an advance up through Armenia and then southeast 
through Media Atropatene—^mostly t e r r a i n unsulted to 
cavalry f i g h t i n g . Parthla's Median a l l i e s would be 
knocked out f i r s t , then a drive could be made on Sel-
eucla. 
I t was late I n the spring before Antonlus Joined 
h i s forces w i t h those of Canldlus I n Armenia. He now 
had a force of 10,000 cavalry, G a l l i c and Spanish, a-
long w i t h 60,000 legionaries. Another 30,000 troops 
were supplied by other nations, notably, 16,000 caval-
74 
ry from Armenia. These were led by Artavasdes, the 
very king who had remained an a l l y of Parthla since 
the time he withdrew his forces at the l a s t moment from 
Crassus' army; I n f a c t , the late Pacorus had been his 
75 
brother-ln-lavr. Canldlus had only recently conquered 
^^Tarn, CAJJ, X, p. 71. 
'^^Dlo 40, 29; and Front. 2, 5, 35. 
"^Slut. Ant b 37. 
'^^Plut. Crass :66. 
64 
76 the Armenians, as well as the tribes of the Caucasus. 
But now Antonlus, perhaps relying on Artavasdes' hatred 
77 
of the Median king (also named Aftavasdes), depended 
on the Armenian as an a l l y : a ris k y thing. 
Antonlus t r i e d to do too much too quickly. No pro-
per base was established where his men could rest a f t e r 
t h e i r march to Armenia. Antonlus Immediately started 
out, though I t was l a t e In the year. We cannot knov/ 
whether t h i s was strategy or mere Impatience. Since 
the land ahead would provide no materials, Antonlus had 
to b r i n g siege equipment w i t h him. This slowed his 
march, so he divided his force: two legions and the Ar-
menians were to bring along the equipment as fast as 
possible, while Antonlus took the cavalry and the best 
I n f a n t r y and hurried to the capital, of Media Atropatene, 
78 
Phraaspa^ He besieged-this well-garrlsoned town, 
working w i t h mounds u n t i l his siege t r a i n could catch 
up. I t never d i d , for the Parthian horse-archers slipped 
around and destroyed I t , j u s t as Crassus had been de-
stroyed. Artavasdes the Armenian had again found I t 
79 • * 
wise to desert. 
Antonlus' pos i t i o n was untenable, though pride made 
him l i n g e r . Eventually he began the harried r e t r e a t . A 
r e p e t i t i o n of Carrhae was prevented by Antonlus' personal 
ao 
leadership and by a strange event. A Parthian named 
^Slut. Ant. 37. 
''^ D^lo 49, 25, 1. 
78jjbid., 3; and P l u t . Ant. 38. 
7Vut. I b i d . . ^' 
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Mlthradates entered the Roman camp and, expressly 
s t a t i n g that he spoke on behalf of his cousin Monae-
ses, advised Antonlus on which route would save him 
81 
from disaster."* So I t d i d , but Monaeses' motives need 
explanation. 
Surenas, a f t e r Carrhae, had been executed by the 
envious Orodes, and Phraates was no less ruthless than 
his father. Monaeses may well have considered t h i s , 
and decided to keep other channels open. The message 
of advice to Antdnlus may have been Monaeses' way of 
establishing, or perhaps re-establishing, an amicable 
t i e . 
Thus spared from destruction, Antonlus' forces 
limped back to Armenia, the nearest haven. Circum-
stances compelled Antonlus to curb his anger with Arta^r-
82 
vasdes, and revenge would have to wait. Antonlus 
t r a v e l l e d . I n advance of his army, to Syria, and at the 
coastal v i l l a g e of Leuke Come he waited f o r Cleopatra, 
83 
who brought clothes and supplies f o r his men. That 
Antonlus chose to rendezvous at Leiike Come rather than 
Tyre or Sldon may Indicate that he feared the Parthlans 
had already swept through Syria, w i t h I t s c i t i e s r i s i n g 
84 
In r e v o l t . " But, on the contrary, the Parthlans had 
85 
f a l l e n out with t h e i r Median a l l i e s over the booty. ®^Plut. Ant. 47. 
^^Dlo 49, 31, 3. 
®^Plut. Ant. 51 
^'^Tarn, C^, p. 75, 
^^Dio 49, 33, 1. 
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The Median king offered his services to Antonlus f o r 
war against Parthla, and p a r t i c u l a r l y to Join In on 
Antonlus' revenge against Armenia. 
Another assault on Parthla,was out of the ques-
t i o n . F i r s t of a l l Antonlus had already claimed v l c -
86 
t o r y , despite the fact that he had l o s t a t h i r d of 
his men, and those l e f t were not l i k e l y to favour an-
other t r y . Antonlus' r i g h t to e n l i s t troops. I n I t a l y 
87 
was a dead l e t t e r . Octavian was the obstacle. He 
ex;plalned neatly that Antonlus had no claim to I t a l y 
since he was In sole possession of Media and Parthla, 
88 
acquired by the brave deeds of Antonlus' soldiers. 
Cleopatra now forced Antonlus to realize who his real 
enemy was: anything else, even Parthla, could be h i s , 
89 
but only a f t e r he had done away w i t h Octavian. 
But f i r s t he had to re-establish his position I n 
the East. A ceremony, f u l l of symbolism meant only 
f o r Easteri) consumption, was held In Alexandria^ at 
which time Antonlus made the famous 'Donations,' par-
c e l l i n g a l l of the Orient among his and Cleopatra's 
c h i l d r e n . Cleopatra herself, now to be called 'Queen 
of kings,' was given Egypt and Cyprus. Caesarlon, to 
be called 'King of kings,' received Syria and a l l the 
region west of the Euphrates as f a r as the Hellespont. ®Slo 49, 32, 1. 87 
Syme, RR, p. 225. 
®®Pluti* Ant. 44. 
89 
Tarn, CAH, X, pp. 76-7. Buchfielm, pp. 87-8, agrees 
that at t h i s time the coming c o n f l i c t w i t h the West was 
a f f e c t i n g Antonlus' a c t i v i t i e s I n the East, 
67 
His brother, Alexander, was. given the yet unconquered 
areas east of the Euphrates as f a r as India. And t h e i r 
90 
s i s t e r Cleopatra received Libya. One of the boys was 
dressed f o r the ceremony In Macedonian garb, the other 
I n Median, and they were accompanied by bodyguards of 
the appropriate n a t i o n a l i t y . Their mother, Cleopatra, 
91 
adorned herself I n a robe sacred to I s t s . 
The more mundane matter of Armenia was more p o l l -
t l c a l l y Important: Armenia must be punished. However, 
a year was lo s t I n dealing w i t h the troublesome Sextus 
Pompelus, who was seeking refuge In the East and who at 
one time even made overtures to Phraates behind Antonlus' 
92 
back. Antonlus at l a s t was free to Invade Armenia 
early I n 34 B.C. He seized Artavasdes, w i t h whom Octa-
93 
vlan may have been I n secret negotiation, but Arta-
vasdes* eldest son Artaxes escaped to Parthla. The Median 
king was rewarded w i t h Lesser Armenia. 
Antonlus himself made no move against Parthla at 
t h i s time, and Plutarch notes that there were rumours 
94 
of I n t e r n a l s t r i f e among the Parthlans. Antonlus 
« 
strengthened the alliance w i t h Media: a mutual aid 
pact was formed, whether against Parthla or Octavlan. 
^ ^ l o 49, 41, 1-4. 
^^Plut. Ant. 54. 
^ ^ l o 49, 17-20. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 39 and 41. 
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P l u t . Ant. 53. Buchhelm, p. 87, says that AntonLus 
s p e c i f i c a l l y abandoned a 'second Invasion' of Parthla In 
order to face the challenge from the West with unimpaired 
resources. I question that any second Invasion had been 
planned f o r the ne^r f u t u r e . 
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Troops were exchanged, and a force of Romans aided the 
Median king I n defeating the Parthlans when they t r i e d 
t o recover Armenia f o r Artaxes. But when Antonlus w i t h -
drew h i s Roman troops and yet kept his Median a u x i l i a r i e s , 
Phraates was able to svreep I n and place Artaxes on the 
Armenian throne, keeping Media f o r himself (30 B.C.).^"^ 
Such, I t would seem, were the dismal results of 
a l l of Antonlus' m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s I n the East. However, 
as we sh a l l see, there I s evidence that Antonlus took 
part I n , or perhaps Instigated, an endeavour to humble 
Parthla through means other than the t r a d i t i o n a l methods 
of o u t r i g h t m i l i t a r y conquest. The new approach was the 
plan to replace Phraates w i t h a king f r i e n d l y to Rome: 
I n other words, a vast extension of Antonlus' eastern 
client-kingdoms. This e f f o r t was pushed, not always 
strenuously, f o r nearly-ten years, even long a f t e r An-
tonlus had been replaced I n the East by Octavian. 
^•^Dlo 49, 44,. 4; and Pl u t . Ant. 53. 
Chapter Four 
The Parthian.Civil War, 35-29 B.C. 
Simultaneous with the c o n f l i c t between Antonlus 
and Octavlan, a c i v i l war was raging I n Parthla. Why 
and when t h i s war began cannot be determined exactly, 
but a close estimate can be made. 
Phraates IV was not an endearing r u l e r , and his 
, long reign of t h t r t y - s l x years may be a t t r i b u t e d to a 
calculated, and probably necessary, ruthlessness aimed 
at e x t i r p a t i n g a l l opposition. Justin reports that 
a f t e r Antonlus was defeated i n 36 B.C., the returning 
Phraates was Insolentlor.^ Justin here also uses the 
word reddltus. but we know In fact that Phraates was 
never on the b a t t l e f i e l d , though he had sent his per-
sonal bodyguard to Join the other Parthian cavalry 
forces.^ The Parthlans were commanded by that very 
Monaeses who had e a r l i e r f l e d to Antonlus.^ « > 
Whether the c i v i l war was the result of Phraates' 
generally Increased Insolence, or due to something more 
p a r t i c u l a r , the date f o r the beginning of the s t r i f e may 
be brought very close to the time of Antonlus' defeat. 
As we have seen, the retreating Antonlus feared that the 
^Justin 42, 5, 4. 
^ P l u t . Ant. 44. 
''^Ibld.. 37. 46, and 48; and Horace Od. 3, 6, 9. 
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Parthlans would s w i f t l y Invade Syria, but they did not. 
There were reports as early as 35 B.C. that the Parthl-
ans were having c i v i l dissensions. Phraates' dated 
tetradrachms f a l l from 36 to A p r i l , 34 B.C^ The Par-
thlans had quickly f a l l e n out w i t h the Medes over the 
booty, and the Median king formed t i e s w i t h Antonlus. 
The Parthian c i v i l war jnay have begun at the same tlme.^ 
The man leading the opposition to Phraates Is named by 
Justin and Dlo, In simila r wording, as i!.a certain T l r l -
dates.'^ 
Who was he? The 'certain' may Indicate that he v/as 
from outside the Arsacld family, but, f o r the sake of 
8 
the tradition, had assumed 'Tlrldates' as a throne-name. 
Certainly, Phraates had seen to I t that there was a 
dearth of proper al t e r n a t i v e candidates to his throne. 
And I f , as Justin states, I t was 'the people' who de-
throned the cruel P h r a a t e s , t h e n I t might have been 
forced t o look f o r a candidate who was not an Arsacld. 
Of course, 'Tlrldates' may have had a more active 
role I n d i r e c t i n g h is own destiny. A Greek I n s c r i p t i o n 
S l u t . Ant. 53. 
^Tarn, CAH. X, p. 78; and Wroth, p. xxxlx. 
^The coin evidence does not, of course, record a 
re v o l t I n I t s Incipient, stages, i . e . , before mints are 
captured and coins Issued, especially from Seleucla. 
7 
Justin 42, 5, 6: 'Tlrldatem quendam;' and Dlo 51, 
18, 2 : 'TIVOS Tipi5»Tow Both must come from the same 
source^ possibly Pompelus Trogus. 
• 8 
Tarn,'Tlrldates I I and the Young Phraates,' Melanges 
Glotz (Paris, 1932), p.. 835. 
^Justin 42, 5, 1-3. ^ ^ I b l d . . 4-6. 
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from Susa, dated by Cumont to the reign of Phraates IV, 
refers to a Tlrldates as a general and possibly governor 
of Susa J, perhaps a commander who gained fame In the 
v i c t o r y over A n t o n l u s . F r o m a parchment of A.D. 121 
found I n Dura-Europus we know the name of the con tempo- . 
rary Warden of the V/estern Marches, one of the four 
great march-v/ardens guarding the Parthian e m p i r e — I t 
13 14 was Monaeses. The position was hereditary,* and the 
Monaeses of 36 B.C., holding the same post, was the nat-
u r a l choice f o r the command against A n t o n l u s . ( i n d e e d , 
nearly a century l a t e r yet another Monaeses, a 'nobleman,' 
was entrusted by king Vologases w i t h the task of I n s t a l -
l i n g by force a Parthian candidate to the Armenian 
throne.)^^ 
So, I t Is very l i k e l y that 'Tlrldates' was actually 
Monaeses. His relations w i t h Phraates were precarious; 
perhaps f o r t h i s reason he had Ingratiated himself v/lth 
Antonlus. He must have been haunted by the spectre of 
Surenas, s l a i n by Orodes'(Phraates' father) a f t e r the 
defeat of Crassus. While Phraates was coming to blows 
w i t h the Median king over the booty, Monaeses may'have 
decided I t was advisable to revolt while he could. Commoni 
^^F. Cumont, 'Nouvelles Inscriptions grecques de 
Suse,' Comptes rendus de L'Academle des In s c r i p t i o n s . 
1930, pp. 208-20.. 
^^Debevolse, p. 136; and Tarn, 'Tlrldates,' p. 833. 
^^Rostovtzeff and Welles, 'Parchment Contract,' pp. 
19-30. 
^ S a r n , CAH, IX, pp. 588-9. 
^^Tarn, 'Tlrldates.,'. p.' 836. 
^^Tac. Ann. r5, 2. . . 
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Interest connected him wi t h the Median king Artavasdes, 
from whom he could seek a i d . Artavasdes had quickly 
a l l i e d himself w i t h Antonlus, who was thus I n contact 
17 
with Monaeses. 
Dlo says that I n 34 B.C. Antonlus marched as far 
as the Araxes, ostensibly to conduct a compalgn against 
the Parthians,.but was s a t i s f i e d w i t h arranging terms 
18 
W i t h the Median king.* Probably, Antonlus was I n -
vestigating the s i t u a t i o n at f i r s t hand, to measure Ar-
tavasdes' strength as an a l l y and the effects of the 
c i v i l war I n Parthla. On the f i r s t point, c e r t a i n l y , 
Antonlus was s a t i s f i e d : Artavasdes was given part of 
Armenia, h i s daughter was betrothed to Antonlus' son, 
and troops were exchanged as part of a mutual pact. 
Antonlus may have decided that he could accomplish a 
great deal against Phraates without the need of himself 
Invading Parthla again. 
This, I think, marks the beginning of Antonlus' 
support of Tlrldates d i r e c t l y , or perhaps I n d i r e c t l y 
through Artavasdes. I n e f f e c t , a t r i p l e alliance a-
galnst Phraates now existed. Assuming (with Tarn) 
that Tlrldates Is ac t u a l l y Monaeses, then by helping 
to place him on the throne of Parthla, Antonlus Is only 
f u l f i l l i n g the promise he made to Monaeses two years 
e a n i e r . ^ ^ 
^ H. Ten Cate Fennema, Quaestlones Parthicae (Neo-
magi, 1882), pp." 4 8 f f . Even before the evidence from 
Susa and Dura was brought to l i g h t , Cate Fennema had 
suggested that Antonlus, Artavasdes and Tlrldates were 
a l l working together. 
^®Dlo 49, 44, 1. ^^Plut. Ant. 37. 
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With Armenia a province. Media In al l i a n c e , and 
c i v i l war In Parthla, the East could be considered 
f a i r l y s e c u r e . A n t o n l u s could concentrate on the 
c r i s i s In the West. I n 33 B.C. he ordered Canldlus 
to bring sixteen legions 6o\m to the sea-coast. 
This was most of his force In Asla,^^ but some troops 
were s t i l l I n Armenia, where they were slaughtered 
three years l a t e r . ^ ^ 
The course of the Parthian c i v i l war Is confusing. 
As mentioned In the l a s t chapter, Phraates at some time 
between 34 and 31 B.C. took a beating from Artavasdes 
the Mede when the Parthlans f i r s t attempted to recover 
24 
Armenia f o r Artaxes. The date may have been before 
33 B.C., I f we assume that the Roman troops which Dlo 
says Artavasdes employed^^ were those withdrawn to the 
coast I n that year, though perhaps Dlo Is ref e r r i n g to 
the troops Canldius l e f t behind. 
During or a f t e r t h i s engagement, Artavasdes may . 
have been Instrumental In what appears to be Tlrldates' 
eventual success In capturing f o r a time Phraates' 
throne. Phraates' tetradrachms f a l l again for 30 B.C., 
and we have only one. I n June, for the year before.^^ 
^°Syme, RR, p. 266. ^^Plut. Arit. 56. 
^^Tarn, CAH, X, p. 77. ^ • ' D I O 51, 36, 2. 
^ \ b l d . , 49, 44, 4. ^ ^ I b i d . 
^^Wroth, pp. x x x v i l l - x x x l x and 135. A. Gutschmid, 
In his Geschichte Irans und seiner Nachbarlander (Tu-
blnger, 1888), pp. 102f, maintains that for some period 
before June of 31 B.C. a r i v a l king was Issuing coins: 
not T l r l d a t e s , but perhaps a son of Phraates. Percy 
Gardner, The Coinage of Parthla (London, 1877), p. 44 
a t t r i b u t e s these coins to Tlr l d a t e s . 
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Phraates f l e d east i n search of a i d , and eventually 
found I t among the * Scythians.'^^ 
I n September of 31 B.C., about the time v/hen 
Phraates f l e d eastward, the b a t t l e of Actlum was 'fought. 
Antonlus was no longer I n a position to support Arta-
vasdes and Tl r l d a t e s ; In f a c t , Cleopatra attempted to 
29 
e n l i s t help from Artavasdes. But Artavasdes, consid-
ering that Antonlus already had Median contingents In 
. his po s s e s s i o n , p r o b a b l y f e l t that he could spare no 
more, since Phraates was, certain to t r y to regain his 
throne w i t h the help of. his Scythian a l l i e s . 
At some time I n the year which elapsed between the 
b a t t l e of Actlum and the deaths of Antonlus and Cleopa-
tra,*^^ Phraates w i t h h i s Scythians came west and began 
put t i n g pressure on Tl r l d a t e s . Both Parthian contenders 
sent envoys, to Octavlan-, who refused to help either slde^ 
saying he was busy w i t h E g y p t . U n d o u b t e d l y this was 
true. Now was not the time to assess policy and decide 
on an active r o l e . I f he knew about Tlrldates, Octavlan 
may yet have been wary of him as being Antonlus' man. . 
Besides, I t was so obviously a good thing that Parthlans 
^^Justln 42, 5, 5. 
^®Dlo 51, 1, 1. 
^ ^ r b l d * , 5, 5,. 
^°Dlo 49, 44, 4. 
"^^Dlo 51, 18, 2: a f t e r Actlum, while Octavlan could 
s t i l l say he was occupied w i t h his war against Antonlus 
and Cleopatra, who were both dead by August, 30 B.C. 
Justin 42, 5, 5; s p e c i f i c a l l y , busy with annexa-
t i o n and re-organization. 
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were f i g h t i n g each other. 
By Late 30 or early 29 B.C., Phraates had won sub-
s t a n t i a l control of Parthla. His tetradrachms begin In 
March of 29 B.C.'^ "^  Tlrldates and Artavasdes both f l e d 
34 
to Octavlan, who was now I n Syria. The victorious 
Phraates overstruck the coins both of Tlrldates and of 
Antonlus.^'^ 
Octavlan, now at the head of the Roman empire, 
presently found himself Involved I n the turmoil In Par-
t h l a , f o r Phraates' arch-enemies, Tlrldates and Arta-
vasdes, were I n his possession. Clearly, I t was Octa-
vlan' s move. 
However, before proceeding with a detailed examina-
t i o n of Octavlan's p o l i c y toward Parthla, the following 
two chapters (one concerning Augustan poetry and the 
second concerning the geographical Information current 
In the age of the soon-to-be-Augustus) are offered f o r 
the Insights we might gain Into that policy. 
^ \ a r n , 'Tlrldates,' p. 832. 
^ S l o 51, 16, 3. Octavlan was'ln Syria between the 
summers of 30 and 29.B.C.: Dlo 51, 18, 1. Artavasdes' 
son, Arlobarzanes, apparently accompanied his father and 
Tlr l d a t e s at t h i s time; Dlo 55, lOa, 5. 
^^Sellwood, p. 146. 
Chapter Five 
Augustan Poets as Evidence f o r Augustan Policy 
I t Is clear that Parthla received an unusual amount 
of notice I n Augustan poetry, references sometimes casual 
sometimes grave, often Linking Parthla w i t h B r i t a i n . ^ 
Why should s a t i r i s t s and Love poets w r i t e so much about 
an area which had a negligible e f f e c t on t h e i r Lives 
and which. I n any case, should have been the sole con-
cern of Augustus? But one quickly senses that the con-
cerns of Augustus do become the concerns of the Augustan 
poets. 
When the poets' views on Parthla, or anything, seem 
to mirror the Interests of Augustus, questions of patron-
age, poetic I n t e g r i t y and propaganda are raised. Such 
questions are Inherently unanswerable: I t Is the very 
evidence I t s e l f which Is being questioned. And I t Is 
the nature of propaganda to hide I t s e l f . S t i l l , s,ome 
general trends I n that controversial poetry can be out-
Lined and some theories about that poetry can be de-
f l a t e d . 
There Is no strong t r a d i t i o n a l viewpoint among 
scholars: only a vaguely accepted feeling that Augustus 
was something more than a protector of b e l l e s - l e t t r e s ; 
that some d i r e c t i o n was Indicated; that there was some 
^See Appendix A. 
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enthusiasm from below and some pressure from above; 
that some refusals were made; and that Maecenas' patron* 
age could be somewhat compromising.^ 
The uniformity and mediocrity one expects of real 
propaganda Is altogether lacking In the major Augustan 
poets.^ V/hether one depicts Augustus as lord of peace 
or l o r d of war, there Is bound to be something In the 
poetry which goes blasphemously In the opposite direc-
t i o n . This variance I s , f o r us, the proof of Indepen-
4.'' 
dence, but I t can also be termed Inconsistency In the 
poets' beliefs—a sign of tampering. 
An avenue did exist by which the poets could come 
to know Augustus' views—or, at least, what he wanted 
them to know—through Maecenas. A certain amount of 
Immediate agreement was natural: the poets spoke as a r t -
i s t s and c i t i z e n s who had l i v e d through the c i v i l wars 
tlons and O r i g i n a l i t y i n Roman Poetrv (Oxford, 1968^, 
pp. 44-50; and H. Meyer, passim. 
3 ' 
They are major not simply because they have sur-
vived; they were prominent among the ancients: see 
Suetonius* De v l r l s l l l u s t r l b u s . Panegyrists c e r t a i n l y 
existed, but, creating less a r t and being less universal, 
they were no doubt less read and have not survived In 
great numbers. Also;, they would have been of less I n -
terest to Augustus, who was discriminating: 'componl 
tamen a l l q u l d de se n i s i et serlo et. a praestantlsslmls 
offendebatur, admonebatque.praetores ne paterentur nomen 
suum commissionIbus o b s o l e f l e r l . ' (Suet. Aug. 89). 
'Pardon, pp. 76-7 and 89, n. 4; G. V/llllams, p. 46; 
see also Schanz-Hoslus, Geschlchte der rSmlschen L l t e r a -
t u r ^Munich, 1935), I I , p. 5; Paul van de V/oestljne, 
'Mecene et V l r g l l e , ' Musee Beige. 1930, p. 2 6 l f . ; E.. 
Gardthausen, Augustus und seine Zelt (Leipzig, 1891), 
I , 2, p. 781; Fraenkel, pp. 221, 434, and 438; and E.T. 
Salmon, 'The P o l i t i c a l Views of Horace,' Phoenix I j no. 
2,.1946-7, p. 10. 
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and Into the world of the restored republic."^ But I f 
there was disagreement or Lack of In t e r e s t , could the 
patron's views be Ignored? The economic and social de-
pendence was not absolute: VlrglL and Horace had been 
ma t e r i a l l y aided, but l i t t l e I s known of V i r g i l ' s de-
pendence, and Horace Is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y exaggerated 
concerning h i s . I n Horace's case, the friendship of 
poet and patron was genuine and h i s t o r i c a l l y attested.^ 
Economically and s o c i a l l y , Propertlus was the most s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t ; p o l i t i c a l l y , the most outspoken. 
Were the poets approached to speak fo r the Prln-
8 
ceps? The evidence I s the recusatlo—the refusal to 
9 
w r i t e an epic I n praise of Augustus. The excuses of-
f e r e d — ' I n a b i l i t y ' and 'my Muse f o r b i d s ' — a r e f a b r i -
cated.^^ They could; they didn't want t o ; and, u n t i l 
the Aeneld was produced,^^ they didn't. Yet t h e i r 
•^ R. Syme, RR, p. 464. 
G^. Williams, p. 44; see Horace Eplst. 1, 7; Suet. 
v i t a Verg. 12, 31, and v i t a Horat. 
7 
Propert. 2, 7, 14; Syme, RR, p. 466; R. Nethercut, 
' I l l e parum ca u t l pectoris e g l t OPUS.' Trans. Amer. PhlloL, 
Assn. .92, 1961, p. 402; and Meyer, p. 68. 
g 
I mean the type of serious approach which would not 
come to Light as does Augustus' p l a y f u l request made to 
Horace, In Suetonius, v i t a Horat. 
9 
G. Williams, p. 46; and Fraenkel, pp. 220-1. 
^^Syme, RR, p. 462. Of Horace, Fraenkel writes 
(pp. 434-5): "Tt Is also possible that he was sometimes 
p e r f e c t l y sincere I n pleading Incompetence. He may have 
f e l t that his production was slow and that. I f he was 
to say anything worth saying, he had to make a sustained 
e f f o r t . ' But E*T. Salmon counters (p. l l ) : '[Horace's] 
claim that he Lacks the a b i l i t y to do so simply w i l l not 
hold water; the man who wrote the ReguLus ode need make 
no apologies f o r his s k i l l . ' 
^^And the Aenfeld Is hardly ia mere panegyric; In 
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poetry Is f i l l e d w i t h laudatory passages, especially 
w i t h i n the recusatlones. This may be only to mitigate 
the e f f e c t s of the r e f u s a l , a n d as a means of main-
ta i n i n g a larger Independence.^"^ Gordon.Williams be-
lieves the recusatlo Is merely a device, modelled a f t e r 
a poetic Invention of Calllmachus, by which the poet 
pretends to refuse a pretended request, and, w i t h pre-
tended h u m i l i t y , verbosely l i s t s the achievements which 
14 
he says he could not possibly t r e a t . Yet Williams 
admits that t h e i r u t i l i t a r i a n approach to the recusatlo 
gives I t 'a tw i s t which would have disgusted Calllma-
chus.'^^ Nor does V/llllams deny the pr o b a b i l i t y that 
Maecenas and Augustus actually approached the poets with 
requests. 
The role of Augustus must now be examined. Pro-
moting good l i t e r a t u r e was cer t a i n l y a worthwhile task, 
17 
but I t was not done w i t h d i s i n t e r e s t . The audience 
was c e r t a i n l y greater than mere a r i s t o c r a t i c l i t e r a r y 
f a c t , one scholar goes so far (too f a r ! ) as to describe 
the Aeneld as a pamphlet directed against Augustus (Fi 
Sforza, 'The Problem of V i r g i l , ' Classical.Review 49, 
1935, pp. 9 9 f f . ) . , For an excellent discussion of these 
puzzling aspects and views of the Aeneld. see R.D. Wil-
liams, ' V i r g i l , ' Greece and Rome, new survevs In the 
class i c s , no. 1 (Oxford, 1967), pp. 23-31. 
^^Fraenkel, p. 434. 
^'^Bardon, pp. 76-7. 
'^^ G. Williams, p. 47. , 
^ ^ I b l d . . p. 46. 
^ ^ I b l d . . pp. 87-8. 
^^Bardon, p. 102; Schanz-Hoslus, p. 4; and Syme, 
RR. ch.. 30: 'The Organisation of Opinion,' especially 
p. 460. 
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c i r c l e s : I t contained classes of people whose opinions 
18 
mattered, and p o s t e r i t y . Augustus would know t h i s . 
A r t which does not praise may become a r t which c r i t i -
cizes. I t must also be remembered that Augustus had 
always valued propaganda and the Influencing of opinion: 
t h i s was the man who had defeated Antonlus largely by 
convincing a l l I t a l y that she must pledge herself to a 
19 
holy war against the East. 
Augustus' personal contact v/lth the poets was oc-
20 
casional. I t was Maecenas who befriended Horace and 
V l r g l L , and through Maecenas Augustus could make his 
Likes and d i s l i k e s known. There Is no reason to doubt 
his tolerance: he was broadmiitdod enough to allow con-
21 
t r a r y views. And even more than Augustus, I t was 
Maecenas who had the so f t t o u c h . T o push too hard 
would mean v i t i a t i n g the a r t : the propaganda value would 
be Lost I n becoming too obvious. Probably Maecenas, a . 
true patron,' refined Augustus' request—too much, perhaps. 
^®Syme, RR, p. 468; and G. Williams, p. 50. 
19 
, Syme, RR, pp. 287-93; and M.P. Charlesworth, 'The 
Fear of the Orient I n the Roman Empire,' Cambridge His-
t o r i c a l Journal 2, 1926,,p. 9. 
^^Bardon, p. 89, n. 4; Suet, v i t a Verg. and v i t a 
Horat.: Tac. Ann. 4, 34, 4; and Macrpblus, Saturnalia 1, 
24, 10-11. None of the evidence Indicates a close re-
lat i o n s h i p between Augustus and the w r i t e r s of the day: 
the e p i s t o l a r y and s t i l t e d nature of those contacts proves 
t h e i r Infrequency. 
21 
Bardon, pp. 102-3; and Schanz-Hoslus, p. 5. The 
exception, Ovid, simply pushed tobfar and In the worst 
d i r e c t i o n : he was Lucky to keep his L i f e . 
Llvy's 'Pompelan' views were rather easily tolerated 
by the restorer of the republic (Tac. Ann. 4, 34, 4 ) . 
22 
Syme, RR, p. 253; Bardon, pp. 102-3; and G. W i l -liams, pp. 44-6. . ^ . 
81 
f o r Maecenas was not Indispensable.^^ Yet his absence 
was f e l t ; the l i t e r a t u r e languished beneath the pressure, 
and relations between the Prlnceps and the poets stag-
24 
nated. The prtnclpate eventually created an atmosphere 
conducive only to the work of f l a t t e r e r s . ^ " ^ 
However, f o r years Augustus had the means of gently 
expressing himself to the poets. And the poets were not 
u n w i l l i n g to sing well-earned praises, though they re-
fused to step down to the level of the panegyrist. 
But what about a l l the forecasting and chatter 
about conquering Parthla, and B r i t a i n as well? The 
poets' Interest must have had an external source. The 
view that they were. I n t h i s matter, speaking for 're-
publican t r a d i t i o n ' or 'public opinion' has l i t t l e e v l -
26 
dence on I t s side. I n those references to Parthla and 
B r i t a i n we f i n d the most'obvious Indications of the I n -
fluence of Augustus. 
This view would be rejected out of hand by those 
who Idealize Augustus as the peacemaker extraordinaire, 
27 
who would have no use f o r such propaganda. Yet he 
28 
c e r t a i n l y d id nothing to discourage the t a l k . Those 
^^Syme, RR, p. 409; and G. Williams, p. 87. 
24 
Syme, RR, p. 412; G. Williams, pp. 87-8; and Bar-don, pp. 102-3. 
25 
Tac. A n n . 1 , 1 . 
^^Meyer, pp. 3 and 104; Schanz-Hoslus, p. 4. These 
views are attacked, successfully, I think, by Brunt In 
his review of Meyer. 
27 
Meyer Is a good representative of t h i s . See also 
J. Buchan, Augustus (London, 1937), pp. 173-5 and 189-92, 
and T.R. Glover, CAH, X, p. 512. 
. Colllngwood, Roman B r i t a i n and the English 
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r 
who view Augustus as a world-conqueror w i l l use these 
references to Parthla and B r i t a i n as e v i d e n c e . Y e t 
why do they receive so much a t t e n t i o n , v/hen Spain, the 
Balkans and Germany yielded the actual m i l i t a r y achieve-
ments and annexations?"^^ 
Settlements (Oxford, 1937), p. 72, writes that 'the 
In t e n t i o n of conquering and annexing B r i t a i n was gen-
e r a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to Augustus, and...he never disa-
vowed I t . V/hether he entertained I t Is quite another 
question.' 
Augustus could dlsavov/ and discourage things: I t 
Is known from Suet. Aug. 53 that he discouraged the use . 
of the word 'domlnus' In reference to himself; and some 
p a l l seems to have been thrown over the whole subject 
of Augustus' most Important acquisition—-Egypt, v/hlch, 
because of I t s peculiar status, received l i t t l e con-
temporary notice. 
29 
Brunt's review of Meyer, pp. 170, 173-6; and 
Wells, The German Policy of Augustus. Introduction. 
''^Meyer, p. 57: 'Elne wesentllche RoLle s p l e l t In 
dlesem Rahmen der Z e l t s l t u a t l o n entsprechend die Nord-
p o l l t l k des Kaisers. I h r gegnuber treten die belden 
Hauptthemen der vorangehenden Z e l t , Brltannlen und die 
Farther, stark zuriick, und wo sle erwahnt werden, da 
geschleht es^*elnem bezelchnenden, veranderten Slnne.' 
V i r g i l died In 19 B.C., before the great northern 
campaigns began. Horace l i v e d u n t i l 8 B.C., when those 
campaigns v/ere at t h e i r height. About 12 B.C. Horace 
wrote two odes celebrating v i c t o r i e s In the north by 
Drusus and Tiberius. V/ars I n Spain fought by Augustus 
or Agrlppa are mentioned In odes 2,6; 3,8; 4, 14;, and 
e p i s t l e 1, 12. But, f o r the numerous references to Par-
t h l a , see Appendix A. Propertlus, v/ho Lived at Least 
to 16 B.C. and perhaps Longer, makes several references 
to Parthla and a couple to B r i t a i n , but never mentions 
Spain or Germany. Ovid has a few words about the West 
and repeats the formulas about Parthla, but he Is not 
of the same generation as the other Augustan poets. 
By contrast, Vellelus Paterculus, who served I n 
the East f o r at Least three years and I n Germany and 
Pannonla under Tiberius f o r eight, devotes twenty chap-
ters to operations I n Europe and s i x to eastern a f f a i r s 
during the reign of Augustus. 
I n regard to coins, there Is nothing to compare 
w i t h the size of the Issues concerning Parthla and Ar-
menia. Discussing Augustus' coinage, Mattlngly says: 
'He writes large the tale of his Parthian and Armenian 
successes, has Less to say of the German wars and, hot 
s u r p r i s i n g l y , nothing at a l l of the revolt of Pahnonla 
and the disaster of Varus.' (Roman Imperial C i v i l i s a t i o n 
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The question may contain I t s own answer. I f we con-
slder that propaganda I s , e s s e n t i a l l y , not the praise of 
achievements, but the preparation f o r them, or the com-
pensation f o r t h e i r lack. L i t t l e propaganda, before or 
a f t e r . Is found concerning Augustus' real m i l i t a r y a c t i -
v i t i e s : I f a campaign I s a success. I t w i l l speak for 
I t s e l f or can be magnified l a t e r ; I f a campaign Is a 
f a i l u r e , the less said before and a f t e r , the better. 
But I f e f f o r t s are being made to achieve something 
by means which are not Inherently glorlous^^—through 
clandestine diplomatic bargaining, f o r example—'then a 
great deal of propaganda Is called f o r to squeeze out 
the l a s t ounce of prestige value. I t was thus w i t h 
Parthla, as w i t h Brltaln."^^ Both were distant and 
(New York, 1959), p. 48). The only reference to wars In 
Europe I s found on a coin of 8 B.C. depicting a German 
hostage (H. Mattlngly, Coins of the Roman Empire I n the 
B r i t i s h Museum (London^.1923) I , no. 492. 
''^Augustus' achievement In B r i t a i n was that, even 
though he did nothing, he managed to create the quite 
f a l s e Impr^esslon that Brltaln^was 'aln^ost a R9man coun-
t r y ' {fjtxi oimav (rxtS6v7i wxpeaK.iun'^a^/Toh PwjAaiow oXnv T^V vncrov 
Strabo 4, 5, 3),. Also see RG 32. . . • ' 
"^^For t h i s view of Augustus' use of propaganda, I 
am Indebted to R.G. Colllngwood's a r t i c l e on Augustan 
po l i c y toward B r i t a i n , I n CAH. X,.pp. 793-4: '...Augus-
. tus, who always had plenty to do nearer home, was I n -
c l i n e d to shirk remote f r o n t i e r problems. I t was more 
cha r a c t e r i s t i c of him to advertise an Intention which 
he did not r e a l l y entertain^, than to abandon an enter-
prise once undertaken.... \lt Is uncertain^ ^ whether he 
act u a l l y planned the conquest of B r i t a i n , only to be' 
diverted from I t by other tasks, or whether, recognizing 
from the f i r s t whether these tasks had a p r i o r claim, 
he only allowed others to think he was planning I t . . . . ' ' 
C.E. Stevens ( i n O.G.S. Crav/ford, Aspects of Archae-
ology I n B r i t a i n and Beyond (London, l9 5 l ) , . p. 332} d i s -
agrees on the ground that what Colllngwood proposes Is 
simply bad propaganda technique. But I think there was 
wider scope I n the ancient world f o r t h i s type of 
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causing no Immediate p e r i l , so f a i l u r e to measurie up 
to one's own propaganda--though f a i l u r e I s advisably 
to be kept q u i e t — I s not as serious as f a i l u r e I n 
nearer and more v i t a l regions. Concerning Spain, the . 
f a i l u r e s had to be hushed.'^'' Failure In the Balkans 
34 
caused panic I n Rome. And In Germany^ a minor set-
back required that a scapegoat be found—^M. LoLllus,^"^ 
and a major setback gave r i s e to stories of Augustus 
beating his head on a door.^^ 
To conclude, the Augustan poets' references to 
Parthla are a re f l e x i o n of what Augustus wanted people 
to think: only t h i s , but t h i s very c l e a r l y . The point 
37 
Is not that the poets misunderstood Augustus, but 
that they understood only what he wanted them to. Au-
gustus' h e a r t f e l t Intentions he kept to himself, and we 
propaganda. Factual Information was not sv / l f t l y or 
widely disseminated. There was no active, truth-seek-
ing press. Distant achievements did not have to meas<r.- -
ure up to previous propaganda: the propaganda could 
make small events great. 
"^"^Vell. Pater. 2, 90, 4 asserts that there was no 
. trouble I n Spain a f t e r Augustus L e f t — a Lie: see Syme, 
RR. pp. 332-3 and 333, n. 2. 
'^\elL. Pater. 2, 110, 7; Dlo 55, 31, 1; and Suet. Aug. 25 and Tib. 16. 
^ ^ V e l l . Pater. 2, 97, 1; Dlo 54, 2, 4 f f . ; and Syme, RR. p. 429, n...5. 
"'^Suet. Aug. 23. 
c i i o i ^ d t a , v . L a s s i c a L PntLblogy i Q ^ n „ i-?Q 
w "^ "^^  have, understood Augustus, se^ 
l 5 6 l T 16?""^''' review of Meyer's book. In Gnomon'3f 
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w i l l not discover his foreign policy by accepting at 
face value the v/ords of the poets. 
Chapter Six 
Augustus' Geographical Knov/ledge 
and a Policy of V/orld Conquest 
Views of Augustus' policy toward Parthla have gen-
e r a l l y been shaded by the Image of the Prlnceps as the 
p a c i f i c consolldator and administrator of a Mediterrane-
an-based empire. I f the Image Is altered, the policy 
may be brought Into new perspective; and, happily, P.A. 
Brunt has rendered this great service by laying bare 
some of the vulnerable points I n this t r a d i t i o n a l view 
of Augustus.^ Obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s arise as soon as 
an examination Is made of the Invasions of Arabia and 
2 • ' • 3 Ethiopia and the German campaigns, a l l of which may 
seem to trespass the requirements of f r o n t i e r defence. 
The martial tone of the Res Gestae Dlv l AugustI and of 
Augustan l i t e r a t u r e In general, and the numismatic 
celebrations of cpnquest also challenge the notions of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s . Brunt concludes with a radical 
view: Augustus was Intent on conquering the world, l i t -
e r a l l y ; he would s t a r t In the north, a f t e r a f f a i r s with 
Parthla had been successfully s e t t l e d and shelved; then. 
^Brunt, review of Meyer, pp. 170-6. 
^S. Jameson, 'Chronology of the campaigns of Aellus 
Gallus and C. Petrpnlus,' .JRS 58, 1968, pp. 79ff. 
\ e l l s . The German Poilcv of Augustus, passim. 
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had not the I m p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the North exhausted his 
hopes, Augustus would have turned his f u l l force against 
the East, u n t i l there was nothing Left to conquer. 
Brunt's well-argued opinion Is based most heavily 
on two hypotheses. One I s that the Augustan poets were 
Instigated by the Prlnceps to advertize his Intention 
of conquering the world: so v/e need only believe what 
we read. I have t r i e d In the Last chapter to cast 
doubt on the view that the Intentions which Augustus 
advertized and those which he actually entertained were 
necessarily the same. I shall also c a l l Into question 
the notion that the poets of that age. I n speaking of 
worLd-conqiiest, meant I t as l i t e r a l l y as Brunt seems 
to think.. 
The other p i l l a r of Brunt's argument Is that, In 
the f i r s t century B.C.,-the world was much more 'con-
querable' as f a r as Augustus' knowledge of I t could ex-
tend. I t I s a question of misunderstanding geography. 
This view I would Like to examine now. 
B r i e f l y , Brunt's argument runs: I n Less than ten 
years and w i t h Less than ten Legions, Julius Caesar con-
quered the Gauls, who were regarded as being similar to 
the peoples Living beyond them to the north and e a s t — 
the Germans. According to 'Agrlppa's Map,' Augustus must 
have thought that the distance from'the Rhine to the 
'eastern ocean'—the furthest extent of the world east-
wards—was only three and a h a l f times the east-west 
distance of Gaul; and the world's north-south distance 
was h a l f that t o t a l . . The world was an Island surrounded 
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by Ocean, the only t r u l y secure f r o n t i e r . 'Agrlppa 
himself evidently had no notion of the size of the land-
mass east of the Rhine. \le are not then J u s t i f i e d In 
saying a p r i o r i that conquest beyond the Rhine was un-
thinkable.'^ 
While Brunt Is quite properly o f f e r i n g new and Im-
portant p o s s i b i l i t i e s , he Is also presenting a misleading 
picture of the state of geographical knowledge In the 
time of Augustus. And t h i s point Is c r u c i a l to Brunt's 
argument. 
Long before Columbus, the earth was regarded as a 
g l o b e . A t h i r d century B.C. Greek geographer, Eratos-
thenes, reckoned the globe's circumference as 200,000 
stades—an amazingly close guess.^ But the 'earth' was 
only an Island on the globe, surrounded by the a l l - e n -
c i r c l i n g Ocean. The length of t h i s land-mass was 78,000 
stades, and I t s breadth 38,000, 
Seneca, w r i t i n g f o r t y fears a f t e r the death of Au-
gustus, mentions hov/ Alexander the Great brought himself 
unhapplness by the study of geometry, because he then 
learned how puny was that earth of'which he had seized , 
8 
only a f r a c t i o n . A contemporary of Alexander, Pytheas 
^ r u n t , review of Meyer, p. 175. 
"^ The Pythagorean doctrine of a sphere dates back 
to 400 B.C.: J.J. Tierney, 'The Map of Agrlppa,' Proc. 
Royal I r i s h Acad. 63, 1962-4, p. 160. 
^J. Oliver Thomson. The History of Ancient Geo-
graphy (Cambridge, 1948), p. 166: eight stades were 
normally reckoned to equal a Roman mile. 
'^Ibld.. pp. 164-6. 
8 
Seneca, ad Luclllum 91, 17: '...quam p u s l l l a terra 
esset, ex qua minimum occupaverat.' 
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of Marseilles, was said to have sailed the A t l a n t i c 
and North Sea as f a r as the Elbe, but there were also 
tales of a Seleucld admiral, Patrocles, who voyaged 
around India and Into the Caspian Sea, which v/as con-
sidered a :'gulf' of the outer o c e a n . T h e r e were also 
rumours of Spanish ships v/recked on the Arabian coast 
a f t e r passing below A f r i c a , ^ ^ and of an Indian vessel 
blov/n o f f course and ending up I n Germany. 
I n the second century B.C. Eratosthenes' views were 
questioned by Hlpparchus of Rhodes, v/ho doubted the 
Ocean assumed to be I n the north, and who r i g h t l y denied 
that the Caspian was a g u l f . As f o r the 'alL-enclrcLlng 
Ocean,' Hlpparchus f e l t no answer was possible on the 
available e v i d e n c e . A generation Later, another Greek 
geographer, Artemldorus, accepted Eratosthenes as the 
standard, though he reduced his measurements of the 
earth's Land-mass even further.^ Posldonlus (135-59 
B.C.) was another Greek geographer v/ho. I n f a c t , wrote 
a work about the Ocean; he also repeated the views of 
Eratosthenes.^"^ The next Greek geographer we knov/ well 
Is Strabo, a contemporary of Augustus. Strabo was an-
other follower of Eratosthenes and a muddled representative 
9 
Tlerney, p. 160. 
^°PLlny NH 6, 58. 
^^Jbld., 1,. 67. 
12 
I b i d . ; and Pomponlus Mela 1, 2 and 3, 5. 
^^Thomson, p. 209. 
^Sllny NH 2, 242 and 246; 4, 102. 
^^Thomson, pp. 211 and 213.. 
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of the stagnation of Greek geography at t h i s tlme.^^ 
Strabo perhaps sensed t h i s , but he doubted whether 
the gaps I n Greek geography could ever be f i l l e d by 
17 
any geographer w i t h a Roman m e n t a l i t y . Roman t r a d i -
t i o n s o f geography were based on roads and I t i n e r a r i e s — 
poor s t u f f f o r map-making, unless combined w i t h a s t r o -
18 
nomy, ManlLlus, a poet and contemporary of Augustus, 
was more e n t h u s i a s t i c about a s t r o l o g y . Most of the 
l i t t l e he wrote about the world's geography was r e -
19 
p e t i t i o n o f Posldonlus. 
Educated Romans knew about Greek g e o g r a p h y , b u t 
they were not keenly I n t e r e s t e d , or I n q u i s i t i v e ; ^ ^ and 
some t a l k e d as I f nothing had been l e a r n t since the days 
of A l e x a n d e r . C i c e r o I s a good example of an I n t e l l i -
gent Roman who found s a f e t y I n o b s c u r i t y when discussing 
geography. He accepted'that the world I s a g l o b e , b u t 
spoke obscurely of * the globe of e a r t h r i s i n g from the 
24 
sea.' And he beli e v e d there was another continent on 
^^Tlerney, p. 161; and Thomson, p.' 321f. 
17 
^'strabo 3, 166. 
1 8 
Tlerney, p. 161. The PeutInger Map, perhaps o r i g -
i n a l l y a work of the f o u r t h century A.D., makes no pre-
tences of being p r o p o r t i o n a l and I s concerned only wl.th-
roads and s t a t i o n s . See Thomson, p. 379 and the b i b l i o -
graphy he provides I n the footnote on th a t page. 
19 
M a n l l l u s 4, 58S-817; and Thomson, p. 328. 
^°Clc. Tusc. Dlsp. 1, 16, 40; 1, 28, 68; 5, 24, 64; 
ND 2, 66; Caesar mentions Eratosthenes, BS. 6, 24. 
^Hhomson, p. 199. ^ ^ I b l d . . . p. 319 
"^^ ND 2, 66: ' lucundum mundum cognosclmus esse r o -
tundum."'" 
24 Tusc. Dlsp.. 1. 68: 'globus t e r r a e emlnentem e marl.' 
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the other side o f the w o r l d , what the Greeks c a l l e d 
jxvriyfioyg. — w h i c h was u n i n h a b i t a b l e , ^ ^ 
The Romans were very confused I n t h e i r terminology. 
The phrase o r b l s terrarum became c l o s e l y I d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
'the Inhabited e a r t h ' — a s opposed to the e a r t h as a 
globe ( f o r which no term was Invented), and a l s o , 
perhaps, as opposed to * the uninhabited e a r t h , ' both sea 
27 
and l a n d . The globe was used as a symbol of the cos-
28 
mlc power o f a monarch, a H e l l e n i s t i c bequest. I n h i s 
own l i f e t i m e , a statue o f Caesar was 'mounted on a l l k e -
29 
ness o f the Inhabited world.' On a coi n of Augustus 
Issued s h o r t l y a f t e r Actlum, Neptune. I s depicted w i t h 
one f o o t on a globe—^symbolic of the power which the 
naval v i c t o r y brought Augustus.''^ V i r g i l speaks of the • 
^•^Clc. Tusc. D l s P i ' l . 68 
^^Thomson, p. 201. 
27 
Ovid, I n a rare d i s p l a y of q u a l i f i e d hyperbole,.-
l i m i t s the ext e n t of Augustus' f u t u r e conquests to tha t 
p a r t o f the w o r l d ('o r b l s , ' l i n e 435) which I s h a b i t a -
b l e CMetam. 15, 830-1): 
'Quodcunque h a b l l a b i l e t e l l u s 
s u s t l n e t , hulus e r l t : pontus quoque s e r v l e t t i l l . ' 
28 
P. Lambrechts, 'Note sur un buste en bronze de 
Mercure au Musee de Namur,' L'Ant. Classloue. 1938, 
pp. 218-20. On the confusion over v/hether the globe 
symbolizes c e l e s t i a l or e a r t h l y power, see S.A. Strong, 
JRS 6, 1916, p. 42. 
^^Dlo 43, 14: r| oi»tov/i^ v»). 
^°G.F. H i l l , H i s t o r i c a l Roman Coins (London, 1909), 
p. 134. Republican coinage from the time of S u l l a used 
the globe as a symbol of w o r l d - r u l e : A. Schlachter, Per 
Globus. Seine Entstehung und Verwendung I n der AntlTce" 
(1927;, pp. 64fT7" The eaTTCest example T~found oi' a 
globe on Republican coinage was f o r the year 76 B.C.: 
Grueber. Coins R. Rep.. I I , p. 358. 
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'world p a c i f i e d by h i s f a t h e r ' s v l r t u e s ' ^ ^ and V e l l e l u s 
Paterculus echoes w i t h the 'v/orld p a c i f i e d by h i s con-
quests':''^ both phrases are t y p i c a l of the extravagant 
way Roman w r i t e r s described Rome's conquests, as I f they 
embraced a l l peoples and lands, although the same w r i t e r s 
must have r e a l i z e d t h a t a large p a r t of the globe's sur-
face, was q u i t e unknown. 
I t seems apparent t h a t the Romans were f a r too baf-
f l e d by the science o f geography to be able t o formulate 
and accept even misconceptions. Contradictions were aL-
lowed t o . p e r s l s t , because the whole subject seemed so 
34 
remote, and was b e t t e r l e f t to the Greeks. 
However, w i t h the r e i g n o f Augustus, geography took 
on a new Importance, and I t s study seemed appeallngly . 
pragmatic. Whether Augustus Intended to conquer the 
w o r l d or n o t . I t cannot'be denied t h a t , by any standard 
or e x t e n t o f knowledge, Augustus Indeed r u l e d a large 
chunk o f I t . Augustus had a vested and a c t i v e I n t e r e s t 
I n the geography o f the world.'^'^ The famous 'Map of -
^ V i r g i l E e l . 4, 17; 'pacatumque reget p a t r l l s v i r -
t u t l b u s orbem."" 
• ^ ^ e l l . Pater. 2, 89, 3: 'pacatumque v l c t o r l l s t e r -
rarum o r b l s . ' 
'^'^Thomson, p. 220. Ovid I s exceedingly loose v/lth 
the v/ord ' o r b l s ' and w i t h the v/hole n o t i o n of world con-
quest: Metam. I S , 435; F a s t i 1, 85, 282, 599, 71 1 f f . ; 
2, 130, 136, 683; 4, 858-62; but so I s T l b u l l u s 3, 4, 
145-50; V l t r u v l u s , De arch. 1 , 1 ; and, l a t e r , Lucan 
Phars. 1, 369; Florus 2, 34, .6 and Oroslus 1 , 1 , 6 and! 
3 , 8 , 5 . 
34 
Clc. ad A t t . 2, 4 and 6-8. 
,c ^ ^ ^ l Augustus' contacts w i t h I n d i a (RG 31 and Strabo 
15, 1, 4; and the need f o r geographical knowledge of the 
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Agrlppa' c e r t a i n l y was approved, and perhaps I n s t i g a t e d , 
by A u g u s t u s . M o d e r n reconstructions of Agrlppa's map 
form the basis o f Brunt's view'that Augustus Imagined 
the w o r l d t o be e a s i l y conquerable •"'^  However, the r e -
38 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s are very confused, and the conclusions 
and assumptions we draw out of Agrlppa's map must take 
I n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the I n t e n t and purposes which went 
I n t o I t . 
That there were any s c i e n t i f i c alms Involved I s 
39 
very much to be doubted. The approach. Judging from 
the r e s u l t s , d i d not amount t o an o f f i c i a l geographic 
40 
survey. Eratostheneis' map, as revised by such men 
routes t o and from I n d i a may have been an added Incentive 
t o A e l l u s Gallus' campaign I n Arabia; c e r t a i n l y , the lack 
of geographical knowledge c o n t r i b u t e d t o Gallus' f a i l u r e : 
Thomson, p. 295. 
b) Before Galus Caesar's e x p e d i t i o n east (2 B.C.), 
I t I s probable t h a t Augustus commissioned I s l d o r u s of 
Charax t o . c h a r t c e r t a i n areas: P l i n y NH 6, 141. I s l d o r u s ' 
one e x t a n t work I s Pa r t h i a n S t a t i o n s . 
c) I n RG 26, Augustus boasts that h i s f l e e t s a i l e d 
along the German coast (probably I n A.D. 5) f u r t h e r than 
any Roman had gone before; al s o noted by Tac. Ger. 34; 
P l i n y NH 2, 167; V e i l . Pater. 2, 106; and Suet'7Tlaud> 1. 
See al s o R. Dion, 'Un passage des Res Gestae D l v l Augustl.' 
Melanges Carcoplno. 1966, pp. 2 4 9 f f . ' 
^ ^ P l l n y NH 3, 17; and Thomson, p. 333. 
"^^Brunt c i t e s A. K l o t z , K i l o 24, 1931. pp. 3 8 6 f f . , 
but adds, 'there are some u n c e r t a i n t i e s . ' (p* 175). 
38 -
See Appendix B. Thomson w r i t e s : 'The evidence 
I s s l i g h t and obscure, and a f t e r a vast discussion (most-
l y German) the map remains ghostly.' ( p . 334). 
39 
Tlerney, p. 164, f o l l o w i n g K l o t z , p. 464. I n . 
agreement I s R. Helnze, Die Augustelsche K u l t u r (Darm-
s t a d t , 1960), p. 80: ' P o l l t l s c h , wenn man w i l l . n a t i o n a l , 
n l c h t w l s s e r i s c h a f t l l c h , v/ar auch die Tendenz von Agrlppa's 
V r e l t k a r t e . ' 
40 Thomson, p. 333. 
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as P o l y b l u s , Posldonlus and Artemldorus, was taken over 
by Agrlppa, whose c h i e f p r i d e was the exactness of h i s 
41 
measurements, f o r which P l i n y praised him. But these 
measurements were drawn from-roads and I t i n e r a r i e s ; f o r 
areas which were not much t r a v e l l e d , h i s measurements 
lacked foundation. Strabo r e f e r s to Agrlppa's map only 
42 
I n connection w i t h the geography of M a l y . 
This map, v/hlch lacked not only s c i e n t i f i c v i s i o n 
t o look beyond the Greeks and I n t o the unknown, but 
which a l s o lacked p r a c t i c a l accuracy outside the reach 
of much-travelled roads, was yet considered worth d i s -
p l a y i n g before the Roman people. I t was painted on the 
p o r t i c o of the Campus Agrlppae; but the b u i l d i n g was not 
43 
even begun before Agrlppa's death I n 12 B.C., and was 
• 44 
S t i l l u n f i n i s h e d I n 7 B.C. The e n t i r e p r o j e c t was 
45 
completed by Augustus.^ One may reasonably wonder 
whose character and purposes were r e f l e c t e d most I n the 
f i n i s h e d product. 
Tlerney discusses the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the map may 
a c t u a l l y be emphasizing a moment I n a h i s t o r i c a l devel-
46 
opment and a Roman's p r i d e I n that-development. ' From 
h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the measurements, Tlerney d i v i d e s . 
41 
Regarding the measurements f o r Baetlca, P l i n y 
^2i 3, 17; Tlerney, p. 164; and K l o t z , pp. 463-4. 
42 
Thomson, p. 332. 
"^•^Pllny NH 3, 17. 
l o 55, 8, 4. 
"^^Pllny NH 3, 17. 
'^^TLerney, p. 165.. 
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the described areas I n t o three groups. I n the f i r s t , 
'v/here t h i s process I s complete, we have ready-made 
provinces': e i g h t I n Europe, three I n A f r i c a and three 
I n A s i a . I n the second group the process I s s t i l l going 
on, and here are 'the rav/ m a t e r i a l s of provinces-to-be, 
which are s t i l l p a r t s of large and scarcely known areas!: 
Germany, Dacla, Sarmatla, Mauretanla and Armenia. The 
t h i r d c l a s s , where no Roman arms have conquered, con-
s i s t s o f I n d i a , Media, Mesopotamia and Arabia, which 
Tlerney describes as 'enormous, amorphous masses lumped 
47 
together as geographical u n i t s . ' 
Tlerney conjectures t h a t the map was painted onto 
the p o r t i c o w a l l by separate regions and one a t a time, 
and o n l y a f t e r the v^hole work had been completed was 
Agrlppa's'name c h i s e l l e d or painted above I t . This 
would e x p l a i n why Strabo r e f e r s t o I t only as 'our choro-
48 
graphic map' and t o I t s maker as 'the chorographer': 
perhaps Strabo saw an uncompleted map, f o r he uses I t s 
I n f o r m a t i o n on I t a l y and nothing e l s e ; and I t would be 
l o g i c a l t h a t I t a l y should be represented f i r s t , as being 
of most I n t e r e s t and accuracy. Strabo comments tri a t the 
map, or r a t h e r the p a r t he saw o f I t , was f u l l of decora-
t i v e f e a t u r e s — d e p i c t i o n s of n a t u r a l topography, and names 
49 
of t r i b e s and famous c i t i e s . This would be e a s i l y done 
4 7 
Tlerney, p. 165. The d e p i c t i o n s of less knovm 
regions need not have been 'enormous,' but simply ob-
scure. Ptolemy complained about c e r t a i n world maps v/hlch 
gave most of the room to Europe and squeezed diminished 
versions of A f r i c a and Asia I n t o the space t h a t was l e f t . 
( P t o l . 8, 1, 2; and Thomson, p. 333). 
^^Strabo 2, 5, 7. ' . ^^md. 
96 
m the case of I t a l y ; but other regions, by comparison, 
. v/ould c e r t a i n l y seem d u l l — a s w e l l .as 'amorphous.' 
Again c o n j e c t u r i n g w i t h Tlerney, perhaps t h i s con-
t r a s t was purposeful. At t h i s l a t e date, the l a s t de-
cade before our era, Augustus was nearlng h i s s i x t i e s , 
and was probably I n t e r e s t e d not so much I n boasting what 
he could do as I n e x p l a i n i n g v^hat he had, or had n o t , 
done."^^ So here I s the reason v/hy these areas of the 
w o r l d had not been absorbed I n t o the empire: they were 
not w o r t h the e f f o r t . 
This l a s t b i t of conjecture proposes a l t e r n a t i v e s 
t o Brunt's assumptions which are eq u a l l y possible; but 
my r e a l hope I s tha t I have demonstrated some of the 
weaknesses I n Brunt's theories about Augustus' knov/ledge 
and use of geography. 
As a r e f l e x i o n o f . o f f i c i a l I n t e r e s t I n the geo-
graphy of the w o r l d , Agrtppa's map serves poorly. I t 
was more f o r popular consumption. I f Augustus were 
planning the conquest of the w o r l d . I t I s u n l i k e l y he 
would e n t r u s t the outcome o f such a dangerous task t o 
the ancient theories of Greek geographers, who were 
discordant among themselves and a l t o g e t h e r confusing to. 
even the most I n t e l l i g e n t Romans. The evidence I s tha t 
Augustus v/as a l l too aware of h i s own I g n o r a n c e . I f 
the Prlnceps commissioned a map t o be made as u s e f u l l y 
The Res Gestae I s v / r l t t e n I n t h i s s p i r i t : ' . . . t o 
represent h i s act i o n s I n the best possible l i g h t f o r 
p o s t e r i t y . ' (Brunt and Moore, Res Gestae D l v l August I . , 
p. 3, I n a discussion of the Res Gestae's l i t e r a r y 
genre, the e l o g l a ) . 
"^ S^ee note 35. 
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d e f i n i t i v e as p o s s i b l e , t h i s was not I t , 
According t o Brunt, Augustus advanced no f u r t h e r 
I n h i s plan f o r w o r l d conquest than Germany, However,• 
t h i s c r u c i a l campaign should not be considered the r e -
s u l t o f a geographical m i s c a l c u l a t i o n , but rat h e r the 
probing f o r geographical c e r t a i n t y . I t seemed possible 
t h a t an advance of the f r o n t i e r might, shorten the l i n e , 
a d e s i r e d aim and a proper sequel to the achievements 
I n the Balkans. I n t h i s , I am going back to the views 
presented by Ronald Syme I n CAH, X, chapter 12, I n h i s 
dis c u s s i o n of the campaigns I n Germany. 
'Imperfect geographical knowledge may w e l l have 
encouraged undue hopes both of the ease w i t h which 
such a conquest could be made and of the advantages 
which would accrue from I t : but I t was worth the 
attempt, and only Invasion and e x p l o r a t i o n could 
g i v e a f i n a l ansv/er.' (p.. 353). 
\ie must yet discover whether t h i s p o l i c y of probing 
f o r a more secure f r o n t i e r , as opposed to a p o l i c y of 
w o r l d conquest (which I cannot accept), w i l l shed l i g h t 
on Augustus' r e l a t i o n s w i t h P a r t h l a . 
Chapter Seven 
Octavlan I n 29 B.C. 
With Antonlus dead, Octavlan became the sole r u l e r 
of the Roman w o r l d . A t t a i n i n g t h i s g l o r y had not been 
easy: h o l d i n g on to I t would prove no l i g h t e r task. The 
sole r u l e r had y e t a m u l t i t u d e o f enemies opposing him 
w i t h i n Rome. His power was supreme, but not u n l i m i t e d : 
the empire could not be run wi t h o u t the help of an o l i -
garchy.^ Octavlan.was a t the pinnacle of p r e s t i g e , but 
I t was a precarious p o s i t i o n . His task now was t o make 
permanent a s i t u a t i o n which could so e a s i l y become 
ephemeral. 
Octavlan was a Roman magistrate; I n 29 B.C. he en-
tered upon h i s f i f t h consulship. But h i s r e a l source 
of power l a y I n the support he derived from h i s g r i p on 
the army and the people. He nov/ commanded some s i x t y 
l e g i o n s , ^ of which most were less than f u l l s t r e n g t h : 
the heirlooms o f the defunct dynasts, Pompelus, Caesar, 
Lepldus, Sextus and Antonlus. These l e g i o n s , he de-
c i d e d , were twice what he neieded or dared maintain. 
Octavlan had very fev; generals he could dare tempt w i t h 
the command of a dozen or so l e g i o n s . I n the end he 
^Syme, RR, p. 307. 
H^.M.D. Parker, The Roman Legions (Oxford, 1928), 
p. 78; Syme, RR, p. 304 estimates n e a r l y seventy legions. 
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chose t o discharge- about h a l f the l e g i o n s , d i s t r i b u t i n g 
the remaining twenty-eight or so^ over various parts of 
the empire. 
Octavlan'.s pre-eminence over a l l other Roman mag-
i s t r a t e s , generals and consular colleagues ( f o r a l l 
twenty-four l l c t o r s f o l l o w e d him) had been l e g i t i m i z e d , 
as I t were, through the oath taken by the people of 
I t a l y I n 32 B.C., swearing a l l e g i a n c e to Octavlan. 
By h i s own account, the oath was d i r e c t l y connected 
w i t h the war which he would w i n a t Actlum.^ I t was to 
be a war, not against the Roman Antonlus, but against 
the o r i e n t a l Cleopatra. Octavlan c a r e f u l l y c u l t i v a t e d 
I t a l y ' s already e x i s t e n t d i s t a s t e f o r the East.^ 
I t was a determined e f f o r t by Octavlan. Antonlus' 
Donations to Cleopatra and her c h i l d r e n gave Octavlan 
an excuse f o r not allowl'ng the c e l e b r a t i o n of Antonlus' 
conquest of Armenia. Antonlus' r e j e c t i o n of the gentle 
Octavla was played to the h i l t . Octavlan made p u b l i c 
Antonlus' w i l l , ' I n which the legacies to Cleopatra's 
c h i l d r e n and Antonlus' s t i p u l a t i o n . t h a t he be b u r l e d 
next t o the Egyptian queen I n Alexandria s t a r t e d w i l d 
rumours I n Rome t h a t the C i t y would be surrendered and 
7 
Alexandria made the c a p i t a l . 
^Syme, 'Some Notes on the Legions under Augustus,* 
JRS 23, 1933, pp. 1 4 f f . 
\G 25; Suet, Aug. 17; and Syme, RR, pp. 284-5. 
•^RG 25. 
^M.P, Charlesworth, 'The Fear o f the Orient I n the 
Roman Empire,' The Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l Journal I I , 1926, 
P« 9. 
Dlo 50, 3, 5; 4, .1-2. S i m i l a r rumours of 
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There was now a cause, the p r e s e r v a t i o n of I t a l i a n 
manners and I n s t i t u t i o n s . The war would be a cr u s a d e — 
be Hum lustum plijmgue—land archaic r i t u a l s were per-
formed. 
A f t e r Actlum, though he had freed himself of Anto-
9 
n l u s , was Octavlan a prisoner o f h i s own propaganda? 
The b a t t l e I t s e l f had been a shabby a f f a i r , an a n t i -
climax: so I t was duly g l o r i f i e d to equal the e a r l i e r 
d r a m a . T h e coins proclaimed AEGYPTO CAPTA:^^ no a l -
l u s i o n s anywhere to Antonlus. But these were words. 
and phrases: Octavlan could toy w i t h them. I n the 
more Important matter o f deeds, Octavlan was not bound 
by h i s own propaganda against Antonlus' actions I n the 
12 • • 
East. He was fr e e to keep or change. I t I s safe to r e j e c t any n o t i o n t h a t Octavlan I n -
13 ^ 
tended to become a new.Alexander. No ex p e d i t i o n of 
conquest would give him more power or solve the empire's 
t r a n s f e r r i n g the c a p i t a l to the East were spread about 
J u l i u s Caesar ( N l c . Dam. 2 0 ) , though Nlcolaus may be 
f a b l i n g a b i t here, f o r he was a contemporary of Augus- . 
t u s , about v/hom s i m i l a r rumours were rai s e d and qyielled. 
See Horace Od. 3, 3, 57f.; V i r g i l Aen. 12, 828; and Llv y 
5, 5 1 f f . , who t e l l s an e d i f y i n g s t o r y about Camlllus. 
Dlo 50, 4, 5; and Syme, 'Llvy and Augustus,* Har-
vard Studies I n C l a s s i c a l P h l l o l o g v 64^ 1959, p. 56 
9 
Klenast, p. 452 and Charlesworth, 'Fear of the 
O r i e n t , ' p. 9 are both a f f i r m a t i v e . 
^°Syme, RR, p. 297; and V i r g i l . A e n . S", 67 8 f f . 
^^Sutherland, Coinage, p. 28. 
^^Syme, RR, .p> 300. 
^^See chapters 5 and 6. 
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a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems, which he was not attempting 
to escape. S t a b i l i t y v/as h i s dedicated goal; the means 
could vary. The forc e o f s i x t y l e g i o n s , which might 
have been used f o r f u r t h e r I m p e r i a l conquests, Octavlan 
cu t by h a l f . . 
I n Syria Octavlan l e f t only a g a r r i s o n of about 
14 15 f o u r l e g i o n s , \ and tv/o more I n Egypt. This was no 
Invasion f o r c e ; and even w i t h a u x i l i a r i e s , there would 
s t i l l be too few troops to prevent the Parthlans cross-
i n g I n t o S y r i a . Indeed, I t appears t h a t the legions 
were s t a t i o n e d w e l l back from the E u p h r a t e s . T h i s 
I n d i c a t e s a great deal about Octavlan's I n t e n t i o n s , 
which showed respect f o r geographic and s t r a t e g i c r e a l -
i t i e s . 
The Euphrates r i v e r and the Syrian desert are a 
strong b a r r i e r t o Invading f o r c e s , east or west. But 
the f r o n t i e r s u f f e r s from a s a l i e n t a t Osrhoene, where 
the r i v e r makes a w e s t e r l y bend which p o i n t s s t r a i g h t 
at S y r i a , A n t l o c h , and routes t o the coast and C l l l c l a . 
Pacorus e x p l o i t e d t h i s s a l i e n t I n 52 B.C. and again 
w i t h Lablenus I n 41 B.C. Carrhae I s only f i f t y miles 
to the east o f the r i v e r . - Crassus' Legions were de-
stroyed here because I t was.;;good t e r r a i n f o r Parthian 
^'^Parker, p. 126; and J.G.C. Anderson, CAH, X, p. 
255. See also Syme, 'Notes on Legions,' p. 3 1 . 
^^Parker, I b i d . Parker f e e l s t h a t the main con-
cern was perhaps the p r o t e c t i o n of Egypt. 
^ ^ I b l d , . p, 128, I n the r e i g n of T i b e r i u s three 
l e g i o n s o f the Syrian g a r r i s o n can be located: one each 
at Apamea on the Orontes (Tac, Ann. 2, 79, 3 ) , I n Cvrrhus, 
on the road from Antloch to Zeugma ( I b i d . . 2, 57, 2) and 
one a t Raphanae (Jos..BJ 7, 1, 3 ) . 
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horse-archers. To the n o r t h I s the more mountainous 
r e g i o n , southern Armenia, through which Caesar had 
planned to march and Antonlus e v e n t u a l l y d i d . Armenia 
provided cover and was needed as a place to which the 
Roman forces could withdraw or r e t r e a t . 
The r e s u l t I s t h a t Armenia was of no special s t r a -
t e g i c value t o an a t t a c k i n g Parthian f o r c e , whereas I t 
was e s s e n t i a l t o a Roman Invasion f o r c e . I f the Romans 
were not planning t o Invade, Armenia had no Immediate 
17 
Importance; aside from the p r e s t i g e of detaching from 
P a r t h l a one o f her vassals. And the Parthlans knew tha t 
l o s i n g ^Armenia made them v u l n e r a b l e . E v e n t u a l l y , f o r 
t h i s reason, Armenia took on value I n Roman eyes: I t 
enabled them to punish any I n c u r s i o n the Parthlans 
might make I n t o S y r i a , whose f r o n t i e r could not e a s i l y 
be secured by l i n e a r defences. This I s defence by the 
18 
d e t e r r i n g t h r e a t of p u n i t i v e offence. 
Armenia had been l o s t by the Romans when, during 
the war of Actlum, Phraates was able to regain h i s own 
throne and place Artaxes on the Armenian throne. Since 
Octavlan was planning no Invasion of P a r t h l a , Arme'nla 
was o f no great Importance to him. Moreover, Octavlan 
had no reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t P a r t h l a was.In a p o s i t i o n 
t o make tr o u b l e worth punishing. Phraates had only j u s t 
recovered h i s throne, and there were other means by 
which the Parthlans could be kept I n check. 
17 
For a discussion of the economic Importance of 
t h i s area, see pp. . 
18 
D. Oates, Studies I n the Ancient H l s t o r v of North-
e r n I r a q (London, 1968), pp. 68-9. 
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Octavlan's p r i o r i t y was to maintain the l o y a l t y of 
the East as f a r as the Euphrates. Antonlus had done t h i s 
by e n t r u s t i n g most of the area (except f o r three actual 
provinces) to the c o n t r o l of l o c a l k i n g s , who were not of . 
dynastic f a m i l i e s , but were able men and 'loyal to Antonl-
19 
us. This h a l t e d Pompelus' premature attempts a t u r -
b a n i z a t i o n , ^ ^ cut dovm on the need f o r Roman administra-
t i o n , and formed a system o f armed b u f f e r states as an 
obstacle to the Parthlans. 
These acts by Antonlus had a t the time been associ-
ated by Octavlan w i t h Antonlus' o v e r a l l moral and p o l i -
t i c a l surrender to o r i e n t a l i s m . But tha t was unimpor-
t a n t now: Octavlan was Pharoah of Egypt.and worshipped 
throughout the East. Octavlan not only saw the wisdom 
of Antonlus' p o l i c y I n I t s general l i n e s , but even con-
firmed I n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s the very, men whom Antonlus 
had selected and who had been l o y a l t o hlm.^^ The Dona-
22 
t l o n s to Cleopatra's c h i l d r e n were, of course, cancelled} 
but they had only been symbolic anyway. Of Antonlus' 
c l i e n t - k i n g s , most had not been die-hards, but had come 
over to Octavlan I n time. Amyntas, ki n g of G a l a t l a , had 
aided Octavlan, and h i s kingdom was now Increased by the 
a d d i t i o n o f I s a u r l a and C l l l c l a Trachela, which had a t 
23 
one time been Roman p r o v i n c i a l t e r r i t o r y . Archelaus 
19 
See p. 58. 
^^Buchhelm, chs. 1 and 2. 
^^Tarn, CAH, X, pp. 113ff, ; Syme, RR, pp. 3 0 0 f f . ; 
and Magle, RRIAM. pp. 440-5, 
^^ RG 31 and.32. 
23 
Dlo 5 1 , 2, 1 ; and Strabo .12, 5,1 and I t , 5, 6. 
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o f Cappadocla was allov/ed t o remain as he was, though 
24 
l a t e r h i s t e r r i t o r y was Increased. Herod of Judaea 
l a i d h i s diadem before Octavlan,, who replaced I t and 
also gave Herod most o f Palestine to r u l e . ^ ^ Polemo, 
k i n g o f Pontus, was r e t a i n e d and given permission t o 
expand t o the north e a s t ; however, f o r a sp e c i a l reason,, 
Lesser Armenia was taken from hlm.^^ 
Artaxes, who hated the Romans, now ruled Greater 
Armenia. But Octavlan had I n h i s possession two of 
27 
Artaxes' b r o t h e r s , who might be used as pretenders 
t o h i s throne. Artaxes kne\y t h i s , and demanded the r e -
28 
t u r n o f h i s b r o t h e r s ; Octavlan refused^ 
Artavasdes the Mede, d r i v e n out by Phraates and 
Arta x e s , was received by Octavlan, even though the Mede 
had been a f r i e n d o f Antonlus. Octavlan took f a i t h I n 
h i s h a t r e d of Artaxes and placed him on the throne of 
29 
Lesser Armenia, a u s e f u l p o s i t i o n -
By r e f u s i n g to r e t u r n Artaxes' brothers and sup-
p o r t i n g the c l i e n t - k i n g s . I n c l u d i n g Artavasdes the Mede, 
Oc.tavlan v/as c o n t i n u i n g Antonlus' p o l i c i e s I n the East. 
And, l i k e Antonlus, Octavlan now possessed T l r l d a \ e s . 
^ ^ l o 5 1 , 2, 1. 
^^Jos. AJ 15, 5-7. 
^ S l o 53, 25, 1. . 
27 
These had been taken along w i t h t h e i r f a t h e r , Ar-
.tavasdes o f Armenia, to Alexandria by Antonlus. I n 3 0 B.C. 
Cleopatra had Artavasdes k i l l e d , but the brothers f e l l 
I n t o Octavlan's hands. 
^ S l o . 5 1 , 16, 2. 
^%lo 54, 9 j 3. 
Chapter E i g h t 
Octavlan and T l r l d a t e s , 30-25 B.C. 
A f t e r T l r l d a t e s f l e d to Octavlan I n Syria I n the 
w i n t e r o f 30/29 B.C., the v i c t o r i o u s Phraates IV sent 
envoys t o Octavlan,^ Dlo says t h a t Octavlan negotiated 
w i t h them I n a f r i e n d l y way—ftAiKws txpT}|i<iT»ffe. This must 
be q u a l i f i e d , f o r there could be no f r i e n d s h i p w i t h 
Phraates a t t h i s stage. As the verb I m p l i e s , I t was a 
business t r a n s a c t i o n . Octavlan, as Dlo s p e c i f i e s , had 
not promised T l r l d a t e s any a i d , y e t permitted him t o 
l i v e I n S y r i a . ^ Octavlan v/as thus making P a r t h l a an 
o f f e r and a t h r e a t a t the same time. The object of 
both v/as the humbling o f Phraates, which could only be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y demonstrated through the r e s t i t u t i o n of 
the standards o f Crassus. The p r e s t i g e associated w i t h 
the r e t u r n of these standards was great: Octavlan did-
not need to seek more, f o r t h i s would symbolize submls-
s l o n . But from Phraates' p o i n t of view, the shame of 
surrendering .the standards was e q u a l l y g r e a t , and n e i -
t h e r the value o f Octavlan's t h r e a t of using T l r l d a t e s 
nor the value o f h i s promise not to could make up f o r 
the loss of p r e s t i g e Phraates would s u f f e r I f he r e -
turned the standards won I n b a t t l e . 
On January 1, 29 B.C. Octavlan entered I n t o h i s 
f i f t h s consulship w h i l e he was s t i l l i n S y r i a . On tha t 
^Dlo 5 1 , 1 8 , 3 . ^ I b l d . 
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day i n Rome the senate r a t i f i e d a l l h i s a c t s . A few 
v/eeks Later a l e t t e r a r r i v e d from Octavlan about the 
Parthlans.^ Probably I t contained the f i r s t Information 
the Romans had heard o f the f a c t t h a t a pretender to the 
P a r t h i a n throne was I n Octavlan's possession and t h a t 
Phraates had sent envoys to him. Possibly more was s a i d , 
r e f l e c t i n g Octavlan's expectation of recovering Crassus' 
standards and the p r i s o n e r s . Whatever was I n the l e t t e r . 
I t was enough t o I n c i t e the senate I n t o decreeing an un-
precedented number o f honours and t r i b u t e s to Octavlan: 
h i s name v/as to be Included I n the sacred hymns; a t r i b e 
v/ould be c a l l e d ' J u l i a n ' a f t e r him; the day he entered 
the C i t y would be held sacred f o r evermore, and so on. 
Octavlan accepted n e a r l y a l l the honours, and the one 
which pleased hliti most was the c l o s i n g of the gates of 
Janus, Implying th a t a l l Rome's wars had ceased. I t 
was the s o r t o f a n t i q u a r i a n formula Octavlan r e l i s h e d , 
but was never bound by. I t d i d not mean there would be 
no f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s : Indeed, a t tha t very moment 
Rome's forces were f i g h t i n g the T r e v e r l I n Gaul and the 
Cantabrl and Astures I n S p a i n . B u t as Octavlan'was 
preparing to celebrate h i s t r i p l e t r i u m p h — f o r I l l y r t c u m , 
Actlum and Alexandria, a l l ' f o r e i g n ' wars^—he. had a . 
• ' D I O 5 1 , 20, 1. 
I b i d . . 2-4. By Dlo's account, these seem to be ad-
d i t i o n a l honours v/hlch the senate ' f u r t h e r appointed' 
(TtpoffKaTecTTrjaavTo ) a f t e r the a r r i v a l of the l e t t e r con-
c e r n i n g P a r t h l a (etTiiSrj KOI Ta TJ<P"I TWV ]Top0wv Ypafi|XaTtt r]kQtv ) . 
Honours decreed s o l e l y because of Actlum are l i s t e d I n 
5 1 , 19, 6-7. 
^ I b l d . . 5. . ^Syme, RR, p. 303. 
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r i g h t t o f e e l t h a t there v/ould be no need to f i g h t the 
Parthlans.. His arrangements I n the East v/ere an Im-
provement even on Antonlus* sound p o l i c y . Though Rome 
had l o s t c o n t r o l of Armenia, Octavlan not only possessed 
pretenders to I t s throne, but als o had Artavasdes the 
i-lede s t a t i o n e d I n Lesser Armenia. And the a c q u i s i t i o n 
o f Egypt compensated f o r a great d e a l . 
The recovery of Crassus' standards would have no 
such s t r a t e g i c or p r a c t i c a l Importance, but the tremen-
dous p r e s t i g e value would n i c e l y cap o f f Octavlan's a r-
rangements, not only I n the East, but I n Rome. Conse-
q u e n t l y , Octavlan must have f e l t some disappointment 
when he r e a l i z e d t h a t Phraates was not going to surren-
der the standards, but was Instead c a l l i n g Octavlan's 
b l u f f . 
« « ^ « » « 
There are Parthian tetradrachms found I n Seleucla 
which are dated May, 26 B.C. and March, 25 B.C. They 
bear the unusual legend ^lAOPdMAlQ . These dates are 
I n the middle o f the t h l r t y - s l x year rei g n of Phraates 
IV, but I t I s Inconceivable t h a t Phraates would employ 
such a legend. The coins are commonly a t t r i b u t e d to 
T l r l d a t e s . That T l r l d a t e s made a second attempt f o r 
the P a r t h i a n throne I s evidenced I n statements by I s i -
dore o f Charax and Dlo Casslus. 
I s i d o r e says t h a t T l r l d a t e s , w h i l e an e x i l e , made 
o 
an inv a s i o n o f P a r t h l a . From the c o i n evidence, the 
7 
McDowell, pp. 185 and 222. 
o 
I s i d o r e o f Charax, Parthian S t a t i o n s . 1. 
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Invasion appears to have begun not l a t e r than the sum-
mer o f 27 B.C., and perhaps I n 28. Phraates was 
caught completely by s u r p r i s e : r e t r e a t i n g , he was 
forced to k i l l h i s harem v/hen there was danger that 
these p o l i t i c a l l y Important women would f a l l I n t o the 
hands o f the Invader. 
Octavlan must have been behind the a t t a c k . Such 
an Important possession as T l r l d a t e s would not be a l -
lowed t o roam about and organize Invasions, unless 
Octavlan approved.^^ The a t t a c k was w e l l launched, 
perhaps from the borders o f Lesser Armenia, where the 
watch-dog Ar.tavasdes waited by the Euphrates, o r , more 
l i k e l y , from Roman S y r i a , which I n e a r l y 27 B.C. be-
came o f f i c i a l l y p a r t of Octavlan's m i l i t a r y province. 
Yet Phraates organized h i s r e s i s t a n c e , and I t was the 
spr i n g of 26 B.C. before T l r l d a t e s reached Seleucla, 
where he minted those coins which d u l y acknowledged 
Q 
Tarn, ' T l r l d a t e s , ' p. 833; and Wroth, p. 135. 
^ ^ I s l d . . Char. 1: the slaughter took place on an 
I s l a n d I n the Euphrates, a t Be l e s l Blblada. On t;he Im-
portance "of the harem, see Colledge, p. 60. Note that 
when Phraates I I defeated Antiochus V I I Sldetes ( c . 129 
B.C.), a niece of the Seleucld k i n g was taken I n t o the 
Pa r t h i a n king's harem ( J u s t i n 38, 10, 10); Surenas took 
h i s harem w i t h him wherever he went, even Carrhae, and 
h i s concubines f i l l e d two hundred wagons ( P l u t . Crass. 
21 and 32 ) ; and I n A.D. 34 T l r l d a t e s I I I , a f t e r f o r c i n g 
Artabanus I I I t o r e t r e a t eastward. Immediately besieged 
a f o r t r e s s I n which Artabanus had L e f t behind h i s t r e a -
sure and harem (Tac. Ann. 6, 4 4 ) . 
^^Karl-Helnz Z l e g l e r , Die Bezlehungen zwlschen 
Rom und dem P a r t h e r r e l c h : e l n B e l t r a g zur Geschlchte 
des Volkerrechts (Wiesbaden. 1964) I s c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
I n saying t h a t Octavlan sided w i t h Phraates against 
T l r l d a t e s ( p . 4 5 ) . but then 'allowed' T l r l d a t e s to r e -
t u r n t o P a r t h l a : 'pnirde^ gestatteik, I n das Parther-
r e l c h zuruckzukehren' ( p . 4 6 ) ; 
V^Dlo 53, 12; 7 . 
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h i s debt to Rome. 
But the b a t t l e f r o n t wavered, ^or a time Phraates 
regained Babylonia, only to lose I t again. Possibly 
t h i s may I n d i c a t e two spring o f f e n s i v e s by T l r l d a t e s . 
But by the summer of 25, Phraates had won d e c i s i v e l y , 
and he overstruck T l r l d a t e s ' c o i n s . 
T l r l d a t e s f l e d , t h i s time t a k i n g v/lth him one of 
Phraates' sons, whom he had c a p t u r e d . N o t s u r p r i s -
i n g l y , T l r l d a t e s went s t r a i g h t t o Octavlan, who v/as 
. then m Spaln,^^ 
The boy was Phraates' youngest son, also named 
17 
Phraates..* T l r l d a t e s may have used the boy as a 
18 
throne f i g u r e , since he himself may not have been an 
A r s a c l d . But now. I n b r i n g i n g the boy to Octavlan, 
T l r l d a t e s may have thought to redeem h i s own f a i l u r e • 
by p r o v i d i n g Octavlan w i t h another card t o play. 
^•^McDowell, p. 222. 
^ ^ A l l o t t e de l a Fuye, Rev. Num., 1904, p. 187: 
the o v e r s t r u c k c o i n i s dated about August, 25 B.C. 
^•^Justin 42, 5, 6; Dlo 53, 33, 2; and RG 32: note 
the word 'postea.' ' 
^ ^ J u s t l n , I b i d . To Journey from Parthl a to Spain 
s a f e l y would I n d i c a t e a r e l i a n c e on Roman t r a v e l f a c i l i -
t i e s : perhaps evidence of ' o f f i c i a l ' I n t e r e s t . 
^ ^ I b l d . . and 12; RG 32; Tac. Ann. 6, 32; Strabo 16, 
1, 28 and Debevolse, p. 144. 
^^Tarn, ' T l r l d a t e s , ' p. 834-6: r e l y i n g on a s t r i c t 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the word 'reges' I n RG 32 and on a 
Pa r t h i a n c o i n of a beardless k i n g whlcTT'Tarn would l i k e 
t o a t t r i b u t e t o t h i s boy and t o the year 26 B.C. Wroth, 
pp. 9 7 f f . , assigns I t to Orodes' son, Pacorus. 
Chapter Nine 
Octavlan and Rome, 29-23 B.C. 
I n Rome, the a r i s t o c r a c y no longer had t o d i v i d e 
I t s d i s t r u s t : Octavlan was the l a s t o f the dynasts. 
The Ides o f March had taught t h a t b l a t a n t despotism 
could be f a t a l , and there would be no permanent gov-
ernment f o r Rome w i t h o u t the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the 
' r u l i n g ' classes. Octavlan strove to make h i s regime 
as p a l a t a b l e t o the a r i s t o c r a c y as he could v/lthout 
a c t u a l l y surrendering too much power. The r e p u b l i c , 
which had deserved I t s end, must seem to be restored: 
a c t u a l r e s t o r a t i o n would mean a r e t u r n to chaos. The 
decade a f t e r Actlum witnessed a t u r b u l e n t e v o l u t i o n I n 
the e x t e r n a l forms o f Octavlan's a u t h o r i t y . The core 
of h i s power v/as l e f t I n t a c t . 
Octavlan had triumphantly returned t o I t a l y I n 
29 B.C., and he Immediately set about the business of . 
s e t t l i n g h i s veterans. He paid f o r everything I n cash, 
e v e n t u a l l y covered by the s p o i l s of Egypt.^ To show 
t h a t an era had come to an end, Octavlan no longer 
.kept a l l twenty-four l l c t o r s as he had since the 'oath 
of a l l e g i a n c e ' sworn by a l l the western provinces I n 
32 B.Ci, but now he shared h a l f the l l c t o r s w i t h h i s 
various consular colleagues.^ Octavlan was o f f e r e d the 
R^G 16; and Dlo 51 , 4, 8. 
^Dlo 53, 1, 1. 
I l l 
t r l b u n l c l a potestas and, under the l e x Saenla. was 
given the r i g h t to create patricians..^ However, there 
were occurrences v^hlch demonstrated an Inconsistency 
between Octavlan's a u t h o r i t y as a consul and the power 
he was exercising. He prevented a t r i b u n e - e l e c t from 
4 
t a k i n g o f f i c e ; he delayed and diminished the triumph 
earned by a proconsul;"^ and he revoked a l l a m l c l t l a 
w i t h the p r e f e c t of Egypt, whom the senate r e c a l l e d 
t o stand t r i a l f o r treason, but v/ho Instead committed 
s u i c i d e . ^ 
Octavlan had to redefine h i s p o s i t i o n . I n 27 B.C 
he d r a m a t i c a l l y 'restored the re p u b l i c ' by handing the 
7 
commonwealth over to the senate and people. A motion 
was Immediately made th a t Octavlan should r u l e the em-
p i r e . He protested against soj^much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 
and asked only the charge of three areas which most 
needed m i l i t a r y a t t e n t i o n : Spain, Gaul and Syr i a . These 
became h i s p r o v l n c l a ; the r e s t of the empire was I n the 
senate.'^s care. Egypt was not mentioned. I t was simply 
.Octavlan's. 
Dlo 51, 19, 6 and 7. On the confusion over whether 
Octavlan a c t u a l l y received the t r l b u n l c l a potestas and 
d i d not use I t , or gave I t back I n 27 B.C., or d i d not 
receive I t u n t i l 23 B.C.; see Brunt and Moore, Res Gestae 
D l v l August I . : pp. l O f . 
\no 52, 23, 7: Q. S t a t l l l u s . 
^Dlo 5 1 , 25, 2: M. L l c l n l u s Crassus. 
^Suet, Aug. 66; and Dlo 53, 23, 7. C. Gallus com— ^ 
m l t t e d s u i c i d e I n 27 B.C. according to Jerome Chronica. 
p. 164c, I n Die grlechlschen c h r l s t l l c h e n S c h r l f t s t e l -
l e r der ersten d r e l Jahrhunderte, ed. R. Helm, v o l . 7, ' 
p a r t 1 ( L e i p z i g , 19lJJT 
R^G 34; and Dlo 53, 12. 
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Most o f the legions were I n Octavlan's provlnclaa 
Q 
though f i v e or s i x were I n the 'public' provinces. 
Yet Octavlan's a u t h o r i t y v/as Increased by the r i g h t to . 
appoint p r a e t o r i a n l e g a t e s , I n c l u d i n g ex-consuls, and ' 
the r i g h t to make t r e a t i e s and declare war. I n essence, 
Octavlan had l o s t nothing of h i s power: I t was simply 
renamed. He, too, had a new, ra t h e r superhuman, appel-
9 
l a t l o n voted him by the senate, 'Augustus.' 
But there were f u r t h e r disappointments I n store 
f o r Augustus. V/hen he l e f t f o r Spain I n mld-27 B.C., 
Augustus appointed M. V a l e r i u s Messalla Corvlnus to 
the post of praefectus u r b l . Once a republican, but 
now an adherent of Augustus, Messalla however served 
o n l y s i x days before he resigned, c a l l i n g the o f f i c e 
' u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . ' 
I n Spain, Augustus^ h e a l t h was undermined. Then 
T l r l d a t e s a r r i v e d , a f a i l u r e . Word came that king 
Amyntas of G a l a t l a had dled.^^ Amyntas, l o y a l and 
f o r c e f u l , had been the o n l y man I n the East capable 
of p u t t i n g an army, organized on Roman models. I n the 
f i e l d . A l s o , an e x p e d i t i o n Into" Arabia led by XeiiW 
Gallus was bungled.^"^ I t s purpose may have been to 
®Syme, RR, p. 314. 
^Dlo 53, 16, 8. 
^^Tac. Ann. 6,2. 
^ b l o 53, 26, 3. 
^^ G. F e r r e r o , Greatness and Decline of Rome. Engl i s h 
t r a n s . (London, 1909;, v o l . 4, p. 228. 
^^Dlo 53, 
162 and 12, 84 
29f.; Strabo 16, 4, 24; and P l i n y NH 6, 
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seize some of the spice t r a d e r s ' r i c h e s , o r , more l i k e l y , 
t o I n v e s t i g a t e and e s t a b l i s h more d i r e c t t r a d i n g l i n k s 
14 
w i t h I n d i a . While G a l l u s , the p r e f e c t o f Egypt, v/as 
absent, the Ethiopians attacked Egypt, but were beaten 
back by C. Petronlus.^"^ Augustus f e l t the need to mag-
n i f y both events beyond t h e i r t r u e p r o p o r t i o n s . ^ ^ 
Augustus,was s t i l l I n poor h e a l t h when he l e f t 
17 
Spain I n 24 B.C.* The senate voted r e j o i c i n g s at h i s 
18 
r e t u r n , and the gates of Janus were closed again. 
But Augustus soon heard, perhaps even before he reached 
Rome, t h a t the t r i b e s of Spain were already I n r e v o l t 
19 
once more. 
I n l a t e 24 or e a r l y 23 B.C., a proconsul of Mace-
donia, M. Primus, was t r i e d f o r making war against the 
kingdom of Thrace w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y . The defendant 
claimed a t one moment.that he had had I n s t r u c t i o n s from 
Augustus, and l a t e r s a i d t h a t they came from Marcellus,. 
Augustus' son-in-law. Augustus simply denied I t a l l , ^ ^ 
which condemned Primus. Worse than the mere ordering 
about of proconsuls was the I m p l i c a t i o n t h a t Marcellus 
had some e x t r a o r d i n a r y a u t h o r i t y simply because he was 
a r e l a t i o n of Augustus: t h a t he was. I n f a c t , the next i 
i n a l i n e o f dynastic succession. Primus was condemned, 
b u t there had been some votes f o r a c q u l t t a l : ^ ^ o p p o s i t i o n 
"^^ See E.H. V/armlngton, The Commerce betv/een the 
Roman Empire and I n d i a (Cambridge, i y 2 8 ; , ens. l "SnS 2. 
^^Dlo 54, 5; Strabo 17, 820; and P l i n y NH 6, 181. 
^^ RG 26, ^^Dlo 53, 28, 1. V^Jbid., 27, 1. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 29, 1. ^°Dlo'54, 3, 2. ^ h b l d . . 4. 
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was hardening. Augustus suddenly uncovered a p l o t 
against h i s l i f e : Fannlus Caeplo and A. Terentlus Varro 
Murena, the l a t t e r a consul, were accused, condemned I n 
absence, and, when found, executed w h i l e r e s i s t i n g a r -
r e s t . ^ ^ 
The execution o f a consul was a very serious mat-
t e r , whether or not there was an a c t u a l conspiracy. 
Yet Augustus was s t i l l able to f i n d a sturdy republican 
who would agree to take Murena's place as consuL*. Soon 
a f t e r Cn. Calpurnlus Plso took o f f i c e , Augustus' h e a l t h 
f i n a l l y broke down. Near death, he handed over c e r t a i n 
papers to Plso, but h i s signet r i n g he gave to Agrlppa.^"' 
Suddenly, he recovered; but t h i s experience,.combined 
w i t h the c o n t i n u i n g r e c a l c i t r a n c e of the noblLes> forced 
Augustus to a l t e r again h i s p o s i t i o n . He resigned h i s 
I t I s much disputed whether Murena the conspira-
t o r I s the same man as A. Terentlus Varro Murena, l i s t e d 
as consul o r d l n a r l u s o f 23 B.C. on only one of the con-
s u l a r f a s t i . and v/hether the conspiracy occurred I n 23,: 
o r , as Dlo r e l a t e s I t , I n 22 B.C. Syme, RR, p. 333-4 
accepts 23. K.M.T. Atkins o n , ' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and Legal 
Aspects of the T r i a l s of Marcus Primus and Varro Murena,' 
H l s t o r l a 9 U 9 6 0 ) , p. 4 4 0 f f . , r e t a i n s Dlo's d a t i n g , but 
questions the I d e n t i f i c a t i o n . P. . S a t t i e r , Augustus ujnd 
der Senat (Gottlngen, 1960), pp. 62-3, assumes 23 B.C. 
But Mrs. Atklnson'^s views have been accepted by J.P.V.D. 
Balsdon, Gnomon 33 (1961!), p. 395 and P.A. Brunt, JRS 
51 U 9 6 l ) , p. 234f. V/. Schmltthenner, 'Augustus' spant-
scher Feldzug und der Kampf urn den P r l n z l p a t , ' H l s t o r l a 
11 U 9 6 2 ) , p. 78, n. 87, maintains 23. F. M i l l a r , A 
Study o f Casslus Dlo (Oxford. 1964), p. 89-90 believes 
' the date must be l e f t open.' The arguments f o r 23 are 
to be found again I n D. Stockton, 'Primus and Murena,' 
H l s t o r l a 14,(1965), p. 18-40. An,examination of the 
consular f a s t i t r i e s t o uphold Dlo's d a t i n g : M. Swan,, 
'The Consular F a s t i of 23 B.C.,' Harvard Studies I n 
C l a s s i c a l P h i l o l o g y 71 U966), pp. 235-47. 
The matter appears to t u r n on prosopographlcal 
p o i n t s w i t h which I am ge n e r a l l y u n f a m i l i a r . For my 
arguments, t h i s I s no crux, so I employ the more gen-
e r a l l y accepted d a t i n g , 23 B.C. 
^•^Dlo 53, 30, 2. 
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24 consulship f o r 23 B.C. I n the middle of the .year, so 
t h a t both annual consulships were now open to the n o b l i -
es. 
Augustus was now only a proconsul of pa r t of the 
empire. But I t was voted by the senate th a t he be a l -
lowed not to lose h i s Imperlum when he entered the Ci t y ' s 
l i m i t s , and he was given a malus Imperium over other pro-
consuls. He was also granted tribune's po\/ers f o r l i f e 
w i t h p r i o r i t y i n convening the senate.^"^ He asked th a t 
imperium be'given also to Agrlppa f o r a period of ten 
y e a r s . T h e I n t e n t i o n behind t h i s may have been to show 
27 
t h a t he d i d not mind sharing h i s power w i t h a colleague; 
or to ensure t h a t Agrlppa would be I n a p o s i t i o n to take 
c o n t r o l of the empire I f Augustus should d i e ; or to pro-
vide Agrlppa w i t h a u t h o r i t y over proconsuls i n the East, 
where he was presently, sent. 
H o s t i l i t y , and even conspiracy, were e a s i l y d e a l t 
v/ i t h i n Rome. But i n the m i l i t a r y provinces, any r e -
28 
f l e c t i o n o f the recent unrest could be f a t a l l y serious. 
^\ > l o 53, 32, 4. ^ ^ I b i d . 
^.^Josephus says Agrlppa administered the provinces 
beyond the Ionian Sea as Augustus' deputy (AJ 15, 350) 
and d i d so f o r ten years (AJ 16, 86). Of course,/Agrlppa 
was I n the west I n 21-19 B.C. (Dlo 5'i, 11, I f . ) , as Jo-
sephus no doubt knew. The conclusion I s that he v^ as r e -
f e r r i n g to Agrlppa's Imperium. For a l l the arguments, see: 
T. Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrecht ( L e i p z i g , 1877), I I , 
p. 8 5 9 f f . ; H.S. Jones, CAH, X, pp. 142-3; Syme, RR, p^ 337, 
n. 1; M. Relnhoid, Marcus Agrippa (Geneva, N.Y.), p. 167ff.; 
and Rudolf D a n i e l , M. Vlpsanlus Agrlppa (Breslau, 1933), p. 57. 
27 
As he boasts of asking the senate on f i v e occasions 
f o r a colleague t o share h i s t r l b u n l c l a potestas (RG 6 ) . 
28 Syme, RR, p. 338. 
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The l a t e k ing Amyntas' t e r r i t o r y , G a l a t l a , had been made 
I n t o a province I n 25 B.C. M. L o l l l u s had been sent out 
to organize I t . Agrlppa was perhaps to supervise and 
keep an eye on a l l the proconsuls at t h i s dangerous time. 
But I n a d d i t i o n , Agrlppa's mission may have had a d i f f e r -
ent purpose, one which concerned the Parthlans. 
Chapter Ten 
The Mission o f Agrlppa 
During the years f o l l o w i n g Actlum, the Parthlans 
were an ever-present subject I n Roman poetry. I n casual 
references and I n serious themes. As a to p i c f o r d a i l y 
c o n v e r s a t i o n , the Parthlans could h a r d l y have ranked so 
hig h or received as much a t t e n t i o n as they did I n the 
p o e t r y . 
The-Parthlans f i g u r e d I n s h o r t , meaningful meta-
phors; they were archetypes f o r treachery.^ There v/ere 
moral lessons of how c i v i l s t r i f e made' Rome vulnerable 
to b a r b a r i a n a t t a c k ^ and wasted the energy which should 
be used against the P a r t h l a n s . A v e n g i n g Crassus was to 
4 
be p a r t of the moral regeneration of Rome. Current a f -
f a i r s were followed w i t h I n t e r e s t " ^ — i n c l u d i n g news of 
T l r l d a t e s ' and Phraates' s t r u g g l e s . ^ The predominant 
e x p e c t a t i o n was t h a t Augustus would I n e v i t a b l y have to 
^Examples o f t h i s category are too numerous and too 
t r i v i a l to l i s t e x h a u s t i v e l y , but see Appendix A. 
^Horace Epod. 7, 4-10; Od. 2, 1, 31-2; and 3, 6, 7-
12. 
•^Hor. Od. 1, 2, 21-24; 1, 21, 13-16; and 1, 35, 29-
33. 
"^Hor. Od.'l, 2, 49-52; 1, 12, 53-7; and Propertlus 
3, 4; and 3 , 5 . 
"^Hor. Od. 3, 6, 7-12; 3, 29, 25-9; and Propert. 2,. 10. 
^Hor. Od. 1, 26, 3-5; 2, 2, 17-21; 3, 8, 19-20; and 
p o s s i b l y 3, 9, 4. 
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7 thrash the Parthlans. 
Augustus never made the u n r e l e n t i n g campaign to 
conquer P a r t h l a , and never Intended t o . The Parthlans 
d i d not present the s o r t o f t h r e a t which had tp be 
t r e a t e d p r e v e n t i v e l y , and the r i s k s were not worth the 
po s s i b l e gain: t h a t would be f i s h i n g w i t h the golden 
8 
hook. Augustus learned from Antonlus' mistakes. 
Yet I f Augustus r e a l l y Intended t o do nothing, 
then the c h a t t e r of the poets would have been most em-
b a r r a s s i n g . Augustus would discourage them, and could. 
But the evidence I s t h a t he encouraged t h e i r expecta-
9 
t l p n s . He had h i s reasons. 
Augustus knew t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n would be e a s i l y 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h the r e t u r n of Crassus' standards and the 
p r i s o n e r s . He sought these from Phraates I n 30 B.C., 
w h i l e threatening him w i t h T l r l d a t e s . When Phraates 
refus e d , Augustus adopted Antonlus' scheme and launched 
T l r l d a t e s I n t o P a r t h l a I n 28 or 27 B.C. For a wh i l e 
there was a chance o f r e a l i z i n g the dream of having a 
c l i e n t - k i n g on the throne of P a r t h l a ; however temporary. 
I t would s t i l l be a coup. That plan f a i l e d , but Augus-
tus gained possession of Phraates* son, and I t remained 
to be seen what t h i s could y i e l d . 
A t any moment Augustus might have succeeded, and 
might y e t . . Perhaps he had not expected Phraates to be 
'^Hor. Sat. 2, 5, 61-5; 2, 1, 12-5; Od. I , 29, 1-4; 
2, 9, 18-24; 2, 13, 17-8; 3, 2, 1-6; 3, 3, 42-54, 3, 5, 
1-12; V i r g i l Georg. I , 498-514. 
g 
Suet. Aug. 25. 
9 See chapter 5, on propaganda. 
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tenacious, or f o r t u n a t e . But v/henever the moment should 
come when Phraates would make a sign of submlsslon—no 
matter how suddenly or through what c o e r c i o n — t h e pro-
paganda p r e p a r a t i o n would make the r e s u l t g l o r i o u s . 
« « « « « 
Rome Y/as aware that Phraates had won h i s war 
against T i r l d a t e s . 
'reddltum C y r i s o l l o Phraaten 
dlssldens p l e b l numero beatorum 
e x l m l t Virtus....'^° 
I n Od. 1, 26 there I s m i l d empathy.for T l r t d a t e s ' p o i n t 
of view, so perhaps Augustus' support f o r T l r l d a t e s was 
known t o Rome, or at l e a s t to Horace. 
From the time t h a t T l r i d a t e s had reached him I n 
Spain, Augustus had been I n t e n s e l y occupied w i t h other 
m a t t e r s . I n c l u d i n g completion of the war, h i s own I I I 
h e a l t h (which brought him near death;, the t r i a l of P r i -
mus, the conspiracy of Caeplo and Murena, and the p o l i -
t i c a l settlement of 23 B.C., which r e s u l t e d I n h i s r e -
s i g n i n g the consulship I n July of tha t year,^^ 'a year 
t h a t might w e l l have been the l a s t , and was c e r t a i n l y 
the most c r i t i c a l . I n a l l the long P r l n c l p a t e of Augus-
tus.' A new Involvement I n Parthian a f f a i r s , w i t h a 
^°Hor. Od. 2, 2, 17-20. 
^^Uaui., 1, 26, 1-6: 
'Musis amicus t r l s t l t l s u n e t metus 
tradam p r o t e r v l s I n mare Cretlcum 
portare v e n t l s , quls sub Arc t o 
rex gelldae metuatur orae, 
quid T l r l d a t e m terrieat unlce 
securus.' 
12 
Mommsen, Rom. St a a t s r . . I l l , p. 797, n. 3. 
^^Syme, RR, p. 333. 
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successful r e s u l t , would p o s s i b l y r e d i r e c t energies 
away from p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e : to reforge the blunted 
SY/ords and t u r n them against the barbarians.^'* 
Crassus' standards were w a i t i n g . But, s t i l l , 
Augustus required nothing more. I t was senseless t o 
make a conquest o f P a r t h l a . Success would no doubt 
be c o s t l y , and the only t h i n g Augustus could do w i t h 
P a r t h l a once he had conquered I t was to make I t I n t o 
a c l i e n t - k i n g d o m , too d i s t a n t to keep under c o n t r o l . 
The Parthlans were no great t h r e a t to h i s well-organ-
iz e d East. And once a Roman e x p e d i t i o n crossed the 
Euphrates, could I t be sure to escape defeat? V e n t l -
d l u s had shown t n a t the Parthlans were not I n v i n c i b l e , 
but east of the Euphrates they had not been beaten. 
Augustus' resources were v a s t , but v/hy waste them? He 
knew o n l y too w e l l how.Antonlus had been weakened by 
h i s f a i l e d venture, and what the consequences had been. 
Besides, Augustus s t i l l had T l r l d a t e s , and Phraates 
son as w e l l . The o p p o r t u n i t y f o r p e a c e f u l l y n e g o t i a t i n g 
the r e t u r n of the standards was yet too great to l e t 
pass. 
Sometime very soon a f t e r the settlement of 23 B.C. 
Agrlppa l e f t Rome and took up residence on the Island of 
Lesbos. Dlo w r i t e s t h a t Augustus had sent him away from 
Rome so that there would be no wrangling between him and 
Marcellus over the f a c t t h a t Augustus had entrusted hts 
14 
Horace Od. 1, 35, 38-40. The Parthlans are not • 
s p e c i f L c a l l y mentioned. Horace's thoughts may have been 
d i r e c t e d toward the proposed campaigns against B r i t a i n 
and A r a b i a , which are mentioned. 
121 
sig n e t r i n g to Agrlppa and not to Marcellus, whom every-
one assumed to be heir-apparent.^^ V e l l e l u s Paterculus 
says t h a t assignments from Augustus were but a pr e t e x t 
f o r Agrlppa's withdrawal: the gossip current I n Rome 
was t h a t Agrlppa f e l t a secret animosity f o r MarcelLus.^^ 
Suetonius has Agrlppa I n a f i t of pique because Augus-
17 
tus favoured Marcellus, or says t h a t he desired not 
to stana I n the young man's way.* P l i n y the Elder c a l l s 
1 W 
the move the 'pudenda Agrlppae able g a t i o . ' Tacitus 
says Augustus allowed Agrlppa t o withdraw when he r e -
quested I t . ^ ^ I n t e r e s t i n g l y , I t I s an Easterner, Joseph-
us, who says t h a t Agrlppa was sent east as Caesar's de-
pu t y , v/lth no mention of any scandal.^^ 
Agrlppa spent n e a r l y two years I n the East, and of 
h i s a c t i v i t i e s d u r i n g t h a t period nothing I s recorded: 
o n l y t h a t a t one p o i n t he received a v i s i t from Herod»^^ 
There I s not even the s o r t of gossip which l a t e r sur-
23 
rounded T i b e r i u s * e x i l e on Rhodes. 
That some scandal l a y behind Agrlppa's departure 
^^Dlo 53, 31-2. 
^ ^ V e l l . Pater. 2, 92, 2. 
17 
Suet. Aug. 66. 
^ ^ I b l d . . T i b . 10. 
^ ^ P l l n y NH 7, 149 
^^Tac. Ann. 14, 53: the v/ords are put I n Seneca's 
mouth as he speaks v/ith Nero. 
^^Jos. AJ 15, 10, 2. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 3. 
^•^Suet. T i b . 11. ' 
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has been seriously brought Into question. Agrlppa 
was Augustus' most loyal f r i e n d . They had known each 
other f o r half t h e i r l i v e s . Agrlppa had served Augusr 
tus t i r e l e s s l y , and Augustus had shov/n him every honour^ 
culminating w i t h the guardianship of the signet r i n g , 
and therefore the empire. Now, Immediately af t e r Au-. 
gustus gave Agrlppa a malus Imperlum v/hlch made him 
second In power only to Augustus himself, we are asked 
to believe that Agrlppa went Into retirement to avoid 
any embarrassing tete-a-tetes^ v^ith a nineteen year-old 
boy who was holding his f i r s t public o f f I c e . I t Is 
more Incredible s t i l l that Augustus, barely surviving 
the opposition t n Rome during the preceding twelve 
months, would l e t the loyal and strong Agrlppa walk out. 
F i n a l l y , we must discard the rumours reported I n our 
sources, v/hen we consider that Agrlppa returned to Rome 
a\^ year and a hal f l a t e r — a n d no sooner, though Marcel-
lus had by then been dead f o r a year—and took up the 
management of the V/est while Augustus was In the iiasty 
he also married J u l i a , Augustus*, daughter.'and Marcellus.! 
widow, and accepted f u r t h e r Important m i l i t a r y commands 
In Augustus' service. 
Magle believes that Agrlppa was sent East to nego-
t i a t e secretly w i t h the Parthlans f o r the return of 
^ a v l d Magle, 'The Mission of Agrlppa In the Orient 
I n 23 B..C.,' Classical Philology 3, 1908, pp.. 14Sff, Also 
see Syme, RR, .p. 3-^ 2: ',..a •.political suspect Is not placed 
m charge of provinces and armies.' 
25 
Propertlus 3, 18, IS: Marcellus died I n the next 
year, aged twenty. 
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Crassus' s t a n d a r d s . T h e r e was good reason for secrfecy. 
Augustus, ever conscious of appearances, knew that an ar-
rangement had to be made which would give him material 
f o r g l o r i f i c a t i o n of Rome.and humiliation f o r Parthla. 
Crassus would not be avenged by a public o f f e r to ex-
change a kidnapped boy f o r the standards l o s t In b a t t l e . 
Agrlppa, capable, discreet, and empowered for any con-
tingency, was to be the negotiator. Lesbos v/as the 
headquarters. I t was near enough the mainland, yet no 
c i t y I n Asia would be as secure, especially f o r keeping 
things secret. Also, the Island was a renowned place 
27 
of e x i l e , so I t suited thoroughly accepted rumours 
of Agrlppa's melodramatic withdrawal. So Agrlppa d u t i -
f u l l y proceeded to Lesbos, and must natur a l l y have made 
28 
quick contact w i t h the Parthlans. 
But what bargaining strength did the Romans have? 
Phraates had never known a defeat at the hands of the 
Romans, and by t h i s time he must have come to the con-
clusion that Augustus was not overly anxious to Invade 
Parthla. Tlrldates had f a i l e d Augustus even worse than 
he had f a i l e d Antonlus. Augustus"' trump, the possession . 
of Phraates' youngest son, may not nave been such an ob-
vious boon. Phraates never displayed much Interest In 
26 
Magle, 'Mission of Agrlppa,* p. 150. 
^^ClC: Pro Rab. Post. 10, 27.' 
28 
At t h i s point I diverge from the opinions of 
Magle, who believes that Agrlppa's mission was a t o t a l 
success and that Augustus' tour of the East was meant 
to accompllshj^^among other things, the 'recovery'^ of the 
standards I n a/*^hlch would appear to be m i l i t a n t and 
f o r c e f u l , though secretly pre-arranged. 
124 
his r e l a t i v e s , except v/hen he murdered his father and 
29 30 brothers, slaughtered his harem, and l a t e r (as we 
sha l l see; sent away his own legitimate sons as hos-
tages. S t i l l , the boy was an Arsacld and a legitimate 
candidate to Phraates' throne. Before the year 23 BiC. 
had ended, Phraates sent envoys to Augustus In Rome.^^ 
Phraates demanded that his son be returned and that his 
'slave' Tlrldates be handed over.^^ Augustus took the 
matter before the senate, which promptly surrendered 
the l a s t of I t s authority over foreign policy by re-
questing that Augustus make the decision.*''^ 
• 
Augustus refused to hand over T l r l d a t e s , who, de-
spite h is tendency to f a i l u r e , might yet be of service. 
However, Phraates' son was returned: sine pre t i c , says: 
Jus t i n , but Dlo states that the condition was the return 
of the standards of Grassus. Both are probably true. 
Justin 42, 5, 1. 
"^^ I s l d . Char. 1. 
^^Dlo 53, 33, 1-2. This passage, which concerns the 
Parthian envoys who were brought before the senate by 
Augustus, Is an Important crux for-our chronologlfcal or-
der. Dlo Is decrlblng the episode as an I l l u s t r a t i o n of 
Augustus* habit of showing respect to the senate. The 
passage may be looking back to a much e a r l i e r Incident, 
only nov/ being described, out of place, as an example. 
But I t seems to me that the description of such an. I n c i -
dent would not be held I n abeyance u n t i l I t could serve 
as an I l l u s t r a t i o n . On the contrary, Augustus' habit of 
deference has been brought to Dlo's mind b^ this I n c i -
dent. Also, I t Is the only example here given. I there-
fore take Dlo's order of narraratlon on t h i s and related 
points to be the chronological order of events as he knew 
them. 
32 
Dlo. I b i d . : Justin 42, 5, 7: 'servum suiim T l r l -
datem et f l l l u m ' — a n o t h e r Indication that Tlrldates was 
not an Arsacld. 
^^Dlo, I b i d . On the significance of the senate's 
act, see Ferrero, Greatness and Decline, IV, p. 264. 
12S 
Waturally, the condition could not be made public: I t 
was a mercenary way of redeeming Rome's honour, and . 
Phraates might openly refuse his part of the bargain. 
However, Dlo I s probably J u s t i f i e d In assuming that 
some price was I m p l i c i t i n the all-too-generous act. 
I t can only be guessed whether Augustus was hoping 
Phraates would reciprocate the gesture I n some servile 
fashion, or v/hether some pre-arrangements had been made 
e x p l i c i t at Lesbos. I n any case, while Agrlppa re-
34 
malned on his Island for months, ready to arrange 
anything, Phraates dauntlessly d id nothing. 
3 4 
As noted by Syme, RR, p. 338, the Island was 
we l l situated f o r Agrlppa to v^atch over not only the 
East, but also the Balkans. That Josephus, who Is con-
cerned mainly v/lth Jewish h i s t o r y , mentions only Herod'a 
v i s i t w i t h Agrlppa does not preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that other client-kings also v i s i t e d the Island on o f f i -
c i a l business. . - . 
Chapter Eleven 
Augustus' Tour of the East 
Late In 22 B.C. Augustus set out from Rome on a 
projected tour of the eastern provinces.^ Augustus 
had not been I n the East f o r seven years, and I t v/as a 
good time to make an appearance before his subjects, 
soldiers and governors. There was undoubtedly much . 
administrative work to be seen to personally. Also, 
I t was a good time to be out of Rome; he could demon-
str a t e to the noblles his ovm necessity, f o r he proba-
b l y foresaw the near chaos which followed his departure 
from the C l t y . ^ Also, there was the matter of the Par-
thlans. 
I t was na t u r a l l y assumed by Rome that thi s was the 
expedition to defeat the Pitrthlans."^ Augustus, even had 
he so desired, could do nothing to prevent that assump-
t i o n . But there was probably no advertisement of a grand 
campaign, no marching out of the C i t y , and the expedition, 
or entourage,, did not proceed d i r e c t l y against the enemy. 
On the contrary. I t was well over a year before Augustus 
reached Syria, a f t e r making several stops and detours on 
the v/ay. He v/ent about his Imperial business, leaving 
Phraates to wonder what he was up to. 
^Dlo 54, 6, 1. 
2 
Syme, K l , p. 371. 
"^Propertlus 4, 3. 
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But something was up: we w i l l f i n d t h a t , when 
Augustus needed them, there stood close by not only 
Artaxes' brother Tlgranes, v/ho had li v e d I n Home f o r 
a decade, but also Arlobarzanes, the son of Rome's 
a l l y , Artavasdes the Mede, now r u l i n g Lesser Armenia. 
Tl r l d a t e s may have been Drought along as w e l l . 
I n the winter of 22/21 B.C., Agrlppa was sum- . 
moned by Augustus, then In S i c i l y , to return to Rome 
and govern the V/est I n his absence."^ Seemingly a l l 
the scandal which had supposedly caused his departure 
was now forgiven, though, as l i k e l y , Agrlppa may have 
been spending the l a s t few months making arrangements 
f o r Augustus' tour.^ In the spring of 2 1 B.C., Augus-
tus sailed from S i c i l y to Greece, v/here he ta r r i e d un-
t i l the winter, which was spent on the Island of Samos. 
There he held court, giving audience to the recently 
8 
defeated queen of the Ethiopians. 
About t h i s time the s i t u a t i o n I n t e n s i f i e d . I t Is 
repprted that an embassy arrived from Armenia represent-
ing not king Artaxes, but a pro-Roman fa c t i o n which 
wanted Artaxes to be replaced by hts brother Tlgranes, 
who v/as I n Augustus' hands (indeed, apparently w i t h i n 
4 
Though, f o r s t r i c t h i s t o r y , we have heard the l a s t 
of T l r l d a t e s . An I n s c r i p t i o n from Spoleto may refer.to 
a son of Tlrldates who became a Roman c i t i z e n and com-
manded some Parthian a u x i l i a r i e s serving i n the Roman 
army ( C I L ; I I I , 8 7 4 6 ) . 
"^Dlo 5 4 , 6, 4. 
Sagle, 'Mission,.' p. 1 5 1 . 
*^Dlo 5 4 , 7. 
®Strabo 17, 1 , 5 4 . 
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9 reach). Without hesitation Augustus compiled, and sum-
moned Tiberius to bring an army from Macedonia and ef-
fect the c h a n g e . B e f o r e Tiberius' force arrived, Ar-
taxes was k i l l e d , conveniently enough, by the Armenians 
t h e m s e l v e s . \ ! l t h no lack of pomp, Tiberius crowned 
Tlgranes I I , presumably In Artaxata.^^ 
Artaxes' death meant that not only Greater Armenia, 
but also Media Atropatene l o s t I t s r u l e r . I t s previous 
king, the loyal Artavasdes, who had been exiled from 
Media since 30 B.C. and had since been r u l i n g Lesser 
Armenia, unfortunately had died r e c e n t l y . L e s s e r Ar-
menia \fent to Archelaus of Cappadocla, but Artavasdes' 
14 
son, Arlobarzanes, was I n s t a l l e d In Media Atropatene. 
Suddenly, without a b a t t l e , Augustus had extended 
the sphere of Roman client-kingdoms to the shore of the 
Caspian Sea, and Roman, -troops were breathing down Phraates' 
neck. And what was the reaction of the king who had 
never known a. defeat at Roman hands, had twice beaten 
back the puppet Tl r l d a t e s , and had never shown the least 
sign of submission? He meekly handed over the precious 
standards and whatever prisoners s t i l l survived. 
^Dlo 54, 9, 4 f . 
^ ^ I b l d . ; Suet. Tib. 14. 
^ b l o 54,,9, 5. 
^ ^ I b l d . 
^ ^ I b l d . . 2. 
33. 
^ ^ V e l l . Pater. 2, 91, 1; Llvy E p l t . 141; Suet. Aug. 
21; Tib. 9; and Dlo 54, 8, 1. 
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I t Is time to c a l l Into question Gibbon's pro-
nouncement that I t was vanity on Augustus' part to as-
sert that he compelled the Parthlans to restore the 
standards Into Roman h a n d s . G i b b o n declares that 
they were gained 'by an honourable treaty' which Au-
gustus preferred to 'exposing his person and his l e -
gions to the arrows of the Parthlans.' 
Quite the opposite: Augustus was threatening to 
recover the l o s t standards by viole n t means, and per-
haps even to replace Phraates w i t h Tl r l d a t e s , or some-
one else. Augustus threatened b a t t l e . Undoubtedly, 
war was not vrhat he wanted, but the genuine threat of 
I t was his weapon. 
Many historians have reconciled the events of 20 
B.C. wi t h t h e i r Image of Augustus as the supreme d l p i o -
17 
mat by c a l l i n g his a c t i v i t y a show of force. But I t 
Is questionable v/hether a 'show of force' could have 
any effectiveness against a king as tough and experi-
enced as Phraates. t h i s was no show} I t was a serious 
threat of war. The difference between being threatening-
l y prepared f o r war and act u a l l y going to war Is 'very 
f i n e , and exists only f o r leaders, such as Augustus, who 
can d i s t i n g u i s h war as an end and war as a means. As 
Phraates knew, Augustus was prepared. 
There Is no record of the strength of Tiberius' 
^^See pp. 2-4 of the Introduction. 
^''fiuchan, Augustus, pp. 173-4; Ferrero, Greatness 
and Decline of Rome. IV, p. 255; Mattlngly, Roman Imper-
Tal C i v i l i s a t i o n . . p . 114; M. Rostovtzeff, Rome (Oxford. 
1-960), pp. 181-2; and A.H.M. Jones, Augustus (London. 
1970), p. 58. 
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force, but I t Is probable that I t consisted of the I I -
18 
l y r l c a n and Macedonian legions. This meant a t o t a l 
19 
force of eight or nine legions. Tiberius was only 
twenty-two years old, but had already served In Spain, 
and would, f o r years to come, continually prove his 
worth as a m i l i t a r y leader. 
There I s no d i r e c t record of the commander of 
• the Syrian force In 20 B.C. Around the year 23 B.C. 
21 
the legate of Syria bore the name Varro: he may have 
been a r e l a t i v e of the conspirator Murena, and may have 
f a l l e n from grace as a r e s u l t . F o r when Agrlppa went 
East I n 23 B.C., though keeping himself at Lesbos, he 
23 
sent subordinates to Syria. One of these may well 
24 
have been M. T l t l u s w i t h the rank of legate of Syria. 
25 
A very cold-blooded s o l d i e r , T l t l u s was unusually well 18 
Parker, p. 91. Since no extensive Eastern cam-
paign was planned, Augustus would only temporarily be 
denuding Macedonia and I l l y r l c u m of t h e i r legions. S t i l l , 
there would be a u x l l l a , as wel l as the protection provided 
by the vassal kingdom of Thrace (G.H. Stevenson, CAK, X, 
pp. 228-32). 
I b i d . . pp. 89-92: f i v e leglQns from I l l y r l s u m , three or four from Macedonia. 
^°Suet. Tib. 9. 
^^Jos. BJ 1, 398; and AJ 15, 345. 
22 
Syme, RR, pp. 330, n. 2, 334 and 338. 
^^Dlo 53, 32, 1. 
24 
For the complex but convincing arguments concern-
ing M. T l t l u s , see L.R. Taylor, 'M. T l t l u s as the Syrian 
Command,' JRS 26, 1936, pp. I l 6 f f . Syme, RR, p. 398, 
n. 1 considers I t possible that T l t l u s was twice legate. 
"^^ He himself executed Sextus Pompelus, who had once 
spared h i s l i f e : Dlo 48, 30. 
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q u a l i f i e d f o r t h i s active post: he had fought the Par-
thlans with d i s t i n c t i o n In 36 B.C., when he served as 
Antonlus' q u a e s t o r . A f t e r becoming disgusted with 
a f f a i r s In Alexandria, he deserted I n 32 B.C. to Octa-
27 ' 
vlan, along w i t h his uncle, Munatlus Plancus, who at 
28 
one time had been governor of Syria. As legate of 
Syria, T l t l u s would now be In command of three or four 
legions, of which one, and, possibly two, had been with 
29 
Antonlus on his Parthian campaign. To these legions, 
perhaps yet containing a fev/ survivors of Antonlus' ex-
pedit i o n , T l t l u s ' reputation would have been knovm. 
Possibly, I t would even be known to Phraates. 
Tiberius led his large force across the Hellespont 
and probably followed the route of Alexander through 
Galatla .and Cappadocla.^^ I n Galatla, there was an ex-
ce l l e n t native legion which Tiberius could have added 
to h i s force."^^ Certainly, Archelaus of Cappadocla 
must have brought some troops w i t h him when he joined 
Tiberius on the march."'^ A rendezvous between T l t l u s "'^Plut. Ant. 42. • 
^ ^ V e l l . Pater. 2, 93; Plut. Ant. 58; and Dlo 50, 3, 1 
^^Applan BC 5, 144, 598. 
^ ^ R l t t e r l l h g , P;::^, s.v. 'Leglo,' c o l . I517ff. and 1587ff. 
^Taylor, p. 170. 
"^^Later known as the Leglo XXII Delotarlana. t h i s 
Galatlan force was organized on Roman' models and had 
fought on Rome's side since the time of Caesar. Galatla 
had become a Roman province In 25 B.C., and, at some 
time a f t e r that, the Delotarlan became a Roman legion* 
By 8. B.C. I t was stationed In Alexandria: Magle, RRIAM. 
pp. 460-1 and 1321. • 
•'^Jos. AJ 15/ 105, 
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and Tiberius may have been arranged at some strategic 
p o i n t , such as Melltene."^"^ Perhaps T l t l u s delivered 
Tlgranes f o r I n s t a l l a t i o n by Tiberius, which was made 
simple by Artaxes' murder at the hands of his fellow 
Armenians. 
Apparently, Roman troop, movements had already be-
gun when Augustus heard, the nevfs of Artaxes' death, 
34 
and again he reacted quickly. V/lth the throne of 
Media Atropatene also made vacant, Augustus I n s t a l l e d 
Arlobarzanes, son of the recently deceased Artavasdes 
the Mede.^ '^  There Is no record as to when or hov/ Arl o -
barzanes was I n s t a l l e d , but Mommsen argues for 20 B.C.,*^ ^ 
which, of course, makes sense,.with Artaxes having Just 
been k i l l e d . An armed escort at least, and more l i k e l y 
-a potent m i l i t a r y force, would be needed to perform the 
task, which would require marching even as far as Anto-
nlus had managed to advance In 36 B.C., and back again. 
Tiberius was undoubtedly too Inexperienced and too valu-
able to r i s k . Probably the Job was given to T l t t u s , who 
37 
c e r t a i n l y knew the route. 
^"^Taylor, p. 170. Antonlus' l i n e of march had run 
through here: Tarn, CAH. X, p. 73. 
"''^One may boldly suspect that he knew of Artaxes' 
death before I t happened. 
•^ R^G 33. 
^^Mommsen, Res Gestae Dlv l Augustl ( B e r l i n , 1865), 
p. 96. 
37 
Taylor, p. 171.; this may explain why the sources 
pass over the event—the Imperial chroniclers were not 
Interested In the achievements of non-members of the Im-
p e r i a l house. S i m i l a r l y , a f t e r Tiberius refused, v/e do 
not know who I n s t a l l e d Artavasdes I I In Armenia In 6/5 
B.C., nor do we know v/ho led the force which I n s t a l l e d 
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With A.rmenla l o s t , Parthla was extremely vulner-
able. A Roman army was marching through the valleys 
toward the Medlan.capltal,.Phraaspa. Phraates had the 
option of unleashing his mounted archers, v/ho could 
demonstrate again how they had destroyed Crassus and 
crippl e d Antonlus, and thus deny the Romans the pos-
session of Media. But Phraates chose to submit. He 
no doubt saw that Augustus was well prepared: the Ro-
man would not have t a r r i e d a l l these years, only to 
come now and f a l l . Phraates did not have to ask Augus-
tus, as Crassus had been asked, what he was doing here* 
Phraates knew a l l too well what Augustus had come f o r , 
and how he might yet be bought o f f . Suddenly the 
standards were not worth keeping. The loss In prestige, 
l i k e the loss of Armenia, was serious but not f a t a l , 
and might l a t e r be recovered. 
At t h i s time Phraates surrendered not only the 
standards, but hostages as w e l l — f o u r sons, two of 
t h e i r wives and four grandchildren. This giving of 
hostages Is usually dated to c. 10 B.C., In view of 
Strabo's statement that the hostages were given Into 
38 
the hands of the legate of Syria, T l t l u s , described 
as legate of Syria by Josephus at a date between 13 
39 
and 8 B.C. But, as noted before. I t Is extremely 
l i k e l y that T l t l u s was also I n command I n Syria-In 
'Tlgranes' about A.D. 7. For further cases In which 
p u b l i c i t y I s denied non-members of the Imperial house, 
see Syme, RR, pp. 332 and 390, 
^^Strabo 16, 1, 28. 
-^^Jos. AJ 16, 270. 
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40 20 B.C., and, more Importantly, the return of the 
standards and the surrender of hostages are d i r e c t l y 
linked by Strabo"^^ (an Augustan), Justin'*^ and Oroslus^"^ 
(who depend on l o s t works of the Augustans Trbgus and 
L l v y ) , Vellelus Paterculus'^'* (a late Augustan) and Su-
45 
etonlus (apparently relying on V e l l e l u s ) . Vellelus 
says that the hostages were given In Armenia to Tiber-
i u s , not T l t l u s ; and Suetonius states that Tiberius was 
sent to the Parthian court to c o l l e c t the standards. 
I f a Roman prince had gone to the Parthian court, there 
would surely be contemporary notice of I t : Suetonius Is 
obviously b u i l d i n g on Vellelus' statement about the 
hostages, which Is refuted by Strabo's words naming T l -
t l u s as the recipient of the hostages. I n Vellelus 
mendacious.eulogizing Is no surprise, and his bias may 
46 
also r e f l e c t h o s t i l i t y between Tiberius and T l t l u s . 
I t may be objected that I n the Res Gestae Augustus 
40 
See p,\'^ o 
^^Strabo 16, 1, 28. 
Justin 42, 5, 10-12. 
'^'^Oroslus 6, 21, 29. 
" ^ ^ e l l . Pater. 2, 94. 
"^^Suet. Aug. 21 and Tib. 9. 
46 
The princely general In c o n f l i c t w i t h the veteran 
s o l d i e r . But also the Interests of Archelaus of Cappa-
docla may have been Involved: he may have sided with one 
or the other. He marched In 20 B.C. with Tiberius and 
was l a t e r defended In a Roman court by him (Dlo 57, 17; 
and Suet. Tib. 8 ) . We are Ignorant of the disagreement, 
but Archelaus and T l t l u s v/ere reconciled through Herod . 
(Jos. AJ 16, 270), and Archelaus snubbed Tiberius when 
the l a t t e r was exiled at Rhodes (Tac. Ann. 2, 42). T i -
berius, when he became emperor, had his revenge (Suet. 
Tib. 37). 
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does not mention the recovery of the standards and the 
surrender of hostages In the. same section, but, of course, 
the Res Gestae Is not organized e n t i r e l y chronologically, 
47 
but more thematlcally. I t I s a most Interesting fact 
48 
that v/hlle Justin, V e l l e l u s , Suetonius, Tacitus and 
Oroslus a l l use the word obsldes to describe the c h i l -
dren sent by Phraates, Augustus himself uses the word 
plgnora. which meant not so much hostages as pledges or 
sureties. We may discover the reason f o r t h i s In the 
statements by our two Greek-writing sources. Strabo 
says that Phraates did not want his sons around because 
he feared sedition i n v/hlch one of his sons could be 
49 
substituted f o r him. Josephus says Phraates was per-
suaded to t h i s course of action by an I t a l i a n slave-
g i r l named Musa, who v/as a g i f t from Augustusi After 
gaining Phraates' love and bearing him a son, she then 
manoeuvred to secure f o r her c h i l d the succession to 
the throne ahead of his older and legitimate brothers."^^ 
Strabo's statement Is very credible, and Phraates' 
fears understandable: parricide was a family t r a d i t i o n 
already going back two generations. Josephus' st6ry 
need not be doubted, f o r i t harmonizes w i t h subsequent 
Parthian hlstory."^^ 
The standards are mentioned among v i c t o r i e s (29) 
and the hostages are l i s t e d among foreigners suppllant-
l y coming to Rome (32). 
"^^Tac. Ann. 2, 1. "^^Strabo 16, 1, 28. 
Josephus AJ 18, 40. 
•^ A^ controversy arises here. Aside from why, we do 
not even know when Augustus gave Musa to Phraates. The 
t r a d i t i o n a l assumption has been 20 B.C., during or Im-
mediately a f t e r the events described In th i s chapter. 
There are three bases f o r t h i s assumption, i ) From the 
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Augustus, by using the v/ord plgnora. may be q u i e t l y 
v e r i f y i n g the fact ( p a t r i o t i c a l l y misrepresented by the 
unknowing) that Phraates was doing himself a favour by 
unloading his children on Augustus. I t may have been 
a bid by Phraates to demonstrate some form of submis-
sion, perhaps even before he surrendered the standards— 
perhaps, hopefully, In l i e u of them. V/hatever the c i r -
cumstances, hostages could not"satisfy Augustus' re-
quirement: the standards were the Important thing. Their 
loss had been Rome's shame; t h e i r return had been Rome's 
demand; and t h e i r recovery would be celebrated by Rome."^ ^ 
Information I n Josephus' statement, Musa had had time to 
have a son old enough to be a viable candidate for the 
throne and she had had time to gain a strong Influence 
over Phraateso 2) The notion that Phraates' sons were 
given about 10 B.C. 3) The fact that Musa's son, Phraa-
taces. Is called luvenls excelslsslmus by Vellelus In 
his eyewitness account of events I n A.D. 1 (2, l O l , 2 ) . 
As f o r point l ) , the period of time required need 
not be more than a couple years, and th i s statement In 
I t s e l f gives no clue to the date of Musa's presentation. 
I n point 2 ) , the notion has already been rejected (see 
pp. 133-6). I n point 3 ) , the word luvenls I s re l a t i v e and 
cannot be pushed too f a r . Besides, by the accepted view 
of Phraataces' age, he would have been the same age as 
Vellelus: c l e a r l y Vellelus Is w r i t i n g not from the stand-
point of the time In which the events occurred, but t h i r -
t y years l a t e r , w i t h the sentiments of a man of f i f t y , 
to v/hom even a man much older than t h i r t y would s t i l l be 
considered a luvenls. 
;A Another piece of Interesting but not conclusive e v i -
dence i s a coin of Phraataces dated f o r 2 B.C. which pic-
tures him with a substantial beard. The Slmonettas v/ouLd 
put back the g i f t of Musa to 29 B.C. (B. and A. Slmonetta, 
'Le Vlcende d l Fraate IV, Re del P a r t i , ' Numlsmatlca. 
1949, pp. 36-46), and even as la t e as 23 B.C. would be 
acceptable to the other evidence. 
As to v/hether a seventeen year-old can grow a beard, 
i t I s a matter of chance and opinion: at least I t was I n 
my case. 
•^ T^he fact that no Roman coin Issued Immediately 
a f t e r t h i s date celebrates the surrendering of hostages, 
while one coin dated 8 B.C. does depict a man surrender-
ing a hostage, has been used by Mommsen to support the 
view that the Parthian hostages were surrendered around 
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Phraates.' sons v/ere sent to Rome. Two eventually 
died there;'^^ the other two, and one of Phraates' 
grandsons, were the pawns of l a t e r p o l i c y . At some 
time the hostages were shown o f f by Augustus at the 
Games: they followed him do'^ m the middle of the arena 
54 
and sat two rov/s behind him. 
10 B.C. (RGDA, p. 94); but Mattlngly Is sure the hos-
tage depicted on that coin I s Germanic,(H. Mattlngly, 
Coins of the Roman Empire I n the B r i t i s h Museum (Lon-dSnj; TT Auiustus"to V l t e l l l u s , 1923, No. 492, and see 
p. c x v l ) . 
^^CIL, V I , 1799; one of the Parthlans apparently 
b u i l t a temple: CUj, XIV, 2216. 
^"^Suet. Aug. 43. 
Chapter Twelve 
A Nev/ East a f t e r 20 B.C. 
Augustus, a f t e r a Leisurely journey home, entered 
the CLty on October 12, a day voted by the senate tq 
become an annual public holiday, the Augustalla.^ To 
honour Augustus the senate decreed a triumph, which he 
refused, and a triumphal arch. An a l t a r of Fortuna 
Redux -was consecrated,*^ and Augustus made plans for 
constructing a temple f o r Mars U l t o r , In which the re-
covered standards would be enshrined; temporarily they 
were resting on the Capitol near the temple of Jupiter 
4 
Feretrlus. 
Horace was unrestrained. 'Who fears the Parthian... 
while Caesar l i v e s ? T h e poet was I n tune v/lth what 
appears to have been a dominant theme: Phraates on 
bended knees, ready to obey: 
*lus Imperlumque Phraates 
Caesarls acceplt genlbus mlijor....'^ 
There Is an excellent statue of Augustus In m i l i t a r y 
dress, and on his cuirass I s depicted a Parthian In 
R^G 11; and Dlo 54, 10, 3. 
R^G 4. 
R^G 11. 
G^. F. H i l l , H i s t o r i c a l Roman Coins (London, 1909), 
pp. 142-3; and J.G..C. Anderson, CAH, X, p. 263. 
^Hor. 0d..4, 5, 25. 
^Hor. Epist. 1, 12, 27-8. 
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n 
the act of surrendering the standards. For the next 
o 
couple of years, the coinage from various mints con-
9 
centrated on the theme of Augustus' eastern successes, , 
depicting a Parthian on bended knee,^^ as well as other 
Images of v i c t o r y , suph as the recovered standards,^^ 
the triumphal arch,^^ Augustus' triumphal chariot, r l d e r -
13 14 
less, and the temple of.Mars Ulto r . A simple Capri-
corn could be depicted,, f o r lt:v/as Augustus' sign, and 
beneath I t the legend SIGNIS PARTHICUS RECEPTIS.^^ Legends 
were Important, and varied but l i t t l e : CIVIB ET SIGN 
MILIT A PART RECUP;^ ^ CAESAR AUGUSTUS SIGN RECE;^ ^ SIG-
NIS RECEPTIS;^® MARTIS ULTORIS.^^ 
Concerning Armenia, Augustus' coins at f i r s t read 
ARMENIA CAPTA,^^ probably reviving memories of AEGYPTO 
^See CAH, v o l . IV of plates, 148, a. 
8 
On the concordance of the mints of eastern c i t i e s 
see C.H.V. Sutherland, The Clstophorl of Augustus (Lon-
don, 1970), pp. 34-7 and 102-4. 
9 
Sutherland. Coinage, p. 28. 
^S^attlngly, Coins R. Erne., v o l . I , no. 10, 18, 40, 
43 , and 56. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 704. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 7, 52, and 77. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 427, and 703. 
^"^Ibld., 315, 332, and 366. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 679. 
^^Jbld., 427. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 10, 40, and 56, 
^ ^ I b l d . . 332. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 315 and 366. z 
^ ^ I b l d . . 18, 43, 44, and 671. 
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21 CAPTA. But soon t h i s legend was replaced w i t h ARMENIA 
RECEPTA^^—less f l a t t e r i n g to Tiberius, but more sa t i s -
23 
fying to Roman pride, f o r some claim to Armenia could 
be traced back to Lucullus; also, Augustus argues that 
he could have made Armenia a province, but preferred to-
24 
i n s t a l l Tlgranes—maiorum nostrorum exemplo. No un-
t r u t h here, though, of course, he does not mention that 
the keenest exponent of the policy had been Marcus An-
tonlus. 
Augustus had greatly altered the East In 20 3.G» 
Armenia, and even Media Atropatene, were now Roman 
client-kingdoms. Lesser Armenia was placed I n the f i r m 
hands of Archelaus of Cappadocla. Commagene's king 
Mlthradates I I , who had been recognised as king by Au-
gustus, either died or was deposed In 20 B.C. A new 
king, also named Mlthradates, was recognised as ruler 
25 
by Augustus. Tarcondimotus was restored to his an-
26 ' 
c e s t r a l kingdom of C l l l c l a , and someone named lambllchus, 
son of lamblichus, v/as allowed to succeed to some dominion 
27 
over the Arabians. At some time, a certain king Arta-
28 * 
xares had f l e d to Augustus: his'kingdom, Adlabene, may 
^^Mattlngly, Coins ,R'.-. Emp.. v o l . I , no. 6 5 0 . . 
^ ^ I b i d . . 6 7 5 . 
23 
I b i d . . p. cxxv, n. 1 ; and Sutherland, Coinage. p. 
4 4 , 
^ \ G 2 7 . 
^"^Dio 5 4 , 9 , 3 . 
^ ^ I b i d . 
^^Dio 5 4 , 9 , 2 . ^^RG 3 2 . 
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at t h i s time have come w i t h i n Augustus' g i f t . 
The p r i n c i p l e was f i r m l y established. The East 
29 
was h a l f Roman, ha l f Parthian. Every oriental king 
who was not already a vassal of Parthla owed his throne 
to Augustus. Succession had to be aipproved. 
Parthla had been properly humbled, and Augustus 
could be at ease with the s i t u a t i o n I n the East. I n 
16 B.C. Agrlppa was sent again to the East: this time 
without any rumours of scandal, or any urgency. Agrlppa 
took his wife Julia and Augustus' two grandsons along, 
and they were feted v/herever they wentj receiving a warm 
welcome from Herod."^^ As vicegerent, Agrlppa was Indis-
pensable to Augustus, for he could be wherever I t hap-
pened that the prlnceps could not; also, the separation 
of the two leaders perhaps made l i f e more bearable f o r 
tl^e nob l i e s , and each, other. 
Agrlppa was In the East f o r three years, and the 
only serious a c t i v i t y which disturbed his leisure and 
administrative a c t i v i t y was the regulation of a f f a i r s 
I n the Bosporan kingdom on the northern shore of the 
Black Sea. Agrlppa's mere threat"of force cooled the 
s i t u a t i o n ; the area was given Into the care of Polemo 
of Pontus."^^ 
The area had economic Importance: I t s grain fed 
29" 
For t h i s contemporary view, see Strabo 16, 1, 28. 
^^Jos. AJ 16, 12; and Dlo 54, 19, 6; and see Magle, 
RRIAM, pp. 476-7 and 1339, n. 26. 
^^Syme, RR, p. 389, 
"'^Dlo 54, 24, 5. 
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Roman soldiers and a great deal of commercial a c t i v i t y 
was carried on i n the Black Sea region."^^ I t would be 
Worthwhile to discuss for a moment the economic consid-
erations which may have affected Augustus' policy i n 
the East. 
Augustus gave every indication of his Interest In 
economic a f f a i r s i n the East. I n acquiring Egypt a f t e r 
the b a t t l e of Alexandria, Augustus Inherited the Ptole-
mies' r i c h monopolies: i n grain, of which a surplus 
could be exported; I n minerals, manufactured goodsand 
34 
t e x t i l e s , and the luxury trade w i t h Arabia and India. 
Augustus' i n t e r e s t In the l a t t e r manifested i t s e l f i n 
Aelius Gallus' expedition down the coast of Arabia i n 
25 B.C. More was involved than merely robbing the Sab-
aeans of t h e i r wealth. Direct trade l i n k s were being 
sought which would cut out middlemen and costs: the 
Nabataeans knew t h i s , and helped Gallus bungle his ex-
pedition.^"^ Yet commerce to India did f l o u r i s h , and 
there was a Roman naval base established at Myos Hor-
mos, an Egyptian port on the Red Sea."^ ^ 
This sea-route was only one of four trade routes 
connecting the Roman world with India and the Far East. 
Two other routes led overland from Syria by diverse 
, '^ '^ J.G.C. Anderson, C^, X, p. 266. 
34 
M.P. Charlesworth, Trade Routes and Commerce of 
the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1924), pp. 18-32. 
^•^J. Thorley, 'The Development of Trade betv/een 
the Roman Empire and the. East under Augustus,' Greece 
and Rome 16, 1969, p. 21. , 
•^^Strabo 2, 5, 12. 
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paths u n t i l they met up again at Seleucla on the T i g r i s ; 
then they s p i l t once more, one heading across the Ir.an-
lan plateau and the other leading to the Persian Gulf, 
37 
Where vessels would arrive from India. These tViTo 
routes were studded w i t h wealthy towns—caravan stops, 
r i v e r crossings, trading centres, and terminals. The 
fou r t h route was far to the north, following the Cyrus 
va l l e y to the Caspian, which was then crossed, and a f t e r 
which the route continued south-eastward along the Oxus. 
v a l l e y to Samarkand, from v/hlch one road led south to 
38 
India and another east toward China. 
This route never entered Parthian t e r r i t o r y . Some 
scholars maintain that t h i s explains the Importance of 
Armenia, I b e r i a and the Caucasus In Roman polic y , p a r t i -
c u l a r l y Augustus'. I t Is argued that since no Parthian 
force ever attacked- through Armenia, there v/as no st r a -
tegic reason for the Romans to hold I t , unless to pre-
39 
vent t h i s trade route f a l l i n g Into Parthian hands. 
Likewise I t I s argued that the Parthlans continually 
t r i e d to regain Armenia whenever'they feared that the 
Romans v/ere succeeding at di v e r t i n g the Central Asian 
40 
trade away from more southerly routes. 
Augustus may have had some Interest In maintaining 37 
Charlesworth, 'Trade Routes,' pp. 100-2. 
"^^armlngton, pp. 22-3; and Charlesworth, I b i d . . 
pp. 106-7. 
39 
V/armlngton, pp. 32-4; and Charlesworth, I b i d . . 
pp. 104-8. 
40 
F. J. ^ .Teggart, Rome and China: a study of corre-
l a t i o n s In h i s t o r i c a l events (Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a , 1939), 
pp. 240-1. 
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t h i s northerly route, at least as an al t e r n a t i v e , so' 
that the Parthians could never seal o f f a l l trade routes 
to Syria. But there i s no reason to think that the Par-
thians would ever do such a thing, which would cripple 
t h e i r own revenues. On the other hand, the Parthians 
did l i k e to control as much of the trade, and thus cus-
tomsrevenue, , as possible: they hindered the Chinese 
41 
from eyer making d i r e c t contact with the Romans. 
I n a larger sense, these trade routes were In no 
way v i t a l : the trade was mostly In luxuries, not neces-
s i t i e s . Of course, the luxuries of Incense, perfumes, 
spices, gems and dyes a l l had a'.greater value In the 
ancient economy, and the trade i n the East provided a 
42 
f a t tax-base f o r the Empire. But Rome had no easily 
transportable items of comparable value, so imperial 
43 
b u l l i o n had to make up the balance. Moreover, Augus-
tus was probably as Interested In trade w i t h i n the em-
44 
p i r e — I t a l i a n manufactures and Egyptian foodstuffs. 
The main argument against these economic explana-
tions of policy i n Armenia i s that there were other very 
« 
strong reasons f o r Rome and Parthia to struggle over Ar-
45 
menla, reasons of strategy, and, more Importantly, of 
prestige. '^^Hirth, pp. 27 f f . 
"^^Thorley, p. 209. 
43 
I b i d . . p. 223; and R.E.M. Wheeler, Rome beyond the 
Imperial Frontiers (London, 1954), p. I 6 4 f f . See Pliny 
NH 12, 84 on the drain of specie eastward. 
'^'^Rostovtzeff, Rome, p. 263. 
• 45 
The discussion of f r o n t i e r defence i s on p. lOlf. 
Chapter Thirteen 
Events East and West, 16-2 B.C. 
V/hlie Agrlppa was sojourning In the East, Augus-
tus' stepsons,,. Tiberius and Drusus, were beginning the 
systematic conquest on the northern f r o n t i e r . I t v/as a. 
necessary task Involving f i r s t the reduction of Alpine 
t r i b e s which even at th i s late date were s t i l l raiding " 
Northern I t a l y and hampering communications w i t h Gaul; 
secondly, the completion of the conquest of the Balkans— 
a l o g i c a l conclusion to the e f f o r t s of Augustus In that 
area nearly twenty years before; and, f i n a l l y , the drive 
f o r a shorter l i n e of defence In Germany, l i n k i n g the 
Elbe with the Danube.V -
Augustus may have been planning t h i s for a long 
time, but he could not begin u n t i l Spain had been paci-
f i e d and the East made secure, w i t h Parthla properly 
humbled. Also, the evidence i s that Augustus had been 
bu i l d i n g up a new army, a better one—not the left-overs 
of c i v i l war,^ 
Agrlppa was summoned back to Rome In 13 B.C. His 
nearly expired malus Imperlum was renewed, aft e r v/hlch 
he was sent to I l l y r l c u m to lead the campaign there. 
But the winter shattered his health, and he died In 
^Syme, CAH, X, pp. 347-63. 
^Syme, 'Some Notes on Legions,' p. 19-20. 
r 
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February of 12 B.C., soon a f t e r returning to I t a l y . ^ 
The wars I n the north were carried on by Tiberius and 
Drusus, and, a f t e r Drusus died, by Tiberius alone. 
Augustus surely had never expected to survive his 
f r i e n d Agrippa. Had Augustus died f i r s t , the empire 
would i n fact have been i n Agrippa's hands. The Claud>-
ians could lead the armies s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , but they 
v/ere nobiles (a class which, i n Augustus' view, could 
help run, but not r u l e , the empire), and they were not 
of Augustus' blood: at least Agrippa was the father of 
Augustus' grandsons, on whom the princeps now placed 
his hopes f o r the succession. Hov/ever, Augustus forced 
Tiberius to divorce his beloved wife Vipsania, Agrippa's 
daughter, and to marry Agrippa's widow, J u l i a . This 
brought Tiberius Into the core of the Imperial family, 
but he no doubt perceived that he was v i r t u a l l y guard-
Ian of Julia and her sons, Gaius, Lucius and Agrippa 
Postumus. V/hen they should come of age, there would be 
no thought of Tiberius succeeding to Augustus' throne. 
His only p r i v i l e g e was to serve. And In the East, events 
suddenly took a turn which would rfequlre Tiberius'* ser-
vices. 
Shortly before 6 B.C."^  Tigranes I I , Augustus' c l i -
ent-king on the Armenian throne, died and was succeeded 
by his son, also named Tlgranes.' The new king ruled 
^Dlo 54, 28, 1-2. 
Suet. Tib. 7,2; and Dio 54, 35, 4. 
•^Tac. Ann. 2,3,5 makes i t sound as i f i t were a 
short time l a t e r that Tiberius r e t i r e d . 
r 
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j o i n t l y w i t h his s i s t e r , Erato, as man and wife, but 
because they had.not waited to receive t h e i r diadems 
by Augustus' command, Roman authority might seem to 
be lapsing. I t would have to be restored. Tiberius 
was the man f o r the job. He had crov/ned the late T l -
granes I I fourteen years before. He was Rome's fore-
most sol d i e r . . A f t e r campaigning fo r eight hard years 
on the northern f r o n t i e r , Tiberius returned to Rome and 
was at l a s t allowed to celebrate a triumph In 7 B.C., 
In which year he also held the consulship.^ But when 
Augustus gave him a special Imperlum and commissioned 
him to handle Armenia, Tiberius asked permission to re-
t i r e from public l i f e , and 'exlied' himself to Rhodes. 
The gossip pointed to J u l i a , but she was only a 
symptom of Tiberius' malaise. He was t i r e d of being 
used and used, knov/lng that In the end he would only 
be put aside, at best. 
Syme maintains that Augustus only gave Tiberius 
t h i s commission In order to remove him again from Rome, 
where Galus and Lucius were being groomed for the . 
^F.B. Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius (Oxford, 1931), 
p. 36. 
^Dlo 55, 9, 4-8. 
g 
Suet. Tib. 10. Suetonius, In f a c t , offers four 
reasons f o r Tiberius' withdrawal; In the last given, 
and emphasized as being Tiberius' own £ost Xacto,ex-
planation, a comparison Is made with Agrlppa's w l t h -
drawal to Lesbos In 23 B.C.: that Tiberius' desire v/as 
to leave the f i e l d open fo r Augustus' chosen successor. 
In t h i s case, Galus. I f so, one would hardly expect so 
much protest over Tiberius' retirement to be made by 
Augustus. The comparison.with Agrlppa Is shrewd: T i -
berius would have knov/n that the stated motive for that 
withdrawal was also dissembling. 
r 
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succession; Syme writes: 'There was no urgent need for 
9 ' him i n the East.' V/ithout denying the other motives 
Syme a t t r i b u t e s to Augustus, i t seems clear that the 
s i t u a t i o n i n the East v/as very serious, c e r t a i n l y some-
• thing Augustus would not toy v/lth. For sound strategic 
reasons, Armenia should be held. I f Armenia v/ere allov/ed 
to s l i p back i n t o the Parthian sphere, i t would be hard-
er to keep hold of the other client-kingdoms. Prestige 
was a v i t a l f a c t o r , and the commercial considerations 
could also have entered Into i t . 
Eventually Augustus ordered that Artavasdes I I , 
probably the t h i r d son of Artavasdes I , and therefore 
brother to the la t e Tlgranes 11, be Ins t a l l e d as king 
i n A r m e n i a . A s w i t h Arlobarzanes' I n s t a l l a t i o n i n 
20 B.C., we have no record of who commanded the force 
which dethroned Tigranes I I I and Erato and placed Ar-
tavasdes I I i n t h e i r stead, presumably because the mis-
sion was not performed by a member of the imperial 
house.' The governorship of Syria changed hands In 6 
B.C.: C. Sentius Saturninus was replaced by P. Q u l n c t i l -
11 • 
lus Varus, but t h i s provides no clue. Artavasdes 
Issued coins w i t h the p o r t r a i t s of Augustus and 
9 
Syme, RR, p. 417. 
.^^Tac. Ann. 2, 3. 11 • • Varus was simply moving upward through various 
posts, aided by the favour of Augustus and his marriage 
i n 7 B.C. to Claudia Pulchra, Augustus' grandnlece. 
Saturninus was the better man, though, at this point i n 
time, he might have suffered f o r his friendship with 
Tiberius. See: PIR^ . no. 27 and 293; OCD, pp. 955 and 
1108-9; V e i l . Pater. 2, 105, 1; and Syme, RR, pp. 424 
and 434. 
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himself. 
But about 2 B.C. Artavasdes was driven out of ^ 
Armenia, as we l l as the supporting Romarj^ 'not without 
disaster,' by the Parthlans under a new and reckless 
klng.^"' 
Percy Gardner, 'On an unpublished coin of Arta-
vasdes I I , king of Armenia,' Num. Chron.. n.s., 12, 
1872, pp. 9-15. 
^"^Tac. Ann. 2, 4: 'non sine clade nostra delectus;' and Dlo 55, 10, 18. 
1 
Chapter Fourteen 
The Mission of Galus, 2 B.C.-4 A.D. 
Phraataces ascended the Parthian throne I n 2 B.C., 
eighteen years a f t e r the return of the standards and 
the surrender of his half-brothers as hostages by Phraa-
tes IV. For those eighteen years, because relations 
w i t h Rome were t r a n q u i l , our sources have l i t t l e to say 
about a f f a i r s i n Parthia. There are hints of internal 
troubles. Josephus mentions that Herod v/-as f a l s e l y ac-
cused of making a pact of friendship v/ith a Parthian 
king named Mithradates who was i n pov/er sometime be-
tv/een 12 and 9 B.C.^  The accuser ( i f not Josephus or 
his source) may have simply erred about the king's 
name;^ or t h i s king may represent some opposition to 
Phraates IV f o r which no other record has survived."^ 
Sometime before 6 B.C. a Jewish nobleman and f i v e hun-
dred of hi s archer-cavalrymen f l e d from his estates I n 
Babylonia and sought refuge v^lth the Syrian legate' C. 
4 
Sentius Saturninus. This must Indicate some c r i s i s In 
the kingship of the ageing Phraates. I n 2 B.C. his 
cares came to an end, f o r Phraataces, his son by Musa, 
had grown up and found I t tedious waiting f o r the old 
man to d i e , and so he poisoned him, w i t h his mother's 
^Jos. AJ 16, 253. 
^Anderson, CAH. X, p. 264, n. 3. 
3' 4 Debevolse, p. 144. Jos. AJ 17, 23-24. 
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help."^ Phraataces ruled w i t h his mother as man-and 
wlfe.^ Perhaps to prove himself In the eyes of the 
nobles, Phraates boldly embarked on a c o l l i s i o n course 
wi t h Roman policy over Armenia. 
Ar.tavasdes I I , placed In Armenia by the Romans 
about 6 B.C., had probably been l i v i n g In Rome for 
about twenty-four years preceding his I n s t a l l a t i o n . 
By now he had l i t t l e I n common with his subjects, and 
no doubt there was a large group anxious to depose him. 
Armenia v/as always torn: c u l t u r a l l y akin to the Parthl-
ans, there nevertheless alv/ays seemed to exist a strong 
pro-Roman f a c t i o n In Armenia. Probably the Armenians' 
greatest wish was f o r Independence from both Rome and 
Parthla. Phraataces no doubt found support when he 
7 
drove out the Romans and toppled Artavasdes I I . 
When Augustus learned that Ttgranes I I I and Erato 
had been brought back to power through Parthian I n t e r -
vention, he realized that again amed force would be 
required to restore Roman suzerainty. 
Circumstances had changed since 6 B.C. when Tiber-
ius had refused to lead the force which would assert 
Roman author i t y over the succession to the Armenian 
throne. This time the Parthlans were d e f i n i t e l y Involved, 
Jos. AJ 18, 43. The e a r l i e s t coins of Phraataces 
(bearded—see ch. 11, n. 5 l ) are from 2 B.C.: McDov/ell, 
p. 222; Wroth, p. 136. 
^Coln evidence: Gardner, pp. 45ff,; and B-. and A. 
Slmonetta, pp. 36f f . The Incestuous marriage, which 
h o r r i f i e d Romans and Greeks, v/as not viewed favourably 
even by the Parthlans themselves: Lucan Phars 8, 401-10; 
and Jos, AJ 18, 42f. 
^Dlo 55, 10, 18. 
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and v/ouLd have to be humbled I f Roman prestige were to 
be maintained. 
Tiberius was s t i l l away at Rhodes, and, under the 
present circumstances, no mere general or legate v/ould 
s u f f i c e . Fortunately, Augustus' grandson Galus had 
come of age. He was s t i l l not yet twenty, but 
8 
' ...Caesaribus v i r t u s c o n t l g l t ante diem.' 
As I n 20 B.-C., Augustus was ultimately prepared 
to use brute force, but only a f t e r every attempt had 
been made to achieve his ends through the mere threat 
of force. As I n 20 B.C., there would be no direct 
attack, but again a lengthy 'tour' during which Phraa-
taces could tremble and other errands could be performed 
by Galus. 
F i r s t , Galus himself v/as b u i l t up. Already ap-
parently destined to succeed Augustus, Galus had been 
showered w i t h honours while yet a boy. Nov/ he v/as given 
the same proconsular authority Agrlppa and Tiberius had 
received, and a w i f e — t o demonstrate a d i g n i f i e d maturl-
Q 
t y . He had already been designated f o r the consulship 
of A.D. 1, which he would assume during his journey. 
To prevent an Inexperienced youth from s t a r t i n g a 
Parthian v/ar needlessly, a m i l i t a r y adviser was ap-
12 
pointed—the experienced M. L o l l l u s . And a geographical 
^ b v l d Ars am. 1, 8. ^Dlo 55, 10, 18-21. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 9, 2-4. ^^Syme, RR, p. 428. 
^ ^ V e l l . Pater. 2, l O l f . ; and Suet. Tib. 12. V e l l e i -
us has nothing good to say of L o l l l u s , but Horace praises 
his I n t e g r i t y (Od. 4, 9, 3 3 f f . ) . He v/as a nevus homo, 
entrusted v/lth the organisation of Galatla In 25 B.C.; 
he v/as I n Rome as consul I n 21; as early as 20 B.C. he 
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study of at least Parthia may have been commissioned 
by Augustus. 
Sometime i n 1 B.C. Galus set out on his journey. 
He t r a v e l l e d through Greece and across the Aegean to 
Asia Minor, where various c i t i e s , knowing who he was 
and who he would become, enthusiastically showed t h e i r 
a f f e c t i o n . T i b e r i u s t r a v e l l e d to Samos (or Chios) 
to pay his respects to Caesar's heir.^"^ Instead of 
16 
heading s t r a i g h t f o r Syria, Gaius sailed to Egypt, 
where he entered his consulship.and apparently engaged 
17 
In m i l i t a r y operations i n Arabia. 
may have been Macedonia's p r o c o n s u l — a . c r i t i c a l posi-
t i o n at that time (Groag, P-W, s.v. ' L o l l l u s , ' c o l . 
1381). He then suffered a " ~ ^ r l f l i n g defeat' magnified 
by his detractors (Syme, RR, p. 429), especially V e l l e i -
us, who r e f l e c t s the h o s t i l i t y between L o l l i u s and T i -
berius. The origins of t h i s h o s t i l i t y are obscure: be-
ginning perhaps i n 17 B.C. i n Gaul, or even i n 20 B.C. 
i n Macedonia, where personalities and duties might have 
clashed. By the time of Tiberius' e x i l e on Rhodes, the 
enmity was f l a g r a n t . I t may have contributed to L o l l l u s ' 
curious downfall i n A.D. 2 (Syme, RR, p. 428-9). 
^ ^ P l i n y NH 6, 141. The geographer was Isidore of 
Charax, whoseTarthian Stations Is datable from internal 
evidence to the reign of Augustus,' close to the d h r i s t i a n 
era: W.H. Schoff, Parthian Stations by Isidore of Charax/, 
(Philadelphia, 1914), p. 17. 
^See Magle, RRIAT^ . p. 1343, n. 41. 
^•^Suet. Tib. 12; and Dio 55, 10, 19. -
^^Orosius 7,3,5-6. 
1 7 
See G.W. Bowersock, 'A Report on Arabia Provincia,' 
JRS 61, 1971, p. 227 and T.D. Barnes, 'The Victories of 
Augustus,' JRS 64, 1974, p. 21-6, who agree on an i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of ILS 140 v/hich i s d i f f e r e n t and, I think, bet-
t e r , than that of Ferrero, Greatness and Decline, IV, p. 
213, or Anderson, CAH, X, p. 276, n. 3. ' These operations 
may have been a r e v i v a l of Gallus' expedition (Gardthausen, 
Augustus und seine Zeit (Leipzig, 1891), I , 3, pp. 1132-3), 
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F i n a l l y Galus reached S y r i a , and h i s approach 
alarmed Phraataces, who dispatched envoys to Augustus 
to e x p l a i n what he had done and to e s t a b l i s h peace on 
the c o n d i t i o n that Augustus r e t u r n Phraates' four l e g i -
timate sons, v/ho were a t h r e a t to Phraataces' position.. 
Augustus wrote a l e t t e r t o Phraataces, addressed simply 
to 'Phraataces,' commanding him to l a y aside h i s ro y a l 
najne and v/ithdraw from Armenia. But Phraataces, s i g n -
ing h i m s e l f as 'King of Kings,' wrote back a r e f u s a l to 
Augustus, addressing him simply as 'Caesar.' 
Tlgranes I n Armenia showed a great deal more sense. 
The deposed Roman nominee Artavasdes I I , the brother and 
r i v a l o f Tlgranes, had r e c e n t l y died of I l l n e s s ( i n 
S y r i a ? ) . .Tlgranes sent g i f t s to Augustus and a l e t t e r 
m which he never used h i s own t i t l e 'king' but Instead 
p e t i t i o n e d the kingship-from Augustus. Augustus accepted 
the g i f t s and t o l d him to go w i t h good hopes to Galus I n 
Syria.^® 
Tlgranes had seen t h a t he could not keep h i s throne 
I f Augustus d i d not w i l l I t . A l s o , the Armenian was no 
doubt d i s i l l u s i o n e d v/lth h i s a l l y Phraataces, who'. I n 
t u r n , was now so disheartened by the submission of T t -
granes and by rumblings of d i s l o y a l t y v / l t h l n P a r t h l a 
t h a t he came to terms w i t h Augustus: there would be 
peace I f Phraataces renounced h i s cl a i m to Armenia, and 
19 
Augustus could keep the four, brothers I n Rome. 
or a campaign to help the Nabataeans, who v/ere t u r n i n g 
to a g r i c u l t u r e , to f i g h t o f f nomadic Invaders (Bower-
sock, p. 227). 
^^Dlo 55, 10, 20-21. ^ ^ I b l d . . 10a, 4. 
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I t had a l l been a grand performance, a repeat of 
20 B.C., made a l l the easier by the f a c t t h a t the audi-
ence knew what was coming. Meanwhile, I n the background, 
n e g o t i a t i o n s had brought a settlement. Phraataces, I n 
f a c t , v/as allov/ed more than h i s mere s u r v i v a l . P a r t h l a 
was now to be recognized as a pov/er, not equal, but 
w i t h a r i g h t to e x i s t beside Rome; the Euphrates was to 
be the agreed border. A l l t h i s was demonstrated by a 
spectacular ceremony—the culmination of an operation 
which from beginning to end had revealed Augustus' 
touch. The two armies drew up on e i t h e r side of the 
Euphrates and on an I s l a n d I n the middle the two young 
men, the k i n g of P a r t h l a and the h e i r to Rome, agreed 
to terms already s e t , and then dined w i t h one another 
on e i t h e r bank. 
This would have s i g n a l l e d t h a t I t was time f o r 
Galus to r e t u r n t o a cheering Rome. But soon a f t e r 
the conference on the Euphrates, Tlgranes'In Armenia 
was k i l l e d by barbarians and Erato resigned her sover-
e i g n t y , so Galus' advisers had to search f o r a new can-
d i d a t e , since w i t h Tlgranes' death"the r o y a l Llne'of 
Armenia died out.^^ Arlobarzanes of Media Atropatene 
^°Vell. Pater. 2, l O l , 1-4, 
^^Dlo 55, lOa, 5. The exact d a t i n g of these events— 
Galus' e n t r y I n t o S y r i a , the conference, the death of T l -
granes, and the f i g h t i n g I n A r m e n i a — I s Impossible. V/e 
do not knov/ v/here Galus was when h i s consulship began I n 
A.D. I; the conference and the f i g h t i n g had not yet oc-
curred I n September, A.D. 1 (see G e l l l u s NA-15, 7 f o r a 
l e t t e r from Augustus to Galus w r i t t e n on Augustus' s i x t y -
t h i r d b i r t h d a y , September 24, A.D. l ) ; Dlo places the 
outbreak of war I n Armenia I n A.D. 2, and V e l l e l u s ( c i t e d 
above) had Galus going to Armenia a f t e r the conference. 
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was chosen. Armenian and Median r o y a l l i n e s were l i n k e d 
by m a r r i a g e b o t h c o u n t r i e s had been under the same 
r u l e r from 30 to 20 B.C.; and Arlobarzanes was apparent-
l y a pleasing and acceptable c h a r a c t e r . S t i l l , a f a c -
t i o n I n Armenia took the opp o r t u n i t y to r e v o l t against 
24 
any Roman Im p o s i t i o n . Galus marched to Armenia to 
I n s t a l l the Mede and subdue the re b e l s , but v/as himself 
m o r t a l l y wounded. He l i n g e r e d , the r e v o l t was crushed, 
and Arlobarzanes was I n s t a l l e d . But f i n a l l y Galus died 
25 
I n February, A.D. 4. 
^^Strabo 11, 13, 1. 
^•^Tac. Ann. 2, 3. 
^"^Dlo 55, 10a, 6. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 7-10; Tac. Ann. 1,3; and JLS 140, 
Chapter F i f t e e n 
A.D. 4 to Augustus' Death 
Before Galus succumbed to h i s wounds I n A.D. 4, 
the r e s u l t s o f h i s mission must have seemed s a t i s f a c -
t o r y to the mentor of I t a l l , Augustus. He had gra n t -
ed t h a t P a r t h l a be recognized as a sovereign pov/er, a. 
gesture which I n no way a f f e c t e d the s i t u a t i o n . And 
the s i t u a t i o n was good. The Euphrates may have become 
the agreed border, but Roman Influence s t r e t c h e d , along 
the n o r t h , a l l the way to the Caspian. And now Armenia 
and Media were under the c o n t r o l of one t r u s t e d k i n g , 
Arlobarzanes. As f o r P a r t h l a , I t s k i n g had been de-
c i s i v e l y embarrassed; Phraataces would not soon t r y 
Rome's patience again. By a l l " appearances the eastern 
f r o n t i e r o f f e r e d the hope of a few years q u i e t . 
T i b e r i u s had been allowed back t o Rome I n A.D. 2, 
a r r i v i n g s h o r t l y a f t e r the death o f Lucius Caesar.^ Two 
years l a t e r , when word came tha t Galus too had di e d , 
Augustus, at l a s t and w i t h o u t j o y , adopted T i b e r i u s as 
h i s son and t h e r e f o r e successor.^ T i b e r i u s Immediately 
took up command I n Germany, and f o r the next seven years 
he commanded the armies along the northern f r o n t i e r , 
s h i f t i n g from one c r i t i c a l p o i n t t o another'^ from Germany 
^Suet. T i b . 13; and Dlo 55, 10a, 10. 
^ S u e t , T i b . 23, quotes Augustus: 'quonlam at r o x 
f o r t u n a Galum e t Luclum f l l l o s mlhl e r l p u l t . ' 
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and Maroboduus to I l L y r l c u m and the Pannonlan r e v o l t , 
and back to Germany a f t e r the defeat of Varus.^ The 
energies of the empire were spent on the North and the 
l i m i t s of power were being discovered. 
By the time T i b e r i u s returned t o Rome I n A.D. 11 
to c e l e b r a t e h i s triumph, I t was seen th a t Augustus 
could not l i v e many more years; and because of the 
p o l i t i c a l trauma which could be caused by the succes-
s i o n . I t was c l e a r t h a t T i b e r i u s could not t r a v e l f a r 
from Rome or the legions of the Westj and the Eastern 
posts were t h o u g l f r u l l y assigned t o adherents of T l b e r l -
A 
4 
us' ' p a r t y . ' 
The combination of the years of exertions on the 
no r t h e r n f r o n t i e r s and the breathless period of w a i t i n g 
f o r Augustus to di e meant th a t less a t t e n t i o n could be 
paid t o the East, v/hlch, against expectations, needed a 
gre a t deal of a t t e n t i o n . 
I t had been an expensive s t r u g g l e to crown Ar l o b a r -
zanes; Galus had perished. But Arlobarzanes himself died 
soon a f t e r , apparently from that rare disease, a n a t u r a l 
5 • 
death. He was succeeded by a soni Artavasdes, probably 
^Syme, CAH, X, pp. 364-81. 
4 . . 
Syme, RR, p. 435. The governors of Syria between 
A.D. 4 and Augustus' death were L. Voluslus Saturnlnus 
( 4 - 5 ) , P. S u l p l c l u s Q u l r l n l u s (6-12?), and Q. Cae c l l l u s 
iMetellus C r e t l c u s Sllanus (12-17): Honlgmann, P-V/, 'Syria,' 
c o l . 1629. Saturnlnus was a f a m i l y f r i e n d of Tiberius 
(Syme, RR, pp. 424 and 435). Q u l r l n l u s paid court to T i -
b e r i u s a t Rhodes (Tac. Ann. 3, 48); the length of h i s 
governorship I s unkno.wn. Sllanus' I n f a n t daughter was 
be t r o t h e d t o the son of T i b e r i u s ' nephew, Germanlcus 
(Tac. Ann. 2, 43) . 
"^Tac. Ann. 2, 4, 3; and RG 27. 
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approved by Rome but not accepted by the Armenians, who 
k i l l e d him around A.D.' 6.^ A f t e r t h i s , another Roman 
nominee was placed on the throne by Augustus' order. 
Augustus s t a t e s t h a t t h i s 'Tlgranes' was a scion of the 
Armenian r o y a l house, but Hommsen's view I s generally 
accepted t h a t h i s parents were Alexander, a son of Herod 
the Great, and Glaphyra, the daughter of Archelaus of 
Cappadocla by an Armenian prin c e s s . So h i s connexion 
w i t h the Armenian house was ra t h e r d i s t a n t , and perhaps 
t h i s caused h i s r e i g n t o be b r i e f , f o r the Armenians 
overthrew him and then t r i e d t o b r i n g back the s l s t e r -
wlfe-queen of Tlgranes I I I , E rato. But she soon l o s t 
power, and the Armenians, w i t h o u t a r u l e r , were I n a 
9 
State of chaos. This was sometime before A.D* 11. 
Despite a l l t h i s t u r m o i l I n Armenia, a country which 
had become the p r i z e eagerly contested by Rome and Par-
t h l a , we f i n d t h a t , f a r from becoming Involved, the f o r -
mer was making l i t t l e e f f o r t and the l a t t e r none a t a l l . 
Rome was simply too occupied. Augustus had not abandoned 
the p o l i c y of maintaining Roman suzerainty over Armenia . 
by means .of p r o p e r l y Invested kings. But lacking' was the 
for c e needed to keep any Roman nominee on h i s throne, not 
so much I n fea r of the Parthlans, but to p r o t e c t the pup-
pet from h i s own su b j e c t s . Some m i l i t a r y contingent must 
^Tac. Ann. 2, 4, 3; and RG 27. 
7 
RG 27: 'Quo I n t e r f e c t o Tlgranem, qui er a t ex reglo 
genere Armenlorum orlundus. I n I d regnum ml s i . ' 
g 
Mommsen, RGDA, p. 80.' 
9 Tac. Ann. 2, 4, 3. 
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have been used to place 'Tlgranes' on the t h r o n e , b u t 
I t probably had n e i t h e r the a u t h o r i t y nor the power to 
keep him there. The northern f r o n t i e r was consuming 
Rome's f i n e s t e f f o r t s ; no legions could be spared, nor 
any o f the capable p r i n c e s , T i b e r i u s , h i s son Drusus, 
or h i s adopted son Germanlcus. 
But the s i t u a t i o n could have been worse, and the 
Romans no doubt were a.ware of t h i s . For the Parthlans 
were having almost as much tro u b l e as the Armenians I n 
f i n d i n g f o r themselves an agreeable k i n g . 
Since the death of Phraates IV I n 2 B.C., the Par-, 
t h l a n nobles had been regaining the pov/er which that 
k i n g had forbidden them, and Phraataces as king had 
meanwhile done nothing to prove himself worthy even of 
being h i s f a t h e r ' s murderer. He v/as an Incestuous 
h a l f - b r e e d , the son and-husband of an I t a l i a n slave, 
and a l l h i s bravado against the Romans had gained no-
t h i n g . I n A.D. 4 he was e i t h e r k i l l e d or forced to 
f l e e , perhaps to S y r i a . T h e nobles selected Orodes 
( I I I ) , a prince from some l i n e of the Arsacld f a m i l y , 
to be k i n g , but h i s violence and c r u e l t y drove the 
nobles u n t i l they f i n a l l y assassinated him around the 
^^Agaln, we have no record of I t because no member 
of the Im p e r i a l f a m i l y was Involved. 
^^Gardner, p. 46: the l a s t coins of Musa and Phraa-
taces are dated A.D. 4. Jos. AJ 18, 42f.; and RG 3 2 — 
the .'Phraates, son of Phraates'^mentloned by Augustus 
may be Phraataces, according to Gardthausen, Augustus. 
I , 3, p. 1141, Debevolse, p. 151, and Z l e g l e r , p. 56, 
n. 72. Disagreeing are Mommsen,, RGDA, p. 91 and Tarn, 
' T l r l d a t e s , ' passim. The arguments, much Involved v/lth 
the wording of RG 32, are very long and d e l i c a t e , and 
they are best stated by Tarn. 
161 
year A.p. 6.^^ Looking f o r a new k i n g , the nobles now 
sought the r e t u r n of one of -the Parthian princes held 
I n Rome;^'^an unprecedented step, but perhaps not sur-
p r i s i n g . The nobles may have expected a son of Phraa-
tes to have kingship I n h i s blood, and yet to be sub-
s e r v i e n t l y g r a t e f u l to the nobles f o r h i s redemption: 
someone t o r u l e and be r u l e d . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Pa:rthlan embassy to Rome may 
have been forwarded to Germany and T i b e r i u s . The 
reason I s not obvious, but Augustus may have been seek-
i n g outside advice. I t was decided to send Vonones, 
the e l d e s t of Phraates* sons v/ho had been I n Rome f o r 
over tv/enty-slx years. He v/as welcomed v/armly, but 
before long the nobles found Vonones to be I n t o l e r a b l y 
w e l l - b r e d : Romanized and u n m a n l y . P e r h a p s Augustus 
had a t l a s t managed to- place a c l i e n t - k i n g on the Par-
t h i a n throne. To replace Vonones, some o f the nobles 
c a l l e d I n Artabanus, k i n g of Atropatene and connected 
on one side of h i s f a m i l y w i t h the Dahae, as v/ell as 
l6 
the A rsaclds. But Vonones proved tougher than ex-
* 
pected, evading assassination and a c t u a l l y beating back 
^^Jos. AJ 18, 44f.; Gardner, p. 46: a c o i n f o r 
A.D. 6/7 may be h i s . 
^"^Jos. AJ 18, 46f.; Tac. Ann. 2, 1; and RG 33. 
^^Suet. T i b . 16. I t I s not c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s I s 
the same embassy as c i t e d I n the note above, but c e r t a i n 
dates f i t ; see Anderson, CAH, X, p. 278. 
^"^Jos. AJ 18, 46f.; and Tac. Ann. 2, 1. See p. 21. 
16 ' 
See U. Kahrstedt, Artabanos I I I . und seine Erben 
(Bern, 1950), pp. 13-14} Anderson, CAH, X, p. 278, n. 3; 
and Debevolse, p. 152, n. 40. 
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Artabanus t e m p o r a r i l y . This was A.D. 9 or 10, and Vo-
nones t r i e d to sound d e c i s i v e by s t r i k i n g coins w i t h the 
legend BASIAEYC ONOCONHS IvIEIKACAC ARTABANON,^^ The ap-
pearance of personal names ra t h e r than simply 'Arsakes' 
18 
I s r a r e : t h i s v/as a score-card to l e t everyone knov/ 
v/ho to support. But I n A.D. 11 Artabanus attacked again, 
1 g 
t h i s time d r i v i n g Vonones out of the country. 
Vonones f l e d t o Armenia, which at the moment v/as 
I n need of a k i n g . The Armenians accepted Vonones, v/ho.; 
s e n s i b l y sought approval from Rome. But h i s request was 
refused. He v/as a cov/ard and a disappointment:^^ Rome 
had hoped f o r a c l i e n t on the Parthian throne, not a 
Pa r t h i a n on the Armenian throne. Nor d i d Artabanus 
want h i s r i v a l to be enthroned next door. He turned 
the Armenian nobles against Vonones, who f l e d to Syria 
21 
I n A.D. 15 or 16. But by t h i s time Rome had a nev/ 
emperor. 
The embassy from Vonones had I n f a c t gone to T i b e r -
i u s , though presumably I t v/as sent soon a f t e r Vonones' 
a r r i v a l I n Armenia, around 12 A.D., when Augustus was 
yet a l i v e . T i b e r i u s must have acted w i t h f u l l a u t h o r i t y , 
but there was l i t t l e he could do about the East at such 
a time. Augustus would die soon. The succession had 
^ \ r o t h , pp. x l l l l and 143f. 
18 
Mlthradates I I I (57-55 B.C.) also made a departure 
from the usual 'Arsakes', though t h i s Issue I s very con-
fused. See V.froth, pp. xxxlv-xxxv and 66. 
19 
. Tac. Ann. 2, 3; and Jos. AJ 18, 48-50. 
^°Jos. AJ 18, 52. 
^^Tac. Ann. 2, 4. 
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22 been regulated as f a r as possible: a f t e r A.D. 13 T i -
be r i u s v/as v i r t u a l l y c o - r e g e n t . S t i l l , I t was a d e l -
i c a t e s i t u a t i o n . T i b e r i u s could not go marching east; 
and he could e n t r u s t a l a r g e m i l i t a r y force to no one: 
no p r i n c e s , no legates, no one. 
^^Syme, RR, pp. 433-9." 
^" ^ V e l l . Pater, 2, 121, 3; and Suet. Tib. 21. 
Chapter Sixteen 
A Summary of Augustus' P o l i c y 
Augustus' p o l i c y toward P a r t h l a was l a r g e l y con-
s i s t e n t w i t h Rome's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s I n the East, 
but v/as Innovative w i t h a regard f o r the changed c i r -
cumstances of the nev/ empire. 
The Republic was h e i r to the H e l l e n i s t i c East, 
whose In t e r n e c i n e wars were brought to an end by Rome. 
But I n a d m i n i s t r a t i n g arid p r o t e c t i n g the East, the Ro-
mans s i g n a l l y f a i l e d . P r o v i n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n under 
the Republic had tended to Impoverish I t s subjects. 
The Romans governed through c i t i e s , which were scarce 
I n many areas; and p r o v i n c i a l governors were a p o t e n t i a l 
t h r e a t to whoever r u l e d I n Rome. As f o r p r o t e c t i n g the 
East, the Romans v/ere not able to prevent the Parthlans 
from twice Invading S y r i a . 
The a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y , which Augustus took over 
from Antonlus, v/as t o r u l e through c l i e n t - k i n g s . They 
could be c o n t r o l l e d I n d i v i d u a l l y ; as l o c a l r u l e r s they 
could more e a s i l y administer I n r u r a l areas; and they 
were valuable a l l i e s , whose kingdoms could provide a r-
mies and act as b u f f e r s t a t e s . 
The t h r e a t came from the Parthlans. Though they 
lacked any formidable u n i t y , they had demonstrated an 
ab.lVlty to occupy, and a desire to hold large parts of 
the East which Rome claimed. ' They had also twice de-
fea t e d Roman armies, which I n I t s e l f , by Roman t r a d i t i o n . 
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j u s t i f i e d the Parthlans' d e s t r u c t i o n . Their p r e s t i g e 
and t h e i r t h r e a t l e f t the East I n an unstable c o n d i t i o n * 
But Augustus could see t h a t the 'conquest of Par-
t h l a ' was time, money and men wasted. I t would be a 
d i f f i c u l t task once undertaken, and I n the end I t was 
not d e s i r a b l e to annex areas which even the Seleuclds 
had found exhausting t o c o n t r o l . 
The s i t u a t i o n had to be re-ordered, but Augustus 
sought a l t e r n a t i v e means. P a r t h l a had to be humbled 
and Roman supremacy "had t o be asserted. Antonlus had 
t r i e d t o replace Phraates w i t h T l r l d a t e s . Augustus 
threatened"^ to t r y again. The c o n d i t i o n was the r e t u r n 
of the standards: t h i s would show the Parthlans to be 
submissive. Augustus might have been s a t i s f i e d v/lth 
t h i s , though we cannot know. Phraates refused, and 
then learned t h a t Augustus d i d not make empty t h r e a t s . 
But Phraates was tough, and T l r l d a t e s f a i l e d . . Agrlppa-s 
m i s s ion, and the hope of ransoming the standards v/lth 
Phraates' kidnapped son, also f a i l e d . Augustus at l a s t 
threatened war, and, before I t v/as too l a t e , Phraates 
sav/ t h a t he meant lt» and so surrendered the standards 
and h i s f o u r l e g i t i m a t e sons as w e l l . 
Augustus took the o p p o r t u n i t y t o re-clalm Roman 
su z e r a i n t y over Armenia and also over Media Atropatene. 
We cannot t e l l how e a r l y Augustus had come to "this de-
c i s i o n : but f o r the r e s t of h i s r e i g n , t h i s v/ould be the 
basis of h i s p o l i c y tov/ard P a r t h l a . Aside from f u r t h e r 
f r i g h t e n i n g and shaming Phraates, the a c q u i s i t i o n of Ar-
menia and Media Atropatene extended Roman c o n t r o l to the 
Caspian and l e f t the Parthlans extremely vulnerable to 
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a t t a c k . The possession of Armenia became a point of 
tremendous p r e s t i g e . • . • ' 
Yet Augustus maintained Armenia as a c l i e n t - k i n g -
dom, not a province o f the empire. Armenia and Media 
v/ere d i s t a n t and unsulted f o r Roman a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
and g a r r i s o n i n g them against Parthian a t t a c k would have 
been.costly I n Roman manpower which would be needed on 
the n o r t h e r n f r o n t i e r of the empire. I t I s debatable 
v/hether Augustus would be I n v i t i n g an a t t a c k more by not 
g a r r i s o n i n g than by doing so, but the main consid e r a t i o n 
was t h i s : I f the Parthlans seized a client-kingdom and 
k i l l e d I t s r u l e r , Augustus had wider options than I f the 
Parthlans had seized a province and slaughtered Roman 
c i t i z e n s . I n the end, Augustus' c o n t r o l and Influence 
were as great I n a client-kingdom as I n a province. 
The Parthlans would, s t i l l f i n d o p p o r t u n l t l e s ^ a s s e r t 
t h e i r I n f l u e n c e , and Roman c l i e n t - k i n g s would f a l l , and 
the Armenians would never be very pleased v/lth the r e -
placements, b u t , a l l I n a l l . I t seemed a good p o l i c y , 
because I t made no pretence of c r e a t i n g a s t a t i c s i t u a -
t i o n I n the t u r b u l e n t East. 
Would I t continue t o seem a good p o l i c y to f u t u r e 
emperors, or would changing c o n d i t i o n s I n the empire 
c a l l f o r a new po l i c y ? 
Chapter Seventeen 
The P o l i c y o f T i b e r i u s 
Augustus, no longer an a d m i n i s t r a t o r , but now a 
god, had l e f t behind f o r h i s successors a warning t h a t 
I t v/ould be l l l - a d v l s e d to extend the boundaries of the 
empire:^ t h i s , from the man v/ho was proud to have I n -
creased the empire on every f r o n t i e r . But Ti b e r i u s 
would understand t h a t there was no hypocrisy here. He 
had been w i t h the Prlnceps I n the East, v/here Augustus 
had obeyed h i s own doubts; and T i b e r i u s himself had led 
the exhausted armies I n the N o r t h , where the ageing Au-
gustus' hopes were c u t . T i b e r i u s would therefore f o l -
low Augustus' l a s t advice, and by thus t u r n i n g a t t e n t i o n 
away from expansion, he v/ould prepare the empire f o r a 
great and slow t r a n s f o r m a t i o n : the I n c o r p o r a t i o n I n t o 
the empire of areas p r e s e n t l y r u l e d by l o c a l kings 
Augustus had I n f a c t l e d the v/ay v/hen he made G a l ^ t l a 
a province I n 25 B.C. T i b e r i u s now d i d the same w i t h 
Cappadocla I n A.D. 17, a f t e r revenging himself upon I t s 
4 
k i n g , the e l d e r l y Archelaus. • 
But t h i s I n c o r p o r a t i o n would be a long and gradual 
^Tac. Ann. 1, 2, 7; and Dlo 56, 33, 2 f . 
R^G 26; and Nlc. Dam. 1. 
"^Magle, RRIAM, p. 496. 
4 
Tac. Arm. 2, 4;^2. See p. »3/^ , n. 46.. 
168 
process, which I n no way meant that the client-kingdoms 
had become unimportant. And the most Important one, 
Armenia, was p r e s e n t l y I n great danger. 
U n t i l Augustus' death, T i b e r i u s had not been f r e e 
to deal w i t h the c r i s i s I n Armenia. Had the s i t u a t i o n , 
been otherwise, T i b e r i u s would s t i l l have given no sup-
p o r t to Vonones. He was an Arsacld and could not be 
p e r m i t t e d t o remain on the Armenian throne. T i b e r i u s 
had not yet had time ,to organize Vonones' replacement 
before Artabanus succeeded I n pressuring Vonones I n t o 
f l i g h t from Armenia I n A.D. 15 or 16."^ Vonones f l e d to 
S y r i a , v/here the Romans allowed him to keep rank as a 
k l n g ^ — o f P a r t h l a , not Armenia. Armenia was given by 
Artabanus to one of h i s sons, Orodes, as a g i f t . 
T i b e r i u s was now confronted v/lth the same s i t u a t i o n 
Augustus had faced on several occasions. T i b e r i u s chose 
to f o l l o w Augustus' p o l i c y - f o r m u l a , to the l e t t e r . Ger-
manlcus, as soon as he could s u c c e s s f u l l y terminate a 
campaign I n Germany and celebrate h i s triumph I n Rome, 
was sent I n A.D. 18 on an e x p e d i t i o n to restore order 
I n Armenia. The emperor's adopted son was given the 
same Imperlum as Agrlppa, T i b e r i u s h i m s e l f , and Galus 
had possessed; he v/as also given an adv i s e r , Cn. Cal-
8 
purnlus Plso, t o r e s t r a i n any excesses of zeal on the 
•^Tac. AnjQ. 2, 4-5; and McDov/ell, p. 223. 
^Tac. Ann. 2, 4. 
^ I b l d . ' . 43. 
g 
I b i d . Plso, though T i b e r i u s ' choice, was hardly 
a subordinate. From one of the most ancient f a m i l i e s 
m Rome, he had been consul v/lth T i b e r i u s I n 7 B.C. and 
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p a r t of the m a r t i a l Germanlcus. 
The e x p e d i t i o n proceeded slowly to Armenia, v/hlle 
a s u i t a b l e candidate f o r the throne v/as found. The 
Armenian r o y a l f a m i l y had long since died out, but 
T i b e r i u s ( o r Germanlcus, or h i s advisers) chose a Pon-
t i c p r ince named Zeno. Son of the f a i t h f u l c l i e n t - k i n g 
Polemo and h i s v/lfe Pythodorls, Zeno v/as the scion of 
two H e l l e n i s t i c f a m i l i e s , y e t he had f o r some reason 
c u l t i v a t e d , r e p o r t e d l y since childhood, a love of Ar-
menian h a b i t s and customs, and was himself admired by 
the Armenians. He adopted the n a t i o n a l name 'Artaxes' 
v/hen Germanlcus placed him on the throne, v/here he r e -
9 
malned f o r an astounding f i f t e e n years. 
Artabanus had presented.no obstacle, and h i s son 
was probably v/lthdrawn without a f i g h t . I n the face of 
a determined and prepared Roman f o r c e , there v/as l i t t l e 
Artabanus could do since he had not yet had time to r e -
assert a strong c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y I n P a r t h l a , v/hlch had 
become very d e c e n t r a l i z e d since the r e i g n of Phraates 
I V . F o r the moment, Artabanus sought an amicable r e -
l a t i o n s h i p v/lth the Romans. He I n v i t e d Germanlcus to 
meet w i t h him on the Euphrates to renew o l d pledges, 
and he s p e c i f i c a l l y requested t h a t Vonones be kept f a r -
t h e r away than S y r i a , f o r h i s agents v/ere I n c i t i n g 
had served I n Spain and,Africa. The problems betv/een 
Plso and Germanlcus cannot be explained e a s i l y as r e -
s u l t i n g e i t h e r from T i b e r i u s ' machinations or Plso's 
Insubordinate p r i d e . 
^Tac. Ann. 2, 56; and Strabo 12, 3, 29. 
ebevolse, pp. 154-7. 
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dlsLoyaLty among c e r t a i n Parthian vassals. Germanlcus 
apparently d i d not attend any meeting on the Euphrates, 
but he d i d t r a n s f e r Vonones f a r t h e r west, though Taci-
tus t h i n k s t h i s was done mainly t o s p i t e Plso, Germanl-
cus' m i l i t a r y a d v i s e r , v/lth v/hom Vonones had Insinuated 
h i m s e l f through various g i f t s . I t I s not unthinkable 
t h a t Plso was- Involved I n the a c t i v i t i e s at which A r t a -
banus was p r o t e s t i n g . 
Vonones had a strange f a t e . Tacitus reports t h a t , 
about A.D. 19, Vonones t r i e d to escape n o r t h , through 
Armenia, to the Lands of the Albanl and Henlochl where 
he had a kinsman among the Scythian t r i b a l leaders. Ke 
v/as caught by. the Romans and s h o r t l y afterwards was 
stabbed by a c e r t a i n Remmlus, who had been Vonones' 
c h i e f guard. Remmlus was suspected of having connived 
a t the escape, and then, of murdering Vonones to avoid 
12 
d e t e c t i o n . The reasoning I s neat and sounds o f f i c i a l , 
but other I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , I n which Vonones may have 
been a t o o l o f p o l i c y , are Impossible to s u b s t a n t i a t e . 
V/lth regard to Armenia, we have seen how T i b e r i u s 
employed Augustus' p o l i c y w i t h greater success than Au-
gustus had ever known. Artaxes (Zeno) happened to be a 
f o r t u n a t e choice, and Artabanus was too weak to advance 
Pa r t h l a ' s c l a i m . Hov/ever, l i k e Galus, Germanlcus d i d 
not r e t u r n from the East, but died of an I l l n e s s con-
t r a c t e d I n Egypt.^"^ 
^^Tac. Ann. 2, 58. 
^^Ibld.« 68. Suetonius' remark ( T i b . 49) t h a t T i -
b e r i u s had Vonones murdered f o r h i s money I s absurd. 
^ ^ t a c . Ann. 2, 72. 
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Artabanus, over the years, centraLLzed the pov/er 
I n P a r t h l a , through minor wars v/ith neighbours, the 
murder of r i v a l Arsaclds, and the general d i m i n u t i o n 
of the pov/er o f the nobles. T h i s , of course, earned 
him the enmity o f the nobles, but Artabanus must have 
f e l t c o n f i d e n t , f o r when Artaxes died about A.D. 34, 
and l e f t no h e i r , Artabanus I n s t a l l e d h i s eldest son 
on the throne. Not only t h a t , he also wrote to Tibe r i u s 
and made menacing remarks about the size of the empire 
of Cyrus. 
Artabanus probably expected no a c t i v e response 
from the e l d e r l y T i b e r i u s , aged about seventy-six and 
a recluse on Capreae. But when a secret Parthian em-
bassy a r r i v e d I n I t a l y , representing d i s g r u n t l e d nobles 
opposing Artabanus, T i b e r i u s was a l e r t . A l l t h a t was 
needed, said the embassy, was T i b e r i u s ' a u t h o r i z a t i o n 
and a prince of the Arsacld name: I f a s u i t a b l e r i v a l 
v/ould show himself on the banks of the Euphrates, A r t a -
banus could be toppled. T i b e r i u s subsidized and equipped 
the prince named Phraates, the youngest and l a s t s u r v i v -
i n g son of Phraates IV. He must have been q u i t e o l d , 
f o r he had been res i d e n t I n Rome f o r over h a l f a century. 
These f a c t s may e x p l a i n h i s death soon a f t e r a r r i v i n g I n 
S y r i a , from e i t h e r the f a t i g u e of the journey or the sud-
ayj 
16 
den adoption of Pa r t h i a n w s of l i v i n g . O r Artabanus 
may have had a hand I n I t . 
14 
Tac. Ann. 6, 3 I f . ; and Dlo 58, 26. 
^"^Tac. Ann. 6, 33; Dlo i b i d . ; and Jos. AJ 18, 97. 
^^Debevolse, p. 158; and'Magle, RRIAf4. p. 508. 
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T i b e r i u s persevered and sent another- p r i n c e , a 
grandson of Phraates IV, T l r l d a t e s ( i l l ) ; but t h i s 
time a Roman escort v/as attached to Insure a successful 
outcome. There was no member of the Imperial f a m i l y to 
send. Germanlcus v/as dead; h i s brother Claudius v/as 
considered s t u p i d ; T i b e r i u s ' son Drusus was'dead, as 
were tv/o of Germanlcus' three sons. The t h i r d , Galus 
(Caligula),was o f age, a l i v e and w e l l , but f a u l t y and 
17 
unbeloved by the emperor. T i b e r i u s appointed L. 
V l t e l l l u s (cos. 34) governor of Syria v/lth a u t h o r i t y 
to r e g u l a t e a f f a i r s , which meant regaining Armenia and. 
I f p o s s i b l e , p l a c i n g T l r l d a t e s on the Parthian throne. 
As f o r Armenia, T i b e r i u s f a c i l i t a t e d matters by 
w r i t i n g to Pharasmanes, k i n g of I b e r i a , requesting that 
he Invade Armenia, I n s t a l l h i s ovm bro t h e r Mlthradates, 
and thus drav/ I n Artaba'nus who v/ould t r y to keep h i s 
son on the throne. Pharasmanes was happy t o comply, 
f o r I n t h i s v/ay he could remove h i s b r o t h e r , a possible 
18 
r i v a l , from h i s own realm. Pharasmanes a c t u a l l y took 
the Armenian c a p i t a l , A r t a x a t a , v/lthout a f i g h t , f o r 
Artabanus' son v/as murdered by b r i b e d attendants. Im-
mediately Artabanus dispatched another son, Orodes, to 
recover Armenia, but he v/as defeated by the I b e r i a n s . 
Artabanus then mobilized Parthian forces f o r r e t a l i a -
t i o n . But agents of V l t e l l l u s I n c i t e d the A l a n l , v/ho 
flooded down I n t o P a r t h i a n t e r r i t o r y , w h ile V l t e l l l u s 
^^Tac. Ann. 6, 46. 
^^Tac. I b i d . . 33; Dlo 58, 26; Jos. AJ 18, 97; and 
P l i n y NH 15, 83. 
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himse l f spread rumours t h a t he v,'as about to Invade 
Mesopotamia. Artabanus r e t i r e d , V i f h l l e V l t e l l l u s a r t -
f u l l y fomented d i s a f f e c t i o n among leading Parthian 
nobles, who p r e s e n t l y forced Artabanus. to f l e e to Hyr-
19 
canla. 
V l t e l l l u s now entrusted T l r l d a t e s to the care of 
the P a r t h i a n nobles, who escorted him I n triumph to 
Cteslphon. But before"^ long, and f o r various reasons, 
many o f the nobles turned against T l r l d a t e s , . a n d w i t h 
s u r p r i s i n g suddenness they came to reg r e t the loss of 
Artabanus.. I n f a c t . I t was so sudden t h a t Artabanus 
h i m s e l f was s u r p r i s e d , f o r v/hen an embassy found him 
l i v i n g by h i s bow I n the Hyrcanlan f o r e s t s , Artabanus 
suspected a t r a p . F i n a l l y convinced of the nobles' 
support (however r e l u c t a n t ) , Artabanus marched west 
v / l t h h i s Scythians, and', s t i l l dressed I n rags, he com-
20 
p e l l e d T l r l d a t e s t o make a shameful f l i g h t to Sy r i a . 
Both V l t e l l l u s and Artabanus v/ere s a t i s f i e d to make 
terms. Artabanus had seen what Rome could do through an 
I n t e l l i g e n t agent such as V l t e l l l u s , and the Parthian 
sa i d no more of Armenia, but sent one of h i s sons to 
Rome as a hostage. 
19 
Tac. Ann. 6, 33-6; and Jos. AJ 18, 96-8. 
^°Tac. I b i d . . 44; and Jos. I b i d . . 99-100. 
^^Jos. I b i d . . 101-3. See Di.o'S9, 17, 5 and 27, 2; 
Suet. V l t e l l l u s 2, 4, and Galus /l9 ; a l l of v^ hom e i t h e r 
give no date f o r the parley andA,the hostage-giving, or 
place I t I n the reign' of Galus. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, The 
Emperor Galus ( C a l l g u l a ) ( O x f o r d . 1934), p. 198 maintains 
t h a t these took place I n the r e i g n of Galus. E. Taubler, 
Die Parthernachrlchten b e l Josephus ( B e r l i n , 1904), pp. 
3 3 f f . b e l i eves t h a t the sources, except f o r Josephus, 
are a l l h o s t i l e to^ T i b e r i u s , and deny him the honours he 
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T i b e r i u s died a few months l a t e r . I n March A.D. 
37. A Roman c l i e n t - k i n g was r u l i n g I n Armenia and a 
b o a s t f u l P a r t h i a n k i n g had been humbled, and even tem-
p o r a r i l y replaced by a contender who had l i v e d most of 
h i s l i f e I n Rome. 
The means had v a r i e d : e i t h e r the o p p o r t u n i s t i c 
use of neighbouring c l i e n t - k i n g s , or the e x p l o i t a t i o n 
of P a r t h i a n I n t e r n a l d i s o r d e r s , or the employment of 
pretenders, o r , I f necessary, the t h r e a t and use of 
f o r c e . V/ar v/as not sought, but r i s k e d . P a r t h l a was 
alv/ays given a way out—Rome's way. Par t h l a v/ould not 
be Invaded, but Armenia would be h e l d . 
Twenty-five years a f t e r h i s death, Augustus' Par-
t h i a n p o l i c y was as yet unchanged* 
me r i t e d . C e r t a i n l y Josephus I s the more contemporary. 
Ta c i t u s ' omission cannot be argued e i t h e r v/ay: he v/as 
biased against -Tiberius, and h i s account of Caligula's 
r e l g r i I s l o s t . 
Chapter Eighteen 
The P o l i c i e s of Galus and Claudius 
Under the new, emperor Galus, Roman p o l i c y tavard 
P a r t h l a was changed. The question I s whether I t v/as a 
d e l i b e r a t e change, or j u s t a lack of p o l i c y . Galus 
summoned Mlthradates, the Roman c l i e n t - k i n g of Armenia, 
t o Rome, and then Imprisoned hlm.^ Judging by l a t e r 
a c t i o n s , Mlthradates may v/ell have been a c r u e l king,-
but so was Herod; and there I s no record of the reason 
f o r Mlthradates' r e c a l l . Galus then, however, apparently 
sent no one t o take the Armenian throne, thus r e l i n -
q u i s h i n g Roman suz e r a i n t y . 
I t has been argued th a t t h i s v/as a d e l i b e r a t e and 
Imaginative p o l i c y which would remove the bone of con-
t e n t i o n between P a r t h l a and Rome, end the bloodshed, and 
2 
yet cost Rome no t h i n g . 
For the moment the a l t e r a t i o n seemed small. , The 
Parthlans d i d not rush I n and place an Arsacld on the 
Armenian throne. But the reason f o r t h i s I s that Par-
t h l a was weakened by c i v i l war. When the time came. I t 
I s absurd to t h i n k they would not have seized c o n t r o l 
of Armenia. The s t r a t e g i c Importance was l a r g e , and the 
^Tac. Ann. 11, 8, 1; Dlo 60, 8, 1; and Seneca, De 
t r a n q u l l l l t a t e a n l m l l l , 12. 
^H. W l l l r l c h , 'Caligula,' K i l o 3, 1903, pp. 297-
304. But see Balsdon, Galus. pp. I 9 9 f . 
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p r e s t i g e to be accrued was even g r e a t e r . 
.V/hlle Rome v/as strong and Pa r t h l a v/eak, Galus' act 
seemed proper; but I n the end Rome could Incur losses 
which v/ould v/eaken her hold on other client-kingdoms 
and provinces. 
Galus reigned f o r less than f o u r years. He was 
succeeded I n 41 by Claudius, who released Mlthradates 
from p r i s o n and arranged t o have him r e - l n s t a l l e d I n 
Armenia through the e f f o r t s of h i s b r o t h e r , the I b e r i -
an k i n g Pharasmanes, supported by Roman troops. The 
Armenians were not anxious f o r a r e t u r n of Roman su-
z e r a i n t y , and, under a Parthian satrap named Demonax, 
they o f f e r e d b a t t l e , but lost."^ 
I n June, 42, a seven-year c i v i l war I n Parthla came 
to an end. A f t e r h i s meeting w i t h V l t e l l l u s I n 36, Ar-
tabanus found I t prudent. I n the face of discontent 
among the nobles, to remove himself from the throne and 
seek refuge w i t h a former v a s s a l , Izates I I o f Adlabene. 
A protege o f Artabanus named Clnnamus was selected to 
r u l e . Hov/ever, Artabanus v/as soon allowed back I n t o 
4 
power, though he died s h o r t l y a f t e r . I n 38. He Vas 
fol l o w e d by Gotarzes I I , a Hyrcanlan,"^ who had tv/o bro-
thers whom he t r i e d to dispose o f . One was murdered; 
Tac. Ann. 9, 9; and Dlo 60, 8, 1. Tacitus c a l l s 
Demonax a praefectus. There was no Parthian vassal-
king. I n Armenia, but Demonax' exact status I s unclear, 
which means t h a t Armenia's r e l a t i o n to Parthla I s also 
u n c l e a r . 
Magle, RRIAM, p. 551 believes Demonax I s Armenian. 
"^Jos. AJ 20, 54-68. 5 Tac. Ann. 11, 8; and Wroth, p. x l v f f . 
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the o t h e r , Vardanes, f l e d . A year l a t e r he was c a l l e d 
I n by the nobles to d r i v e out Gotarzes, which he d i d . 
However, w h i l e Vardanes v/as busy besieging Sele.ucla, 
which was I n r e v o l t , Gotarzes returned w i t h the a i d of 
the Dahae and Hyrcanlans. During the ensuing s t r u g g l e s , 
the brothers became av/are of a plan by the nobles to de-
p r i v e them both of the throne. So the two v/ere drav/n 
together and agreed t h a t Vardanes should occupy the 
throne of P a r t h l a and Gotarzes should r u l e I n Hyrcanla. 
I t was June, 42, before 'Vardanes s e t t l e d h i s kingdom 
and ended the r e v o l t I n Seleucla.^ 
I t was Vardanes who received the Armenians' plea 
f o r r e l i e f from Mlthradates. He t r i e d to e n l i s t the 
a i d of one of h i s stronger vassals, Izates I I (who had 
s h e l t e r e d Artabanus I n Adlabene), but the vassal r e -
fused t o enter any c o n f l i c t w i t h the Romans: f i v e of 
h i s sons were l i v i n g I n Rome. Angered, Vardanes a t -
tacked I z a t e s . . Possibly to d i s t r a c t Vardanes from t h i s 
or an a t t a c k on Armenia, V l b l u s Marsus, governor of 
7 
S y r i a , made a th r e a t of war. But a t about the-same 
time ( 4 3 ) , Vardanes was again attacked from Kyrcahla by 
Gotarzes. Vardanes drove him back, but I n 45 Gotarzes 
again began a s t r u g g l e , v/hlch ended two years l a t e r v/lth 
A l l t h i s I s very much condensed from Tac. Ann. 
11, 8-10 and Jos. 20, 69-74; see also Phllostratus, 
L i f e o f Apollonlus of Tyana 1, 19-40: Apollonlus t r a -
v e l l e d through Piarthla I n the spring of 42. See also: 
McDowell, pp. 1 4 l f f . , on the f a c t i o n s I n Seleucla; and 
Debevolse, pp. 165-9, f o r a s l i g h t l y l a r g e r d e s c r i p t i o n 
of' these events. 
7 
Tac. Ann. 11, 10; and Debevolse, p. 170. 
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Q 
Vardanes' death. 
There was d i v i s i o n over accepting Gotarzes as k i n g . 
Some nobles wanted t o summon ore of the Arsaclds from 
Rome. Gotarzes d i d not w a i t to be asked, but took the 
k i n g s h i p . However, excesses of c r u e l t y ( i . e . the usual 
attempts a t c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power) convinced the no-
9 
bles t h a t they should send t o Rome. 
Claudius received the appeal In,47,^^ and sent 
Meherdates, son of Vonones I and grandson of Phraates 
IV.^^ C. Casslus Longlnus, governor of Syr i a , was com-
manded t o escort Meherdates to the Euphrates. But sup-
p o r t f o r Meherdates melted as he proceeded along a 
cautious route through Osrhoene, Armenia and Adlabene, 
and Gotarzes defeated him I n b a t t l e . Meherdates' l i f e 
was spared, but h i s ears were s l i c e d o f f , which d i s -
q u a l i f i e d him from ever r u l i n g P a r t h l a . 
Gotarzes died I n 51, a year v/hlch also saw the suc-
cession of two other kings from the Median l i n e , Vonones I I 
and h i s son or b r o t h e r , Vologases I . ^ " ^ 
®Tac. Ann. 11, 10; and McDowell, p. 190. 
9 
T a c , I b i d . 
^^Tac, I b i d . , 10 and 11, provides an I n t e r e s t i n g 
example of the Roman view. I n the time of Trajan, of 
Rome's h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h P a r t h l a . 
^ ^ T a c l t u s c a l l s him a l u v e n l s , but h i s f a t h e r had 
been dead nea r l y t h i r t y years. He may have been born 
I n the East, a f t e r h i s f a t h e r was released from Rome, 
and v/as only sent back t o Rome l a t e r as a boy; other-
wise, he would now be over f o r t y . 
^^Tac. Ann. 12, 12-14. 
^*^ r b l d . , and Jos AJ 20, 72-4; the d e t a i l s of both 
are few and c o n f l i c t i n g . See McD.ov/ell, p. 191. 
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I n the next year Armenia was attacked, but not by 
Pa r t h l a or Rome. For the l a s t nine years the Armenians 
had been l i v i n g p e a c e f u l l y though p a i n f u l l y under M l t h r a -
dates. Presently h i s brother Pharasmanes, king of I b e r i a , 
discovered t h a t h i s own son, Rhadamlstus, was o l d enough 
to be kin g of something, p r e f e r a b l y not I b e r i a . Pharas-
manes sent the young man against h i s uncle—^who was also 
h i s f a t h e r - i n - l a w and b r o t h e r - i n - l a w — a n d Rhadamlstus 
made a successful Invasion. Mlthradates sought refuge 
w i t h the Roman g a r r i s o n a t Gorneae, which was more or 
less besieged. The v e n a l i t y of the Roman p r e f e c t , v/ho 
v/as b r i b e d by Rhadamlstus, r e s u l t e d I n Mlthradates' sur-
14 
render and consequent death. 
C. Ummldlus Quadratus, governor of S y r i a , and h i s 
s t a f f were not sure how Rome would r e a c t , so they them-
selves took no a c t i o n , but sent a note to Pharasmanes 
requesting t h a t he wlthdrav/ h i s son and troops. However, 
then Quadratus learned t h a t a Roman procurator had, un-
der Ignominious circumstances, l e n t h i s presence to 
Rhadamlstus' coronation,•thus g i v i n g a shameful semblance 
of o f f i c i a l sanction. Quadratus ordered a l e g i o n to be 
sent I n t o Armenia. The commander, H e l v l d l u s Prlscus, 
had d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers to s o r t things out as best he 
cou l d . Apparently, he accepted the s i t u a t i o n : Rome!s 
basic I n t e r e s t s I n Armenia (the continuance of Roman su-
z e r a i n t y and the maintenance of a king not f r i e n d l y w i t h 
P a r t h l a ) had not e s s e n t i a l l y been damaged by the change 
^*^Tac. Ann. 12, 43-47. 
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of r u l e r s . But, suddenly, Prlscus was r e c a l l e d to Syria.^"^ 
Vologases I , though he had been king I n Parthla f o r 
only a year, had already shown himself to be a v/ise r u l e r . 
I nstead of murdering h i s tv/o b r o t h e r s , Pacorus and T l r l -
d ates, Vologases found Important p o s i t i o n s f o r them to 
occupy. Media Atropatene v/as to be r u l e d by Pacorus, and 
T l r l d a t e s would s i t on the throne of Armenia. 
No doubt Vologases had reached the conclusion that 
Rome would not come to the a i d of Rhadamlstus. I n 52 
Vologases began an advance I n t o Armenia and. q u i c k l y 
reached A r t a x a t a , by v/hlch time the Romans had w i t h -
drawn: there y/as L i t t l e Prlscus could do w i t h one l e -
g i o n . I t was, I n f a c t , the harshness of the v/lnter and 
the l a c k of p r o v i s i o n which forced Vologases to v/lthdrav/ 
h i s forces and T l r l d a t e s . Rhadamlstus, who had f l e d to 
I b e r i a , returned and used harsh means I n an attempt to 
make h i s p o s i t i o n more secure. The reverse happened; 
the Armenians r e v o l t e d and Rhadamlstus again took f l i g h t . 
17 
T l r l d a t e s returned t o Armenia I n 54. 
Before the news of t h i s reached Rome, Claudius v/as 
dead. Claudius had re-asserted Augustan p o l i c i e s I n the 
East. He recovered Armenia and was eager to meddle I n 
P a r t h i a n a f f a i r s , sending out yet another Parthian prince 
who had been l i v i n g I n Rome. But I n the l a t t e r years of 
h i s r e i g n , Claudius l e t the guidance of p o l i c y s l i p I n t o 
^"^Tac. Ann. 12, 47-50; and Magle, RRIAM, p. 552. 
^^Tac. I b i d . . 44; and Jos. AJ 20, 74. 
^^Tac. I b i d . . 48; and Jos. I b i d . , 81-91; and B.W. 
Henderson, 'Chronology of the V/ars I n Armenia,' C l a s s i -
c a l Review 15, 1901, pp. I 5 9 f f . 
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the hands of h i s freedmen, who acted as stewards of 
18 
the empire. A d m i n i s t r a t i o n I n the East stagnated 
f o r l a c k of leadership. And v/orse than no p o l i c y was 
the appearance given by a weak p o l i c y , through which 
Rome l o s t c o n t r o l of Armenia and saw her ov/n p r e s t i g e 
w i l t w h i l e t h a t of P a r t h l a grew. 
^®M,P. Charleswor.th, C^, X, p. 701. 
Chapter Nineteen 
Corbulo's Campaigns 
and the Neronlan Settlement 
Nero was not q u i t e seventeen when he became em-
peror I n October, 54. I n December news reached Rome 
of events I n Armenia, and Immediately preparations v/ere 
made f o r war—v/hlch was to l a s t f o r over ten years.and 
Involve c r i t i c a l decisions of p o l i c y I n regard to the 
'Armenian Question.' I t I s a matter of much dispute 
whether Nero, h i s advisers Seneca and Burrus, the senate, 
or Corbulo formulated and d i r e c t e d the p o l i c y of Rome.^ 
For our purposes l i t t l e need be said of the cam-
paigning I t s e l f . Roman preparations were massive, f o r 
Vologases. was recognized as being a formidable opponent. 
Y e t , a t t h i s time, the k i n g was contending w i t h a r e v o l t 
by one of h i s sons as w e l l as a war v/lth the Hyrcanlans. 
There v/ere a number of unsuccessful attempts t o n e g o t i -
ate a settlement betv/een Rome and P a r t h l a , but by the 
sp r i n g o f 58 Corbulo had rejuvenated the eastern legions. 
B.W. Henderson, The L i f e and P r l n c l p a t e of the 
Emperor Nero (London, 1903; empnasLzes Wero's "^recTlon, 
w i t h the^heVp of h i s advisers. W'. Schur, 'Die Or l e n t -
p o l l t l k des Kaisers Nero,' K i l o . B e l h e f t 15 ( L e i p z i g , 
1923) allov/s f o r Nero's energy and c a p a b i l i t y , but stresses 
t h a t h i s advisers provided a con s i s t e n t p o l i c y . A. Moml-
g l l a n o . 'Corbulone e l a p o l l t l c a verso I P a r t i , ' A t t l 
d e l 11 Conp^resso Nazlonale d l Stud I Romanl (Rome, 193l) 
f i n d s the source of p o l i c y In.the senate. And M. Ham-
mond, 'Corbulo and Nero's Eastern P o l i c y , ' HSCP 45, l93-=i, 
pp. 81-104, a t t r i b u t e s the f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y to 
Corbulo. 
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e n l i s t e d the forces of Antlochus of Commagene and Pharas-
manes the I b e r i a n , and had entered Armenia. Knowing that 
Vologases was occupied w i t h the Hyrcanlans, Corbulo urged 
T l r l d a t e s to p e t i t i o n the emperor. 
V/hat Corbulo was suggesting was that an Arsacld be 
allowed to s i t on the Armenian throne, but only I f he 
received I t from Nero. This would mean the end of e f -
f e c t i v e , and the beginning of nominal, suzerainty. This 
v/as not a simple r e j e c t i o n of Augustan p o l i c y as v/rong; 
Corbulo perceived t h a t circumstances had changed. Short 
of annexing Armenia, Rome's suzerainty v/ould grov/ less 
' e f f e c t i v e ' as P a r t h l a displayed more muscle. Vologases' 
revealed the danger f o r Rome I n being too r e l i a n t on 
Pa r t h i a n d i s u n i t y . And the change I n p o l i c y . I f execut-
ed I n the manner Corbulo was proposing, could only raise 
Roman p r e s t i g e which had sunk so lov/, w h i l e the Arsaclds 
would seem to be p e t i t i o n e r s . V/hlch I s why T l r l d a t e s 
refused. He had not yet been beaten and would not ac-
cept such terms. 
I n two more years of f i g h t i n g , Corbulo captured 
A r t a x a t a and Tlgranocerta, f o r c i n g T l r l d a t e s to f l e e 
to P a r t h l a . Rome sent out a Romanized prince to occupy 
the Armenian throne. This was Tlgranes, a great-grandson 
of both Herod the Great and Archelaus of Cappadocla,^ and 
h i s I n s t a l l a t i o n represented a r e t u r n t o Augustan p o l i c y . 
I t has been argued t h a t Corbulo disfavoured t h i s approach, 
and more or less l e f t Tlgranes t o h i s ov/n precarious fate.'^ 
^Tac. Ann. 13, 34-7. ^Jos. AJ 18, 140. 
"^•lammond, pp. ,92ff. 
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For the new k i n g of an Armenia v/hlch had been diminished 
I n slze"^ soon attacked Adlabene, a vassal of P a r t h l a , 
thus I n c i t i n g VoLogases to r e t a l i a t e . Corbulo prevented 
the Parthlans from t a k i n g Armenia, and arranged a truce 
under v/hlch both sides v/lthdrev/ from Armenia. Nothing 
more I s heard of Tlgranes.^ 
Corbulo occupied himself w i t h p r o t e c t i n g S y r i a , and 
requested th a t a commander be sent out f o r the forces I n 
Armenia. L. Caesennlus Paetus a r r i v e d , and declared 
t h a t he would annex Armenia, but t h e n . f a i l e d I n the a t -
tempt and v/as forced by the Parthlans to make a hasty 
r e t r e a t from Armenia. Vologases sent a message to the 
emperor: though the Parthlans had demonstrated t h e i r 
pov/er, T l r l d a t e s was prepared to receive h i s crov/n from 
Roman a u t h o r i t y — h e would even do homage to the emperor's 
standards and assume hl's kingship I n f r o n t of the Roman 
army—and he v/ould have come to Rome v/ere he not h i n -
dered by taboos connected w i t h h i s Maglan priesthood. 
Rome's r e a c t i o n was that I t v/ould be a h u m i l i a t i o n to 
accept these terms, o f f e r e d a f t e r Paetus' defeat. The 
bearers of Vologases' message were dismissed, but took 
v/l t h them g i f t s — a n d h i n t s that I t v/ould be v/ell f o r 
7 
T l r l d a t e s to come to Rome I n person. 
Corbulo now received a maIus Imperlum and made a 
de v a s t a t i n g Invasion of Armenia; Vologases and T l r l d a t e s 
asked t o meet w i t h Corbulo. And arrangements were made 
8 
f o r T l r l d a t e s ' journey to Rome. 
^Tac. Ann. 14, 26. ^ I b l d . . 15, 5. 
^ I b l d . . 6-25. ^ I b l d . . 26-30. 
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The meeting of T l r l d a t e s and Nero I n Rome gleamed 
w i t h ceremonial pomp. Both p a r t i e s endeavoured to ap-
pear triumphant. T l r l d a t e s , as promised, k n e l t before 
Nero, but he refused to l a y aside h i s dagger, v/hlch he 
had n a i l e d I n t o I t s scabbard. Nero crowned T l r l d a t e s , 
9 
who I n t u r n d i d reverence to Nero as Mit h r a s . I n 
Rome Nero v/as able to s t e a l the shov/. I n P a r t h l a , years 
a f t e r Nero's death, a pseudo-Nero appeared and was r e -
vered by the Parthlans as the man who had returned Ar-
menia t o P a r t h i a n c o n t r o l . ^ ^ 
q 
Dlo 62, 2-5; and see F. Cumont, 'L ' I n l z l a z l o n e d l 
Nerone da parte d l T l r l d a t e d'Armenla,' R l v l s t a d l F l l o -
l o g l a 6 1 . 1933, pp. 145-54. 
1 ^ 1 o 66, 19, 3b. 
Chapter Tv/enty 
GoncLuslon: 
A R e j e c t i o n Rejected 
An e f f e c t i v e s u z e r a i n t y over Armenia was the core 
of Augustus' p o l i c y toward P a r t h l a , He would not I n -
vade P a r t h l a , but could do so, and most e a s i l y through 
Armenia, which became the bone of contention and quick-
l y acquired a p r e s t i g e value f a r beyond I t s s t r a t e g i c 
v/orth. Nov/, from the r e i g n o f Nero, Rome no longer 
had an e f f e c t i v e s u z e r a i n t y , and there follov/ed f i f t y 
years dur i n g v/hlch Rome and Parthla d i d not f i g h t . I t 
Is tempting, but wrong, to conclude from t h i s that Au-
gustus' p o l i c y was a f a i l u r e . ^ C e r t a i n changes I n 
co n d i t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s had made an a l t e r a t i o n of po-
l i c y advisable, and yet even f u r t h e r changes would be 
needed to make the new p o l i c y work. 
By the time of Nero's accession I n 54, nearly a 
century had passed since the Parthlans had attacked the 
Roman provinces I n the East. The Parthlans, who v/ere 
c o n t i n u a l l y d e b i l i t a t e d by c i v i l s t r i f e , were given nev/ 
leadership under Vologases. But even he was occupied 
w i t h the r e b e l l i o u s Hyrcanlans, while Nero, as Corbulo 
r e p o r t e d l y sald> governed peaceful provinces: the f i g h t 
^As do both Magle, RRIAM, pp. 485-6, 496, 553 and 
561; and J.G.C. Anderson, CAH, X, pp. 257, 273, and 
773-4. 
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2 w i t h the Parthlans was h i s only war. This couLd not 
have been said of Augustus, who had important wars to 
f i g h t i n the North and virho, f o r a number of reasons, 
v/as j u s t i f i a b l y cautious about, in c r e a s i n g too r a p i d l y 
the number of provinces i n the East.^ However, the 
century which followed "the l a s t invasion by Pacorus and 
Labienus i n 40 B.C. sav/ the East being slowly incorpo-
r a t e d i n t o the i m p e r i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as more provinces, 
were created: G a l a t i a (25 B.C.), to which was added 
Paphlagonia ( 6 B.C.); Cappadocia and Commagene (A.D. 1 7 ) ; 
L y c i a (43) and Judaea ( 4 4 ) ; and Pontus v^as l a t e r i n c o r -
porated i n t o G a l a t i a ( 6 4 ) • 
There v/as a simultaneous .and by no means unrelated 
e v o l u t i o n t a k i n g place on the other side of the Euphra-
t e s . V/hile Rome was cementing her hold on the East, 
the Parthians were shaking o f f the influences of the 
V/est. A 'neo-Iranian renaissance' began under Volo-
4 
gases I . T i r i d a t e s , sent to Rome to meet Nero, may 
have journeyed f o r over a year because of Zoroastrian 
taboos against d e f i l i n g v/ater."^ Magian funerary customs 
were spreading throughout P a r t h i a ; ^ and the scattered 
•^Tac. Ann. I S , 27, 2: 'contra i m p e r a t o r i suo im-
motam ubique pacem e t unum i d bellum esse.' 
•^Magie, RRIAM, p. 496. 
4 
. Ghirshman, p. 256; and Debevoise, p. 196. 
"^Pliny NH 3 0 , . l 6 f . ; Tac. Ann. 15, 24; and Debevoise, 
p. 196; but Ghirshman , p. 263, argues t h a t t h i s \/as a 
t r a d i t i o n a l taboo i n I r a n i a n r e l i g i o n s and d i d not i n -
d i c a t e any new development. 
^Ghirshman, p. 271: from excavations at Susa con-
cer n i n g the end of the f i r s t century.A.D. 
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t r a d i t i o n s of the Avesta, o r a l and manuscript, were c o l -
7 
l e c t e d by order of Vologases. On coins s t r u c k by Volo-
gases p r i e s t s are depicted s a c r i f i c i n g before a f i r e a l -
t a r ; and most I n t e r e s t i n g I s the appearance of Pahlavl 
l e t t e r i n g along w i t h the usual legends I n Greek charac-
t e r s , v/hlch have become hopelessly c o r r u p t . Vologases 
a l s o founded a c i t y , Vologasla or Vologesocerta, between 
Babylon and Seleucla, perhaps Intending to displace the 
. l a t t e r , which was Parthla's l a r g e s t commercial c e n t r e , 
9 
but also Greek and troublesome. C i t i e s on the v/estern-
most o u t s k i r t s of the Parthian empire, such as Dura-Eu-
ropus and Palmyra, were. I n the f i r s t century A.D., be-
coming predominantly o r i e n t a l I n t h e i r a r t and b u i l d i n g s , 
even where the foundations v/ere l a i d by Greeks. 
V/lth t h i s hardening of a t t i t u d e s of both East and 
V/est, I t I s d i f f i c u l t t o believe that f i f t y years of 
peace were bought w i t h Rome's surrender of Armenia. 
For the Parthlans those years were to a great extent 
spent f i g h t i n g o f f barbarian, t r i b e s from the Caucasus 
(perhaps I n c i t e d by Rome) and s u f f e r i n g another c i v i l 
war.^^ The Romans, meanv/hlle, wasted no time. Ves-
pasian, a veteran of the East, recognized that the s i t u -
a t i o n there v/as s t i l l u n s a t i s f a c t o r y I n regard to I t s 
7 
Debevolse, p. 196; but Ghlrshman, pp. 271-2 argues 
a l a t e r date f o r the c o l l e c t i o n . 
®Wroth, pp. 182ff., x l l x f f . ; and McDov/ell, p. 192. 
9 
McDov/ell, pp. 229-36; and Ghlrshman, pp. 256-7. 
^^ M. R o s t o v t z e f f , 'Dura,' pp. 294-6. 
11 
Debevolse: Rome Involved, pp. 201-2; c i v i l v/ar, 
pp. 213-18. 
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s e c u r i t y . K e raised the number of legions i n the 
13 ' 14 ' East, b u i l t s t r a t e g i c roads, appointed a consular 
instead of a k n i g h t to govern i n C a p p a d o c i a , a n d an-
nexed Commagene, pl a c i n g tv/o legions a t that very s t r a -
t e g i c p o s i t i o n , M elitene.^^ 
I t has been argued th a t these arrangements led i n -
e v i t a b l y toward, or v/ere preparations f o r , Trajan's 
P a r t h i a n War of 113-117, duri n g v/hich Armenia and Meso-
17 
potamia v/ere made i n t o Roman provinces. ,As a matter 
of p o l i c y , Vespasian's actions d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y lead 
to Trajan's. Vespasian was i n e f f e c t acknowledging the 
s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of the Neronian settlement, and, l i k e 
Augustus, Vespasian v/anted to be i n a p o s i t i o n v/here 
he could react w i t h f o r c e i f the Parthians broke the 
r u l e s . I n th a t sense—as a matter of f a c t , not p o l i c y — 
Vespasian's e f f o r t s d i d serve as preparation f o r Trajan's 
i n v a s i o n . 
^\.P. Longden, 'Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of 
Traj a n , ' _JRS 21. 1931. p. 24. 
"^^ P-W, 'Legio,' X I I , c o l . 1363-6. 
14 
A milestone found near Palmyra dates to A.D. 75 
(Ann, g p i g . . 1933, no. 205). 
^•^Suet. Vesp. 8, 4. 
. ^^Jos. BJ 7, 1. 
17 
F. Cumont i n A n a t o l i a n Studies presented to S i r 
W.M. Ramsay (Manchester, 1923), p. 114f,; ' i l n'est pas 
douteux que I'annexion de ces deux 'etats-tampons' Ves-
pasian's annexation of Commagene and Lesser Armenia 
a i t eu pour but de permettre l a r e a l i s a t i o n d'une oeuvre 
qui d e v a i t assurer l a suprematie de Rome sur l a Grande 
Armenie..., Cette conquete preparee pars les ingenieurs 
des Flaviens f u t obtenue.sans peine par les legions de 
Trajan.' See also Longden, p. 24 and F.A. Lepper, 
Trajan's Parthian War (London, 1948), p. 172f. 
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No great crime was needed to make the Neronlan 
settlement crumble. About 110, the Parthian k i n g , Os-
roes, deposed from the Armenian throne a c e r t a i n T l r l -
d ates, who had apparently been appointed by Osroes' 
predecessor and approved by Rome. Now the throne was 
given-, to a c e r t a i n Axldares, v/hlle the Romans stood by 
18 
unconsulted. . The emperor Trajan had before him a l l 
the o l d choices: a) l e t the Parthlans do as they please 
v / l t h Armenia; b) renew the Neronlan settlement of nomi-
n a l s u z e r a i n t y ; c) r e v e r t t o the Augustan system of e f -
f e c t i v e s u z e r a i n t y ; or d) annex Armenia. Trajan f e l t 
t h a t the empire's s t r e n g t h v/as such th a t Rome need not 
s e t t l e f o r anything less than annexation. I t v / o u l d r e -
q u i r e more than the mere t h r e a t of v/ar, but Trajan would 
not have had I t any other v/ay. 
Trajan conquered-as no one had since Alexander. 
Armenia and Mesopotamia v/ere Immediately made provinces. 
I n s i d e P a r t h l a , Trajan found the Arsaclds q u a r r e l i n g as 
u s u a l , so he crowned one and thus, a t l e a s t s u p e r f i c i a l l y , 
19 
made the Part h i a n Empire a client-kingdom of Rome. 
» 
The P a r t h i a n forces had not been destroyed, but I t I s 
questionable I f they could have soon dislodged a Roman 
fo r c e determined to ho l d on. There v/ere r e v o l t s through-
out the East, but they were c o n t r o l l e d . The cost v/as 
very h i g h , and Trajan drew back te m p o r a r i l y ; y e t , despite 
I l l n e s s , he planned a f u r t h e r campaign to secure Rome's 
^^Dlo 68, 17 and 19. 
^ ^ I b l d . . 30. 
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h o l d i n g s . B u t he succumbed to h i s i l l n e s s , and 
Pfadrian had to p u l l back t o the ante bellum p o s i t i o n . 
Yet we cannot know i f t h i s .was a r e f l e x i o n of f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y or p a r t of the necessary moves to secure h i s 
p o s i t i o n as the new emperor. 
The dream of conquering P a r t h i a once and f o r a l l 
might have been r e a l i z e d . More i m p o r t a n t l y , the s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s might have endured under the form o f a c l i -
e n t - k i n g s h i p . But i t would have been very d i f f i c u l t to 
mai n t a i n : i t v/as u n n a t u r a l . . The s t r a i n on the empire 
v/ould have been tremendous. I t was a good t h i n g t h a t 
Hadrian withdrev/i 
The Parthians v/ere replaced by the Persians i n the 
middle of the t h i r d century, and wars v/ould recur on • 
Rome's eastern f r o n t i e r as long as the empire l a s t e d . 
I n the l a r g e s t sense, - n e i t h e r side could hope t r u l y to 
defeat the other. Nor could they expect to l i v e i n ab-
s o l u t e peace: great empires make poor n e i g h b o u r s — i t i s 
no less true today. 
For t h a t reason, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d f a u l t w i t h 
Augustus' p o l i c y toward P a r t h i a — a p o l i c y v/hich held no 
plan of conquest (Trajan's s o l u t i o n ) and no expectation 
of peace (as required i n the Neronian Settlement). The 
tension v/as alv/ays present, and the r i s k of v/ar. Augus-
tus measured Parthia's weaknesses against Rome's, and 
managed to keep Rome i n a p o s i t i o n of dominance i n those 
20 
Longden, p. 28: discusses Trajan's e f f o r t s as 
successes, not f a i l u r e s . 
^ h b i d . . p. 29; and Lepper, pp.. 212-3. 
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areas v/hlch mattered t o Romie. The p r i c e he paid was 
constant e f f o r t : I t v/as a permanent problem which could 
not be v/lped av/ay, but only minimized. Augustus gave 
the Parthlans a great deal of u n s e t t l i n g trouble w i t h -
out ever committing Roman troops to b a t t l e : Instead he 
sent a, pretender,- to the Parthian throne who could 
foment c i v i l v/ar. There would be no settlement betv/een 
Rome and P a r t h l a , but only a c o n t i n u a l need f o r re-adjust-
ment, Hov/ever, through t h i s p o l i c y I n the East, Augus-
tus avoided the s o r t of great and p o i n t l e s s v/ars v/hlch 
would r u i n . a number of f u t u r e emperors j u s t as Crassus, 
and even Antonlus, had been ruined. 
Appendix A 
References to P a r t h i a i n Augustan Poetry 
The f o l l o w i n g i s a l i s t of references to Parthia 
or the Parthians found i n the poetry of V i r g i l , Horace, 
P r o p e r i t u s , Ovid, G r a t t i u s and M a n i l i u s . The references 
are d i v i d e d ainong a number of s u b j e c t s . The l i s t i s not 
exhaustive, and a number of extremely casual references 
are excluded. I t should also be mentioned that i n a l l 
the poets there are numerous vague references to eastern 
lands, among v/hich, c e r t a i n l y , P a r t h i a would o f t e n be 
i n c l u d e d . 
1. The Parthians seen as a t h r e a t : 
a) V i r g i l Eel., r, 62; 10, 59; Georg. 1, 509; 2, 
121-3, 126, 134-9; 3, 313f.; Aen. 8, 685-8; 12, 
857f. 
b) Horace Epod. 7, 9; Od. 1, 2, 21 and 52. 
2. The Parthians considered treacherous: 
a) Hor. E p i s t . 2, 1, 112. 
b) Ovid Ars ajn. 3, 248. / 
3. Parthi'a l i n k e d w i t h B r i t a i n : 
a) Hor. Epod. 7, 7; Od. 1, 2 1 , 15; 35, 30; 3, 5, 
4: 4, 14, 48. 
b; Ovid Amores 2, 16, 39. 
4. That P a r t h i a w i l l be, or ought t o be, conquered: 
a) V i r . Georg. 3, 2 6 f f . ; 3, 313f. 
b) Hor. S&t, 2, 1, 15; Od. 1, 2, 21; 12, 5 3 f f . ; 
2 1 , IS; 29, 1-5; 35, 40; 2, 13, 17f.; 3, 2, 3; 3, 
5, 4. 
c) Propertius 3, 4, 5; 3, 5, 46f.; 3, 12, 6-12; 
4. 3, 35-40 and 65-9; 4, 6, 79f. 
d) Ovid Ars ami 1, 177, 199, 20l.f., 223ff.; 2, 
175; F a s t i 3, 719f. 
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5. The Parthlans seen as being humbled, defeated 
or I n f e r i o r : , 
a) V l r . Aen. 8, 726. . 
b) Hor. Od. 1, 35, 9; 2, 9, 17f.; 3, 3, 44; 4, 
14, 42; 15, 23; Carm. Saec. 5 3 f f . ; E p l s t . 2, 1, 
256. 
c) Prop. 2, 10. 
d) Ovid Rem, am. 155ff.; 224. 
6. Parthian p o l i t i c s and c i v i l war: 
a) V l r . Georg. 4, 2 l 0 f . 
b) Hor. Od. 1, 26, 5; 2, 2, 17; 3, 8, 19; 3, 29, 
27f. 
7. Respected, e s p e c i a l l y f o r m i l i t a r y s k i l l : 
a) Hor. Od. 2, 13, 17f. 
b j Prop. 3, 9, 5 3 f f . ; 4, 3, 35-40. 
c) Ovid Ars am. 1, 199; 3, 786. 
d) G r a t t l u s 508. 
8. The Remoteness of P a r t h l a : 
a) M a n l l l u s 4, 674 and 803. 
Appendix B 
Sources f o r Reconstructing Agrlppa's Map 
The best works on the subject of Agrlppa's map 
are Geographl L a t l n l Mlnores, e d i t e d by A. Rlese ( f i r s t 
p ublished I n 1878, but r e p r i n t e d I n Hlldeshelm I n 1964); 
A. K l o t z , 'Die gepgraphlschen commentarll des Agrlppa 
und I h r e Uberreste,' K i l o 24, 1931, pp. 38-58 and 386-
466; and J.J. Tlerney, 'The Map o f Agrlppa,' Proceedings 
of the Royal I r i s h Academy 63, 1962-4, pp. 151-66. 
We have f i v e sources f o r the measurements from 
Agrlppa's map (and I t I s much disputed e x a c t l y hov/ these 
measurements v/ere o r i g i n a l l y I n d i c a t e d on the map I t s e l f ) . 
The fragments come from Strabo, Oroslus, P l i n y and the 
D l v l s l o o r b l s terrarum and the Demensuratlo provlnclarum.-
Strabo mentions the map only I n reference to I t a l y . 
There are occasional confirmations I n Oroslus' chapter 
on geography ( I , 2 ) . P l i n y I s our best ancient source. 
Of the l a t e r works, the D l v l s l o comes from a t h i r t e e n t h 
c entury manuscript, but had already been reproduced I n 
the f i r s t f i v e chapters of the De Mensura Orbls Terrae 
w r i t t e n by an I r i s h scholar, D l c u l l , I n A.D. 825. He 
worked from a map of the f i f t h century which probably 
used as I t s source some copy of the map of Agrlppa. 
The Demensuratlo I s e x i s t e n t I n a number of f i f t e e n t h 
and s i x t e e n t h century manuscripts, which a l l derive 
from a n i n t h century codex I n the l i b r a r y of Merton 
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College, Oxford. The i n t e r n a l evidence points to a com-
mon source of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r both the D i v i s i o and De-
mensuratio. But there are s t i l l d i f f e r e n c e s i n the a r -
rangement of each.. 
The discrepancies betv/een these f i v e sources are 
numerous, as are the divergences of opinion betv/een 
K l o t z and T i e r n e y . i n t h e i r separate r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s . 
The most basic source of confusion i s the use by our 
sources of the terms l a t i t u d e and lo n g i t u d o . which are 
not comparable to the modern t e c h n i c a l terms, but o f t e n 
meant simply breadth and l e n g t h . 
To demonstrate the r e l a t i v e proportions of Agrippa's 
map, and yet not to plunge i n t o controversy, f i g u r e s v / i l l 
be used which have been organized mostly by Tierney. As 
Ti,erney p o i n t s o u t , the f i g u r e s v/e are given allov/ us to 
create nothing more than a series o f rectangles v/hich 
provide only the vaguest idea o f the shape of the country, 
the p o s i t i o n i n g of i t s length-breadth axes i n r e l a t i o n to 
compass d i r e c t i o n s , and the r e l a t i v e c o n g r u i t y of the 
separate rectangles. 
F i r s t , the v/orld i s d i v i d e d i n t o three p a r t s , Eu-
rope, A f r i c a and A s i a . Among the areas l i s t e d f o r Eu-
rope, I t a l y i s 1,020 miles long and 410 miles wide on a 
l i n e through the n o r t h - ( P l i n y 3, 4 3 ) . Gaul has an east-
west measurement of 920 miles and i s 318 miles 'wide' 
( D i c u i l 1, 6 and P l i n y 4, 105). The rectangle f o r Ger-
many i s much smaller: 636 by 248 miles ( P l i n y 4, 96), 
as i s the rectangle f o r Illyricum-Pannonia: 540 by 325 
miles ( P l i n y 3, 150). B r i t a i n i s a rather large 800 by 
300 m i l e s , w h i l e I r e l a n d ( Hibernia) i s hardly smaller: 
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800 by 200 miles ( P l i n y 4, 102). 
North A f r i c a I s f o u r t e r r i t o r i e s I n a row 3,000 
miles long ( P l i n y 5, 40) whose southern boundary I s 
unknov/n. The Mediterranean, from Gades to Alexandria, 
I s reckoned as 2,600 miles ( P l l n y 6, 207). 
Asia Minor I s 1,155 by 325 miles ( P l l n y 5, 102), 
and Armenia I s 480 by 280 miles ( P l l n y 6, 47). 
Beyond these areas the measurements are more ex-
treme. I n Europe, Dacla I s 1,200 miles by 400 ( P l l n y 
4, 8 1 ) . Further east, Sarmatla I s 980 by 715 miles 
( P l l n y 4, 91), Media I s 1,320 by 840 ( P l l n y 6, 137), 
Arabia I s 2,170 by 1,296 ( P l l n y 6, 196), and I n d i a and 
the Far East are 3,300 by 1,300 ( P l l n y 6, 57). 'India 
alone, t h e r e f o r e , has a longitude as great as the v/hole 
Mediterranean, v/hlle I t s l a t i t u d e I s comparable to that 
of Europe and A f r i c a combined.' (Tlerney, p. 164). 
These measurements are the basis of Tlerney's r e -
marks about the 'enormous' and 'amorphous' appearance 
of lands beyond the reach of the Romans.^ 
The boundaries to the n o r t h , east and south are de-
f i n e d by the phrase qua cognlta e s t . But Dacla, 'Sarma-
t l a and Armenia a l l t r a i l o f f I n t o the northern ocean, 
w h i l e Armenia I s also bounded on the east by the Chinese 
ocean. Beneath A f r i c a Agrlppa mentions an 'Aethloplc 
sea.' So there I s no departure from the general n o t i o n 
of an a l l - e n c l r c l l n g ocean. 
^See pp.95-6. 
Appendix C 
The Kings of P a r t h i a 
B .C. 
Arsace's ( c . 250 -248) 
T i r i d a t e s I ( c . 248 -211) 
Artabanus I ( c . 211 -191) 
P r i a p a t i u s ( c . 191 -176) 
Phraates I ( c . 176 -171) 
Mtthradates I ( c . 1171 -137) 
Phraates I I ( c . 137 -128) 
Artabanus I I ( c . 128 -123) 
Mithradates I I ( c . 123 -87) 
Gotarzes I (91--80) 
Orodes I (80-•75) 
Sinatruces (75--69) 
Phraates I I I (69--57) 
Mithradates I I I (S7. •55) 
Orodes I I ( c . 57-36) 
(Pacorus, f o r r u l i n g j o i n t l y w i t h h i s 
f a t h e r , Orodes, counts as 'Pacorus I ' ; 
he died i n 38 B.C.) 
Phraates IV ( c . 38-2) 
T i r i d a t e s I I (31-30; 26-25) 
Phraataces (2-A.D. 4) 
A . D . 
Orodes I I I 
Vonones I 
(4-7) 
(7-12) 
(Vonones, one of the hostage-sons of 
Phraates IV, v/as sent by Augustus.) 
Artabanus I I I (12-38) 
(Phraates, son of Phraates IV, v/as 
sent by T i b e r i u s i n 35, but died 
before reaching P a r t h i a . ) 
( T i r i d a t e s I I I ( c . 3 6 ) , a grandson 
of Phraates IV, was sent by T i b e r i u s , 
and v/as crowned, but was soon ejected 
by Artabanus.) 
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(Cinnamus '(c. 37) i s b r i e f l y seated 
on Artabanus' throne by the Parthian 
nobles.) 
Gotarzes I I (38-51) 
(Meherdates, another grandson of 
Phraates IV, v/as sent by Cla:udius, 
but defeated by Gotarzes (SO).) 
Vardanes ( c . 39-48) 
Vonones I I ( c . S i ) 
Vologases I (51-80) 
Pacorus I I . (78-116) 
Artabanus IV (80-81) 
Osfoes ( c . 109-129) 
Vologases i l (105-147) 
Parthamasiris ( c . 117) 
Mithradates IV (128-147) 
Vologases I I I (148-192) 
Vologases IV (191-207) 
Vologases V (207-223) 
Artabanus V (213-227) 
Artavasdes (227-229) 
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